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How do we make sense of the tangled web of voluntary standards that have 
recently proliferated across the globe? There are ov r 430 different social and 
environmental voluntary standards in the world today. Prior to 1990 there were 
twelve. Most of these voluntary standards exist within industries that contain several 
other standards and ecolabels. Behind the scenes of this veritable industry of industry 
standards, we observe a vibrant and yet faintly understood political landscape. In 
some markets, as in the forest industry, industry actors revolt against NGO-initiated 
 
 
standards to form competing standards. In other markets, as in the diamonds industry, 
industry actors, advocacy groups and even states align to create the dominant 
voluntary standard system for the planet. While still in others, as in the coffee 
industry, there is such a diversity of standards originating from a variety of actors that 
few patterns have yet to be discovered.  This reseach explores the logic behind 
voluntary standards, and proposes a framework to explain and predict the pattern of 
emergence and competition of standards within an industry. Drawing from existing 
research in norms evolution, non-state market drive governance, voluntary clubs and 
corporate social responsibility, I develop two principle arguments.  The first, the logic 
of market integration, suggests that when social move ent norms are increasingly 
institutionalized within markets, the movement itself will gradually take on the forms, 
character and procedures of market actors. The second extends this logic in order to 
understand how, why and when multiple voluntary standards emerge, and seemingly 
compete, within the same industries.  Based on the in-depth case analysis of the 
coffee market, as well as an extended analysis of ten o her markets, I highlight how 
this phenomenon of multiple standards may be understood by examining change 
along two factors: Industry Political Centralization and Differentiation. The 
overarching thesis is that standards proliferate whre power is more decentralized, 
and opportunities for differentiation along market s gments are highest.   Further, that 
differentiation also follows a pattern: higher, more stringent standards, will occupy 
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In early 2011, I attended a workshop where the International Association of Infant 
Food Manufacturers (IFM) was developing a 3- to 5-year strategy for their 
organization.  I did this in my capacity working for AccountAbility, a pioneer in the 
scholarship and advocacy of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) scholarship, 
which was making a transition from non-profit think-tank and (CSR) advocacy 
organization to becoming a for-profit consulting firm.  Neither one of these 
organizations fit neatly into traditional typologies; both exhibited attributes of 
organizations normally at odds with one-another.  
The IFM, which includes the major multinational food and pharmaceutical 
companies Heinz, Nestlé, Mead-Johnson, Pfizer Nutrition, Abbott, Danone and 
Fonterra, was working to overturn the impression that t ey, through sales of infant 
formula, were working counter to the public interest by violating guidelines set by the 
WHO on the marketing of infant formula.  They understood that the market was 
fraught with defectors – organizations that did notabide by WHO standards for the 
marketing and sales of infant food formula – but they insisted their firms were not the 
culprits.  They also understood that even though their members acted within the 
guidelines set forth by the WHO, the reputation of the entire industry, including their 
own, was being tarnished by the actions of a few rogue firms. One proposed solution 
was the development of standards, more strict than ose of the WHO, which IFM 




mechanisms attesting their compliance to these standards, the IFM sought to enhance 
the reputation of their firms, the products they sell, and the industry.  
As a student of political science, I was fascinated by the opportunity to 
witness the genesis of a new voluntary standard1.  The workshop I attended seemed to 
take place at a regulatory and policy-making fault line where public policy, initiated 
by states, and private policy, initiated by market ac ors, converged; where private, 
semi-private or public groups develop competing and/or complementary regulations 
to curb undesired market practices.  
At the end of the two-day workshop I made these observations: first, these 
firms were not looking for a way to circumvent, compete with, or discredit WHO-
established guidelines, but to surpass them – an unexpected goal for these traditional 
market actors; second, this initiative did not begin with, nor was it in response to, 
activist pressures; third, the development of voluntary standards was motivated in no 
small part by protecting their reputation to achieve traditional business goals, but they 
did not believe that this alignment of business goals would threaten the legitimacy of 
their standards; and finally, both the organization I worked for, and the IFM were 
blurring the lines between NGO, non-profit and for-profit. They seemed to morph and 
transform, taking on the form of ‘the other’ as the environment shifted. My 
organization was an early norm entrepreneur advocating for, and promoting norms of, 
corporate social responsibility across firms and at the World Economic Forum (WEF 
2008).  Now it is a for-profit consulting organization helping traditional firms 
                                                
1 As of April 2014 the IFM had not yet established an independent set of voluntary standards for the 




implement CSR programs in their organizations.  TheIFM, an industry association 
consisting of some of the largest and most powerful m lti-national corporations, was 
working to outshine the WHO by promoting more rigorous norms for the marketing 
and sale of infant food formula. The role of firms and advocacy groups has been 
described as contentious and competitive with respect to the promotion and adoption 
of emerging social and environmental norms, but this is not how it seemed to be 
playing out.  
What I observed confused the boxes, categories, and typologies that I had 
come to understand, and raised questions about the processes and institutions 
involved in shifting marketplace norms.  It challeng d not only the traditional view of 
state-market relations, but of the dynamic between no -state actors within the sphere 
of non-state transnational governance. I did not understand the process by which, or 
the driving mechanisms that would explain why, norm entrepreneurs transformed into 
for-profit firms. I did not understand why firms resort to any form of self-restraint or 
governance outside the pressure exerted upon them by advocacy groups. More 
confusing still, was why the IFM chose the route of developing its own standards 
rather than use the WHO to enforce greater transparency within their industry. Now 
there would be multiple standards within the same industry – one backed by states, 
and the other by firms, and outcome that many would consider a failure of non-state 
international policy making. 




how can we understand the existence and persistence of multiple alternative standards 
within the same industry? Underlying these research-o iented questions is a more 
important normative question: is this a desirable outc me for proponents of 
progressive social and environmental policies, or is the marketplace acting to 
subsume social movements in order to turn a profit?  What the following research 
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1 SOCIAL MARKETS 
 
Indeed, in our modern world standards are arguably the most important 
manifestation of power relations.  
Lawrence Busch 2011, p 28 
 
 
There are over 430 different social and environmental voluntary standards2 in the 
world today (Ecolabel 2013).  Prior to 1990 there were twelve.  In 2009, 18% of these 
standards were run by organizations that described th mselves as for-profit, 8% were 
government run, and the majority was run by non-profits.  Most of these standards 
exist within industries that contain several other standards. Behind the scenes of this 
veritable industry of industry standards, we observe a vibrant and yet faintly 
understood political landscape.  In some markets, industry actors revolt against NGO-
initiated standards to form competing standards. In others, industry actors, advocacy 
groups and even states align to create the dominant voluntary standard system for the 
planet. While still in others, there is such a diversity of standards originating from a 
variety of actors that few patterns have yet to be discovered.   
                                                
2 This is a tally of social and environmental voluntary standards that use some form of labeling to 
communicate to consumers adherence to a set of voluntary standards. The label in these cases is called 




This research explores the logic behind voluntary standards, and proposes a 
framework to highlight and understand the pattern of standards within an industry. 
The rise of standards is split into two broad periods in time – before the mature 
development of a social market, and after.  The first period explores the emergence 
and transformation of a social movement into a formal organization that uses 
voluntary standards to promote new norms into the marketplace. The principle 
mechanism of change in this first period is, as other scholars have explored (Cashore 
2002; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Prakash and 
Potoski 2007; Segerlund 2010), the struggle to establi h legitimacy for the social 
movement, as well as for the formal organization that aims to promote the norm 
through voluntary standards.  In this study, I examine the rise of voluntary standards 
guided by the premise that as the norm is institutionalized into the marketplace, social 
movement organizations that aim to convert market actors will gradually tend 
towards integration into the marketplace. I present a foil to Taylor’s claim that these 
organizations are “in the market but not of it,” (2005) and propose that they are “in 
the market, and part of it.” 
The second period of time explores the integration of voluntary standards into 
the market, which may, and more likely does, involve the rise of other voluntary 
standards.  The logic of this period is explored through observation of change in two 
key variables: Industry Political Centralization and Differentiation. The overarching 




competition - political competition, as observed through the variety of political 
organizations within an industry, as well as market competition.  I observe a tendency 
towards greater multiplicity where industry power is decentralized and fragmented, 
and opportunities for differentiation along market segments are greatest.  I also 
observe that in highly concentrated industries thathave fewer market segments and 
consumer-facing brands, there is a lower likelihood of any voluntary standard 
existing, or that it would be captured by dominant industry players, therefore a greater 
need for state involvement.  In addition to the differences across industries, we 
observe a pattern of standards within industries.  Specifically, that standards will not 
aim to compete directly against each other – that is to say, within the same market 
segment – but will occupy different segments in an attempt to cover varying 
constituencies across the market.  Further, this segmentation also follows a pattern: 
higher, more stringent standards, will occupy higher end market segments, while 
lower less stringent standards occupy mainstream market segments. 
The governance of markets through voluntary standards is very much a 
function of the political and economic realities of that industry (Manning, Boons, von 
Hagen and Reinecke (2012).  In the world of voluntary standards the political bleeds 
into the economic, and the economic informs the politica  – the two can not be 
separated. Thus, the traditional dichotomous perspective between governance, 
normally the purview of states, and markets, is not an accurate description of this new 




(Coen 1997; Fligstein 1996).  They gain legitimacy through direct engagement with 
the public as they co-create policies based on a segmented market-based version of 
global governance. In this world, both firms and NGOs act to serve the political 
wishes and desires of a constituency defined by the confluence of production and 
social norms.  
This rise in market-based governance systems comes at a time when people 
around the world have shifting expectations related to government and business. 
Politics, it seems, is being played out within the marketplace.  In a survey of over 
10,000 men and women across 31 countries, Havas Worldwide (Havas 2013) reports 
that more people have faith in nonprofits or NGOs (from 55% to 69% depending on 
age) than in their national governments (30% to 40% depending on age) (Ibid. p 11). 
These sentiments are reflected in how citizens choose t  affect change in society; 
only 7% of respondents claim to have run for, or served in, public office, whereas 
17% boycotted a company or product for irresponsible behavior (Ibid, p.7). When 
asked what makes a “good citizen,” 35% said being a responsible consumer, versus 
29% who said voting in local and national elections (Ibid. p.8).  This definition of a 
good citizen not only reflects weariness about how well government can channel 
individual contributions into social change (over 50% believe it is easier for them to 
influence business versus governments), but of which institutions bear responsibility 




statement “Businesses bear as much responsibility as governments for driving social 
change,” (Ibid, p 16) over 60% agreed.    
This is the social and political context within whic  private standards are 
emerging.  A politically relevant environment defind by doing rather than voting, 
and on individual and business over political parties and government.  In this context, 
the study of private standards and market-based governance; the study of business in 
society and of consumer behavior, is not a secondary m tter for political science, but 
a central and highly relevant space for the study of international politics.  
1.1 Focus of This Study 
This study examines the emergence and competition of voluntary standards systems 
that appear in response to changing norms, and act to further the norm across a newly 
norm-infused market, or social market3. The story of social markets is of the battle 
between political organization and market organization. On one hand, certain actors 
and organizations – primarily those of the advocacy, tivist and NGO world – aim to 
develop standards across the entire industry to shape, shift, and transform an 
industry’s production and trade practices towards great ethical responsibility (Buthe 
and Mattli 2011; Conroy 2007; Vogel 2005, 2008).  On the other hand, market actors 
                                                
3 Social Markets is introduced by Archon Fung quoted h re “To the extent that consumption and 
investment decisions depend not only on preferences about the price, quality, or features of products or 
about the risk and return characteristics of securities but also on preferences concerning the labor and 
environmental consequences of production processes and corporate policies, social values become 
important components of economic markets. When markets become infused with such value, they can 
appropriately be called social markets.” From Fung, Archon Making Social Markets: Dispersed 
Governance and Corporate Accountability. In Market-Based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, 




fight to maintain independence and competitiveness while being responsive to 
changing norms and buyer expectations. It is a battle between politics and markets. 
Both are sources of power that dictate the economic and political conditions within 
which citizens must live (Fligstein 2011). In the world of voluntary standards, politics 
and markets collide and struggle for supremacy in the world of new governance. In 
social markets, the world of politics and markets are not separate, but present an 
interesting case for a renewed perspective on the relationship between these two 
spheres (Buthe and Mattli 2011).  
This research starts from the position that the explosion of voluntary standards 
across the globe is a reflection and consequence of the shifting nature of international 
politics in which the lines between public and private, state and market, consumer and 
citizen are blurring (Ostrom 2010).  Understanding this new political landscape will 
require the analysis of market forces as political forces, corporate power as political 
power, and voluntary standards as a form of internaio l regulation (Bartley 2007, 
2009; Cashore 2002a; Haufler 2003a, 2003b).  Where power is increasingly 
expressed, within an “increasingly institutionalized transnational arena of discourse, 
contestation, and action concerning the production of global public goods, involving 
private as well as public actors” Ruggie (2004, p504).   
I will not attempt to evaluate the value of the norms these organizations are 
promoting. Nor will I be weighing in on substance of the standards, or engaging in 




Instead, I argue that voluntary standards, and the ensuing development of social 
markets, are institutional forms that promote political bargaining and act, albeit 
imperfectly, to synthesize public preferences related o the public interest (Fung 
2002).  Therefore, prior to an exploration of their ffectiveness, or the normative 
value of the change they seek, or the impact they hope to have, we must begin to 
understand how they work.  I am therefore motivated by the following question:   
What process best explains the emergence of voluntary standards systems, and 
what factors lead to the rise of multiple competing standards within the same 
industry?  
There are two premises that guide how these questions will be explored.  First, 
that shifting norms left unaddressed, or insufficiently addressed, by states may, if 
sufficient support for these norms exist, motivate th rise of private institutions of 
regulation and global governance. This will require an analytical framework that 
places the emergence of voluntary standards systems within the greater context and 
study of norm evolution (Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2010; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; Segerlund 2010).  I will adopt the norm evolution lifecycle, and adapt 
it for the study of non-state actors within the scope of norms on the production of 
goods and services that flow across the globe.  
Second, that competition or the rise of multiple private standards systems 
within the same industry provides unique insight into the political character and 




their emergence is necessary to understand competition among standards, which is 
key to addressing an important popular sentiment: that competition and multiplicity 
leads to consumer confusion, and greenwashing4.  Scholars echo this sentiment when 
competition is examined as a battle between activists and industry, and the rise of 
industry-led standards are in response to the flawed attempts of activists to ensure 
sufficient legitimacy to enable all political bargaining to occur within their standards 
organization (Bernstein and Cashore 2007).  Instead, I rgue that competition and 
multiplicity is the “normal” state of affairs for standards organizations, therefore 
understanding the patterns of competition will provide insight into the future of 
private governance systems, and help inform policymakers as to the proper role of the 
state and state regulation.  
Patterns of competition across standards can be further understood by 
examining the calculus that potential new entrants into the social market may face, a 
calculus informed by two factors. First, the distribution of power as observed through 
the political centralization of a social market will determine the costs for new 
entrants – is it easier to develop a new standard, or align with existing standards. 
Second, opportunities to differentiate oneself within and across social market 
segments will determine the possible benefits for new standards. The result is a web 
of policies segmented by market niche, set by private organizations, rather than states, 
that contradicts an ideal of uniform international law across states.  
                                                
4 Greenwashing occurs when firms adopt standards or practices for the sole purposes of public 





1.2 Shifting Norms and Unsatisfied Preferences 
Voluntary standards emerge in response to shifting norms and unsatisfied public 
preferences. Trade liberalization, as promoted by the WTO, means that states cannot 
place “ any restrictions on the importation of products solely because of the way in 
which they were produced.” (Conroy 2001, p. 1) Clothes from Bangladesh cannot be 
banned from import no matter what the conditions of the factories where they are 
produced, or how many people die from these conditions.  Wood, paper or other 
timber products cannot be banned no matter how destructive the production methods 
were to the originating forests, or how contaminated rivers were left as a result. Even 
food products cannot be restricted based on the chemi als used in their production. 
Driven by a concern that countries would throw up barriers to freer trade, officials at 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations explicitly excluded “production and process 
methods” (PPMs) from the agreement that formed the WTO in 1993 (Ibid., p2). 
The dictates of international rules embodied by the WTO are clear, no laws 
restricting imports based on means of production can be made.  Yet, environmental 
and social movements intent on reining in unfettered globalization are continuing to 
grow (Ayres, Jeffrey M., Beth Schaefer Caniglia, Sean Chabot, Marco G. Giugni, 
Michael Hanagan, Tammy L. Lewis, Gregory M. Maney et al. 2002; Chatterjee 2012; 
Epstein 2001; Mertes 2009; Starr 2000) as activists seek ways to satisfy their policy 
and regulatory preferences.  Within this vacuum of regulation –fueled by the friction 




popularized in the Reagan-Thatcher years and the rise of deregulation, 
institutionalized by a variety of regional and bilateral trade agreements, and 
formalized at the international level by the WTO – emerge innovative non-state forms 
of governance aimed at aligning global production methods with shifting 
transnational norms (Conroy 2001, p.3) 
To understand the rise of voluntary standards as non-state forms of 
governance, this study begins by understanding how t ey rise in response to shifting 
norms. 
1.3 Norms, Rationality and Voluntary Standards  
The theoretical approach applied in this study is ba ed on developments in IR around 
norm evolution (Checkel 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Kahler 2000; Lutz and 
Sikkink 2000; Zurn and Checkel 2005) while intentioally drawing attention to the 
“strategic social construction” of preferences that influence behaviors, especially 
among market actors (Checkel 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Payne 2001; 
Saurugger 2010; Sikkink 2002). I accept the normative nature of shifting preferences 
and how they give rise to new organizational platforms, then turn my focus towards 
how these new organizations act to promote change ad influence behavior in a 
newly configured rational preference set. The principle points of departure and 




Legitimacy: I challenge the imperative declared by Buchanan and Keohane (2006) 
that the “legitimacy of global governance institutions matters” writ large, since, as I 
argue, it matters far less for these institutions of global governance. I challenge the
resulting focus on legitimacy as a primary explanatory factor surrounding the creation 
of organizational platforms of private governance (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). 
Specifically, this challenges a) the premise that te struggle for legitimacy defines 
how voluntary standards emerge and compete, and b) informed by scholarly work on 
institutional theory and the development of legitimacy through ‘‘mimetic 
isomorphism’’ (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge 2009; Deephouse 1996; DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, 2000; Tolbert and Zucker 1999; Zucker 1987) or mimicking of the 
most prominent entities in the field to gain legitimacy.  For voluntary standards, this 
specifically relates to the copying of organizational forms related to multilateralism 
using stakeholder-based open and consensus based gov rnance structures (Zurn 2002, 
2004; Zurn and Stephen 2010). Instead, I accept the premise by Bernstein (2005) and 
restated by Bernstein and Cashore (2008) that legitimacy is “the acceptance of shared 
rules by a community as appropriate and justified,” but differ in that voluntary 
standards organizations can and do go straight to the political consumer for this 
legitimacy. This results in a shift away from the scholarly notions of institutional 
design that ostensibly reflect, express, and enable legitimacy, namely the procedural 
elements that promote an open, consensus-based, and multistakeholder form of 
governance (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, Prakash and Potoski 2007, Zurn 2004).  




efforts on issues relating to procedural legitimacy, including accountability, openness, 
and transparency, potentially to the detriment of efforts to bring about more 
fundamental change.” I argue that more fundamental ch nge may be on the horizon 
within social markets. 
Market Integration: I develop a three-stage model that builds upon the strategic 
choice of firms and proposes the inevitable integration of voluntary standards with 
market principles and dynamics.  
Multiplicity:  I view competition of voluntary standards, or multiplicity, as the 
inevitable normal state of affairs for private governance and voluntary standards. 
However, multiplicity is not a failure of policy or execution, but a model for how 
international policy-making can emerge. Instead of a dualistic state-market 
dichotomy, multiplicity proposes a segmented and diverse mosaic of policies where 
higher-level standards align with higher market segm nts, and mainstream standards 
with mainstream market segments.  
These are important points of departure because they c allenge existing 
scholarship on legitimacy as an explanation for the ris  of competing systems and the 
need to establish legitimacy within voluntary clubs, or that these organizations of 
global governance will adopt and mimic the tenets of multilateralism (Zurn 2002, 
2004; Zurn and Stephen 2010). Anticipating critiques, I will address the question of 
how these forms will gain legitimacy at all by showing how the gradual and constant 




norm itself will have to battle for legitimacy, but once established, legitimacy shifts to 
the market dynamics. 
Finnemore and Sikkink propose a norm lifecycle of three stages (1998) to help 
explain, as well as provide a foundation for furthe research into, the emergence and 
institutionalization of norms in the international system. Their framework was 
intended to address the emergence of norms, not the non-state actors that emerge in 
response to these norms or the specific organization platforms that they operate from. 
Nor was their framework intended to address the specific market-based nature of the 
subject of this study. Thus, in an attempt to tie th  emergence of voluntary standards 
to the shifting normative context that leads to their creation, this study will adopt and 
adapt the norm lifecycle to reflect the emergence of voluntary standards and social 
markets.   
Like these previous authors, this study highlights the process of “strategic 
social construction” (Ibid., p15) where the different behavioral logics dominate 
different stages of the lifecycle.  It is premised on the important fact that norms and 
rationality can not be separated in the study of international relations. That the 
normative contexts within which actors operate determine their preference sets which, 
in turn, inform their rational decision-making. In some cases, as would be the case for 
the citizen-consumers that form the important demos to a market-based governance 
system, the powers of socialization alter the normative context and individual 




maximizing material gain. This is the case when citizen-consumers pay premiums for 
ecolabeled products (Arnot, Boxall and Cash 2006; Bird and Hughes 1997; Hiscox 
2011; McGoldrick and Freestone 2008; Pelsmacker, Liesbeth, Driesen and Rayp 
2005) that are otherwise equivalent to their non-certified substitute products.  In other 
cases, an altered normative context that approaches a threshold of acceptance among 
the demos, thereby shifting their preferences, can le d to a strategic context that alters 
the material benefits to political actors. This is the case when firms, as political actors 
responding to changing norms or consumer preferences, can extract economic or 
competitive advantages by satisfying those preferences.  While firms in these 
scenarios often tout their actions as socially respon ible and normatively motivated, 
they are also making very hard-nosed rational decisions to maximize material benefits 
or minimize material loss. Thus, understanding the organizational platforms that act 
to extend new norms in the marketplace provides important insight into the rise of 
corporate social responsibility.   
Voluntary standards and corporate social responsibility are intertwined, but 
not interchangeable. The voluntary standards that properly shift the material 
consequences of firm behavior promote acts of social responsibility. The firm, as 
“learning organization,” (Zadek 2006, 2007) acts in response to an external 
environment that holds it accountable for its actions. In an environment void of 
environmental and social norms, its “architecture of accountability” (Donahue and 




Friedman’s claim that a firm need only be concerned with shareholder wealth 
(Friedman 1970).  Yet, in a social market, voluntary standards act to alter a firm’s 
architecture of accountability by either raising the stakes for non-compliance to a 
norm, or creating some economic benefit for adherence to it. Voluntary standards thus 
create the space where norms and market concerns overlap, and provide an interesting 
case for the continued study of where norms and ration lity overlap in IR (Checkel 
1997; Kratochwil 1991; Muller 2004). 
The analytical framework guiding this study attempts to highlight this hand-
off between norms and rationality by starting with the norm lifecycle first proposed 
by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), examined by others (Sikkink 1993; Sikkink and 
Lutz 2000; Checkel 1991, 1997, 2001) and adapting it, with insights gained from 
Lisbeth Segerlund’s study of Corporate Social Respon ibility (2010), to the unique 
nature of non-state actors and marketplace norms by focusing on the emergence and 
competition of voluntary standards – the organizational platforms formed by early 
norm entrepreneurs to promote and expand a new normin the international system. 
The focus on these organization forms, their relationship to forms of multilateralism 
as conduits to enhanced legitimacy, their relationship with stakeholders, and their 
means by which they choose to deliver private regulation in the public sphere, 
contributes to the scholarly discussion of organization l theory in international 
relations (Bernett and Finnemore 2004). It does so by expanding the notion of 




bureaucratic forms, while still creating “the underlying mechanisms and logics that 
[…] allow social order to be created and sustained.” (Hurrell 2007, p14)  My 
framework adopts a similar three-stage model, and derives its logical foundation and 
generates research hypotheses from the following two arguments: 
1.4 The Argument 
1.4.1 The Logic of Market Integration 
While a battle for legitimacy was once relevant for standards organizations to assert 
their authority in the marketplace (Bernstein and Cashore 2007), behaviors based on 
this battle become less relevant as the social market matures. After socialization 
pushes a norm towards greater legitimacy and acceptance, the preferences of citizen-
consumers are reconfigured, and the basis for future rational choices by market actors 
reflect that reconfigured socio-political context. The organizational platforms that 
emerged to expand the norm in the socialization stage respond to this reconstituted 
reality by shifting their strategies, policies and procedures in order to take advantage 
of this change. They now focus on reconfiguring the costs-benefits calculus for firms 
to adhere to new norms. An increased and sustained adoption of a norm will occur 
when socialization and the logic of appropriateness is replaced by a logic of 
consequence (March and Olsen 1996).  
In this situation change will increasingly be explained by an organization’s 




persuasion and socialization give way to mechanisms of competitiveness, strategic 
choice, and market differentiation.  This will change the character and nature of the 
social market. Where once activists and advocacy groups dominated a social market, 
it will increasingly be the domain of business and business-oriented organizational 
platforms.  The principles and procedures of legitimacy recede and give way to 
principles of market competition.  The battle for legitimacy will be fought early on in 
the development of a social market, but once establi hed, becomes a less important 
factor for change and future development.   
This argument motivates the discussion of legitimacy nd reputation as a 
principle explanation for the formation of standards organizations and clubs.  This 
explanation, while critical in explaining the early rise of some organizations, no 
longer applies to more developed social markets that we are now able to observe, and 
it does not help explain the rise of competing systems.  
1.4.2 The Logic of Multiplicity 
In the world of market governance, failed political bargaining between groups need 
not carry tremendous costs.  The processes and procedures emulating the 
multilateralism of traditional international organizations – deliberations within 
general assemblies, open consensus-based governance, stakeholder involvement, etc. 
– are designed to lower the costs of political bargaining (Abbott and Snidal 2009). 
However, when external factors within the social market align, the barrier to entry 




are less costly than participating in extended political bargaining within the dominant 
standard system. In such a situation an insurgent sta dards group is more likely to 
develop a new policy or standard rather than trying to integrate into an existing 
system. This cost-benefit calculus defines the bargaining between market-based 
political actors. Understanding the conditions that inform this cost-benefit calculus is 
key to understanding the logic of multiplicity. These factors are proposed and 
explained later in this section.  
 While competition among standards is pervasive, it is not complete. Some 
social markets have one dominant standard, others see direct competition between 
two or three standards, and other markets see to acc mmodate several standards 
organizations in a seemingly non-competitive environment. This logic is not greatly 
influenced by the procedural elements that exist in the first standards organization.  
This is observed from the recent split between the dominant Fairtrade Labelling 
Organization and Fairtrade USA, even in an open multi-stakeholder pseudo-
democratic organization, reaching consensus among like-minded parties can prove 
insurmountable, even after many attempts at reconciliation. This suggests that the 
bargaining game need not be limited to NGO-firm conflicts alone – a widespread gap 
of existing scholarship – but also between NGOs. Paradoxically, it may be far more 
difficult to alter the policies of an entrenched multistakeholder organization with 




Bargaining costs can be so high that it may not even be attempted (Abbott and Snidal 
2009).  
Explaining how, when and why multiplicity emerges will draw on the logic of 
market integration and understand the conditions that will lead to variability in 
competition.  The ideals of multilateralism (Zurn 200 , 2004; Zurn and Stephen 
2010), including stakeholder participation and consensus-based governance that 
mimic international political governance and aim to increase the legitimacy of 
standards organizations do not explain the emergence of ompeting systems.  Instead, 
standards are understood as being responsive to thepolitical landscape of the industry 
as well as market demands, including the competitiv mperative of their client firms.  
 Standards also must emerge in a political environment where NGOs, industry 
associations, powerful lead firms and other standards organizations exert influence 
and control in a social market.  Increased dominance by fewer key political 
organizations5 increases the cost of a new potential standard to venture out on their 
own. In a highly centralized political environment, incentives are skewed towards 
falling in line with the powerful players.  On the other hand, if there is a diversity of 
power-players that compete against each other – that is to say, a decentralized 
political environment – new standards have choices, and can opt to emerge along side 
a variety of power players, seeking alliances from a variety of choices.  Thus, a 
decentralized political environment lowers the cost f r new entrants.  
                                                





To explore the potential costs of competition, I focus on an industry’s political 
centralization. This political context – whether there is a high or low degree of 
political centralization, I posit will be helpful in assessing if, when and how standards 
entrepreneurs choose to align with existing standards or start their own.  When 
centralization is high, competition is high, therefor  the costs of starting a new 
standard organization will be high.  Alternatively, when centralization is low, there 
are a variety of alliances to be made in order to compete, barriers to entry are lower, 
and therefore more likely that alternative systems erge.  
However, just because the costs to entry are lower, it does not mean that the 
benefits exist for the creation of a new standard.  The costs of new standards that 
simply want to compete with existing standards can be very high. Instead, when there 
are ample opportunities for differentiation in a more stratified and segmented market, 
the benefits for developing a new standard can be more attractive to new entrants.  
Thus, the second key factor that informs the logic of multiplicity is opportunities for 
differentiation.  When there are more opportunities for new standards organizations to 
differentiate, there are greater potential benefits for starting new standards, therefore a 
higher likelihood that multiple systems emerge within t e same social market.  
These two logics will be further explored in the following chapter, and will 
form the basis for the development of a framework for standards and a theory of 




1.5 Categorization of Voluntary Standards  
This study is interested in the emergence of, and interactions between, environmental 
and social voluntary standards.  These voluntary standards have been described as 
one type of organization within the larger institutional context of regulating 
transnational business activities as expressed in Abbott and Snidal’s formulation of 
Transnational New Governance (TNG) (2009). Abbott and Snidal propose a map 
depicting the wide range of forms the institutions of new governance could take. In 
their conception, (TNG) relies on the actions and iteractions of three primary 
regulatory actors: the state, NGOs, and firms. Created through the initiatives of some 
combination of these primary three actors, the web of governance organizations can, 
when successful, take on a life of their own in the pursuit of transnational “regulatory 
standard-setting” (RSS).  The authors introduce a map of various RSS schemes 
placing them within a “Governance Triangle” based on the degree to which each of 
the three central actor groups participate in their formation. The three points of the 
triangle show institutions formed by the exclusive initiative of NGOs (e.g., Rainforest 
Alliance), States (e.g., WHO Codes, German Blue Angel ecolabel), or firms (e.g., 
Sustainable Forest Initiative). Inside the triangle are three spaces that reflect 
institutional forms created through a mix of NGOs and firms (Fairtrade Labeling 
Organization), NGOs and States, States and firms (ISO 14001, UN Global Compact), 
and a center area listing institutions formed through the equal collaboration of all 




 Building on Abbott and Snidal’s categorization of private power, Green 
(2013) proposes a new typology to that she argues is required to move towards a 
comprehensive theory of private authority in the global public sphere. Highlighting 
the importance of private actors to public actors, she distinguishes between two types 
of authority based on their relationship to public power: delegated and 
entrepreneurial.  Authority, she argues, is “relational and requires the consent of those 
who are subject to it.” (Ibid. p6) In which case, private authority is understood as 
“situations in which non-state actors make rules or et standards that other actors in 
world politics adopt.” (Ibid. p6) 
 Delegated authority is conferred to non-state actors by the state. Explained as 
a simple principal-agent relationship, states are the principals that circumscribe a set 
of tasks to non-state actors as their agents. When private authority does not originate 
from the state, it is considered entrepreneurial.  In this second type of authority, 
private actors must seek legitimacy and persuade oth rs to adopt their rules and 
standards.  
This distinction is an important contribution, specifically for highlighting the 
role of non-delegated private authority. The idea th t authority exists and pervades 
the international arena even outside any delegation from the state is an important shift 
in international relations theory. She argues that private authority does not occur in a 
vacuum, so the role of the state in produce, trigge or promote private authority is 




of entrepreneurial private authority – in this way, state authority is always 
fundamental to the rise of private authority, in its presence or absence.  
This study will consider both types of authority, although without any attempt 
at categorizing them in this way. What is more pertin nt to the scope of this paper is 
not whether authority is delegated or entrepreneurial, but how the private forms of 
governance interact with each other in their pursuit of private authority through 
voluntary standards. This interaction between forms of transnational business 
regulation is increasingly gaining attention in the fi ld of international relations 
(Cashore and Stone 2014; Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger and Wood 2014; 
Gulbrandsen 2014; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014).  While interactions can happen 
across private and public forms of regulation, I focus on understanding how 
interactions between voluntary standards lead to various outcomes for social markets 
themselves. Building on studies that show divergence and convergence between 
standards organizations (Manning, Boons, von Hagen and Reinecke (2011), I will 
explore the mechanisms that would lead to, not onlydivergence or convergence along 
standards, but of consolidation or diversification f organizations within social 
markets, 
In order to focus on these interactions between organizations of private 
regulation, I re-aggregate where others have disaggregated. What scholars have called 
“the most intriguing” (Bernstein and Cashore 2004a) of the new institutional forms, 




non-state governance to arise in the last 50 years,” (Bernstein and Cashore 2004a) 
encompass those forms created with nearly no involvement from states whatsoever.  
In addition to the distinction of being created through the collaboration of non-state 
actors, they are designed to leverage the incentives, structures, and mechanisms of the 
marketplace.  This categorization of non-state market based governance systems, 
requiring no state involvement, has formed the basis for an extensive research 
program (Bernstein and Cashore 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Cashore 2002; Cashore et al. 
2007; Auld, Balboa and Bernstein 2009; Fridell 2007; Leys 2003).  
Yet, as transnational private governance matures and its scope, influence, and 
complexity increases, further understanding of their true nature demands a review of 
existing definitions and frameworks. While segregating and isolating governance 
types is necessary, it is also appropriate to re-aggregate if the similarities across 
organizations are important enough to understand how t ey may, together, impact the 
development of organizations. Bernstein and Cashore’s typology of non-state market 
based governance systems leverage market incentives to induce change among actors 
(Bernstein and Cashore 2007), but the same dynamic can occur when states act to 
induce similar change, as is the case of the state-ponsored German Blue Angel label, 
or even the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) involvement in organic 
certification.   In between pure hard-law on one hand or voluntary standards on the 
other, there lie varying degrees of market-based governance systems that may be 




sitting along this axis but not be altogether that clear for there to be a strong argument 
to typologize a purely non-state system versus a some-state, or all-state system. The 
definition of non-state market drive governance (NSMD) drives a wedge between a 
system like the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Kimberley Process because 
the latter involved coordination at the state level, even while the FSC can also 
coordinate directly with states to encourage adoption of their standard as domestic 
policy (Gulbrandsen 2010).   
Making NSMDs distinct from state programs is important for its ability 
highlight the rising importance of private spheres of power.  Yet, it also constrains 
analysis to a reduced subset of systems. Comparisons between purely private 
standards and those with some state involvement can be helpful in understanding the 
relationship between the two and their joint impact on a market. There are important 
similarities across TNG organizations that span the State-NGO-Firm spectrum that 
are important enough to study, namely: when and how states get involved; will purely 
non-state systems arise to compete against state-supported systems; do systems differ 
in their impact on the social market; which systems are more effective?   
Bringing these various organizations together strengthens our ability to 
highlight how State involvement can lead to differenc s in outcomes when other 
variables are held constant. In Bernstein and Cashore’s (2007) framing, an NSMD 
would not include the German Blue Angel ecolabel because it is created at the 




developed with any state involvement, including: Nordic Swan, Green Seal (USA), 
Ecologo (Canada), or any of the 25 nationally sponsored eco-labels.  Organics 
standards are often created and certified through state agencies, but this does not tell 
the entire story of ethically grown foods.  In the US, for example, USDA standards 
and the entry of large multinationals into the now multi-billion dollar organics food 
market has left an opening for other, non-state bound, ethical food standards to 
emerge (Courville 2006; Harrison 2008; Howard and Allen 2006, 2010; Sawyer, Ker 
and Hobbs 2008). These are evidence of multiplicity within the ethical food market, 
and can not be studied in isolation of the state-based standards. These state-based 
standards function like non-state based labeling initiatives. While standards are 
agreed upon within a state agency, participation is voluntary and rewards are sought 
out in the marketplace.  Distinction between state and non-state voluntary standards 
leads to analytical limitation that persists in Abbot and Snidal’s model as well (2006). 
State-based initiatives, such as the ones listed above, are categorized differently from 
the non-state initiatives that seek to achieve similar ends, such as the FSC, FLA, or 
SFI.  The categorization problem is highlighted even more when the FSC and SFI are 
seen as categorically distinct when they are actually two competing systems within 
the same norm-market nexus.6 Creating separate conceptual categories for groups that 
use similar methods to achieve change within the marketplace limits our ability to 
compare across systems and answer one of the most fundamental questions for TNG: 
how does State, Firm, or NGO involvement change outcomes?    
                                                
6 In other words, they establish competing standards to address the same emerging norm, sustainably 




While some cases may fit well in one type versus another, there is evolving a 
global sphere of governance with significant overlap nd coordination and 
interactions between states and private actors (Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger 
and Wood 2014, Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). This evolving governance sphere 
demands of scholars the ability to compare across schemes – whether purely private 
or not.  In order to understand the levers of power for market-based governance 
systems outside the influence of hard law, this research will aim to study governance 
systems that are primarily private in nature, but will also seek to compare them 
against systems that involve some state coordinatio.  Thus, the appropriate starting 
point is the social market. By social market I mean the marketplace context where a 
particular norm-set of ethical production meets at product or industry. For example, 
the coffee social market is where the norms of improved environmental and social 
conditions surrounding the production of coffee as expressed in the coffee sold to 
consumers.  The forest social market is less product-specific, but encompasses 
improved environmental practices surrounding the harvesting of lumber for a variety 
of wood, paper and pulp products which range from paper used by consumers or to 
create books, to wood furniture.  
There are several ways to “slice and dice” voluntary standards, and distinguish 
them across a variety of factors.  This study start from the position of understanding 
their similarities first, then highlighting the factors that can inform differences in their 




broadly, similar intentions: to set rules, principles or guidelines with the intentio  of 
addressing social or environmental externalities of market actors and not covered by 
state laws and do it without being coerced. It should be noted that this study is 
focusing solely on standards that target a change i the behavior of market actors. 
Specifically, it involves a change in the production methods of certain products or 
services.  One key strategy that these standards systems use – a strategy designed to 
impose market-based incentives on members, and distinguish members from non-
members – involves the use of product labeling, or ec labels.  
I am not interested in creating separate categorizations for these voluntary 
standards based on whether they were purely private versus some mix of private and 
public, or whether they were created by firms as a direct challenge to an NGO-based 
organization, as is the case with the Sustainable For st Initiative. Nor I am interested 
in separating out voluntary standards organizations by their economic aims – whether 
they are nonprofit or for profit organizations does not matter for the study of how 
they interact with the social market.  As already noted, there are over 430 different 
social and environmental voluntary standards that use ecolabels in the world today 
(Ecolabel 2013). In 2009, 18% of these standards were run by organizations that 
described themselves as for-profit, 8% were governmnt run, and the majority was 
run by non-profits.  Most of these standards exist within industries that contain 




1.6 Methods and Data Collection 
The primary goal of this study is concept formation, elaboration and refinement 
through descriptive inference rather than theory testing (Ragin 2004). That said, I do 
delve deeply into potential explanatory factors, including tallying of indexes based on 
a survey of key variables across voluntary standards o ganizations and social markets. 
I aim to extend of how and why voluntary standards emergence and compete.  Given 
the inchoate nature of these systems, there lacks a comprehensive analytical 
framework that is sufficiently broad and inclusive to be able to propose incisive 
hypothesis around the phenomenon; especially related to what I argue is an essential 
facet of these systems: the existence of multiplicity within social markets. This study 
will extend current scholarship by refining the conepts related to the emergence and 
competition of systems, propose logics of interaction between and among systems, 
and explore frameworks for the benefit of future hypothesis testing. I will make use 
of case-based research strategy (Yin 2011) in order to meet two following goals: 1) 
substantiate and corroborate a three-stage framework exploring the emergence of 
voluntary standards and the overarching thesis of market integration; 2) examine the 
logic of multiplicity – why some social markets have more multiplicity than other 
markets, and why some markets have none at all.  
Descriptive and explanatory case-based analysis has been selected as the best 
strategy to achieve the two aforementioned goals. Yin (1984, p. 23) defines a case 




and within its real-life context” which is particular y suitable when “the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” He further notes that the 
case-study inquiry is useful for dealing with the unfortunate situation of having more 
variables of interest than data; consequently, it incorporates evidence from multiple 
sources and relies on theory to guide data collection and analysis. According to Yin 
(1984), a case study thus is an all-encompassing method covering the logic of design, 
data collection, and data analysis.  Yin’s observations form the basis for the reasoning 
in this study to use case-based analysis, which is summarized in the following three 
points. 
First, due to the underexplored nature of voluntary standards systems, 
specifically the interaction between and among system , there lacks a common 
analytical framework that can be applied to the concept of multiplicity. Second, while 
existing literature is robust and accurate in placing these systems within the broader 
context of private forms of global governance, there is insufficient research focused 
specifically on the interaction effects between systems. Third, while there may be 
sufficient cases from which researcher can gather and examine data for large-n 
statistical analysis, the appropriate questions and hypotheses related to the interaction 
of systems within social markets remains underexplored.  A case-based strategy is 
used here in order to hone in on the general concepts of multiplicity and potential 
analytical frameworks, furthering the goal of identifying the relevant data to be 




This does not mean that the case-based analysis is only qualitative in nature. 
Instead, I will gather and present data that is quantitative in nature, including the 
development of various indexes to measure change within and across systems. While 
the data is quantitative, there are insufficient observations in this study in order to 
employ a methodologically quantitative analysis of my data. Instead, the indexes 
created and examined in this study are used to elucidate observations related to the 
logics of market integration and multiplicity that form the overarching argument for 
this study. Below I elaborate on the methods and data collection related to these 
logics...     
1.6.1 Market Integration 
I am proposing logic behind how social markets evolve, and seek to understand this 
pattern. The analysis is descriptive in nature, although I do seek to organize the 
observations into a dataset from which I derive twokey indexes representing degrees 
of change related to market integration within and across voluntary standards 
organizations. Observations will focus on the way in which a social movement 
transitions from its earliest stages of emergence, formalizes into a voluntary standard 
organization, and eventually makes its way into the marketplace where it will attempt 
to change the status quo of business practices to align with the movement’s normative 
cause.   I expect to see evidence that the social market will evolve from being subject 
to influences and powers of advocacy and activism, to being itself a reflection of the 




to enhance and improve its legitimacy in its earliest stages, but gradually adopt the 
practices, processed, incentives, language and strategies of market actors.  In this 
observation, change will occur over time, and more sp cifically defined by the three 
stages of growth I propose as a framework for observing social market development.  
I organize my observations into a Market Integration Dataset. The market 
integration dataset is intended to explore logic of market integration – that social 
markets tend away from legitimacy and toward market int gration. The two principle 
observations within the dataset are 1) an index for the value of legitimacy (accounting 
for attributes of procedural and constituent legitimacy), and 2) an index for the degree 
of integration towards the market, including the adoption of market norms, incentives 
and actors.  
The market integration dataset provides a snapshot of the voluntary standards 
within the coffee social market in August and Septemb r of 2012.  I use a variety of 
sources to create the dataset including several interv ews with representatives of the 
standards organizations, as well as practitioners in the social market from roasters, 
intermediaries and retailers of certified coffee. I also leverage information gleaned 
from informal contacts and conversations in 2011 with experts in the field of 
certification, including consultants and members of the ISEAL Alliance (The 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling).  I also gather 
information from publicly available data on the stand rds and the organizations 




several years, these organizations have become quiteff cient at making data and 
documents available, as well as making themselves aailable for interviews, with one 
exception.  The FLO has set a policy not to respond to individual requests for 
interviews, but instead has focused on making much of their information available 
online.  While this dataset aims at quantifying and testing data about changes within 
the social market, it remains limited by the number of cases to be analysis, 
specifically the number of standards organizations within the social market: eight.  
Thus, the data can only be described for general patterns, but tests for statistical 
significance would have to be performed in future research.   In Chapter 5, I narrow 
down the observation of Market Integration into two indexes, which consolidate 
details about the organizations. These two indexes ar  elaborated on below.  
1.6.1.1 Procedural Legitimacy Index 
The adoption of elements meant to increase an organization’s legitimacy, as measured 
by elements of procedural and constituent legitimacy is expected to decrease across 
social markets where the earlier standards will adopt higher levels of procedural 
legitimacy and later standards will have lower leves of legitimacy.  
I focus on procedural legitimacy to limit the index to a composite of values 
that are more quantifiable and objective in nature than other aspects of legitimacy, 
such as perceived legitimacy or pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  As I have 
argued in the previous chapter, these procedural elements of legitimacy, derived and 




(Bäckstrand 2006; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Buchanan 2003; Held & Koenig-
Archibugi 2005; Payne and Samhut 2004, Vallejo & Hauselman 2004) are a good 
proxy for the battle for legitimacy as a whole based on existing scholarly arguments 
which suggest the imperative a key institutional and organizational elements that 
characterize a battle for legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Vallejo and 
Hauselman 2004). This point is worth emphasizing as it informs the data selection 
used in this chapter to create a proxy for the otherwis  nebulous and intangible virtue 
of legitimacy for purposes of measuring, or at the very least, determining the 
existence of legitimacy among standards organizations.   According to Buchanan 
(2003), civil society groups have focused on “their collective efforts on issues relating 
to procedural legitimacy, including accountability, openness, and transparency” 
(p673). Bernstein and Cashore 2007 raises the same issu  but provide some detail on 
what these procedural elements may be, which correspond well with observable and 
measurable organizational elements.  First, the greate  the range of members in an 
organization, while more difficult to gain support, once achieved, it will enjoy greater 
legitimacy than systems with narrower ranges of members.  Second, procedure 
structures that ensure stakeholder access and deliberation, and accountability to those 
affected by decisions, enhance legitimacy.  Finally, legitimacy can be observed when 
the norms an organization supports are widely accepted (this can be measured as a 
function of the range of stakeholders included in the organization). I elaborate on 
these two categories of legitimacy below. The goal of the analysis in the following 




on these two categories of attributes. I will show that it did, which indicated the 
rejection of the hypothesis that subsequent standards o ganizations emerge when 
there is a lack of legitimacy in the original and dominant standard.  Second, I assess 
how much subsequent systems adopted these elements of legitimacy. I will show that 
these elements of legitimacy are gradually rejected by standards systems. 
Vallejo and Hauselman (2004, p3) note that legitimacy “depends on the level 
of acceptance by the different direct stakeholders and external audiences. Issues of 
representation, inclusiveness and transparency will be critical to building the 
necessary trust for legitimacy. Additionally, legitimacy depends on the ability of the 
process to engage the stakeholders in a meaningful dialogue in which they feel 
ownership and the possibility to derive benefits. This requires full transparency, 
openness and respect.” This belief leads to their conclusion that a central tenet for the 
legitimacy of a governance system is “a process of negotiation and power balance”  
(p2) Distilling the observable elements required for this legitimacy, I list the 
following: a multi-stakeholder membership organization; direct participation of 
stakeholders in policy making; institutional checks on power; a process to report 
grievances; third party verification of compliance  
In addition to developing the necessary processes, Ca hore and Bernstein 
(2007) argue that a broad list of stakeholders, evidence of a widely accepted norm, is 
also necessary for legitimacy.  I add to this by arguing that not all stakeholders are 




legitimacy as a broad mix of advocacy groups, industry associations, the UN or other 
international non-governmental organizations, umbrella organizations (such as 
ISEAL) or even States. Thus, the quality – so to speak – of the stakeholders in 
addition to quantity should also be considered.  These include: environmental and 
social groups; the UN; States; umbrella organizations (such as ISEAL, The 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance); 
industry support. 
1.6.1.2 Market Integration Index 
The index value for the increased integration of market dynamics, norms, principles, 
and people into the organization is an innovation in the perspective of voluntary 
standards. The observation of these data is based on the premise, fundamental to this 
study and this research program, that the market its lf is a valid political arena within 
which governance emerges, where political bargaining incurs, and where legitimacy 
is sought.  
The market integration index is created by consolidating and coding for 
information on the organization (is it for profit, or non-profit), the details of the 
constituency base (are the organization’s members and constituents all firms, all 
activists, or a mix?). Moreover, since the organization’s leadership is both a reflection 
of the organization’s culture and goals, as well as a factor that influences these facets 
of the organization, I observe how an organization’s leadership may change as the 




through a combination of publicly available information and interviews.  Additional 
details on the coding of this index are provided in Chapter 5. 
1.6.1.3 Factors Influencing Market Integration 
One key premise of the market integration argument is that aspects of the 
organizations change as a social market develops. There is one key point in time that 
was already surpassed in the social market – that the social movement has been 
formalized into a voluntary standards organization.  This represents the second stage 
of social market development. After this stage, the social market enters into a stage of 
market institutionalization, which is to say that it begins to shed the elements of 
advocacy and activism while taking on the characteristics of market actors, albeit 
with the new norm-set internalized into their operations and strategies.  Yet there are 
degrees of social market development even in this final stage. As the social market 
continues to develop, the legitimacy of the market is further affirmed, and the need 
for organization-level political legitimacy wanes.   
The change happens temporally – the longer a social market, built upon the 
tenets of a newly established norm-set, operates, interacts, and delivers on its 
promise, the more legitimacy the market becomes, and the more the organizations 
will have to contend with the dynamics and constrain s of the market.  In a social 
market where comparisons can not be made across several organizations, the 
important independent variable would be time. The cange also happens in an ordinal 




legitimacy and integration with the market, and removes the conditions that would 
force new organizations to comply with the requirements of legitimacy set by the 
original social movement.  New organizations will be less likely to take on the 
procedural elements that original systems once fought to establish as key elements of 
their legitimacy, and opt for greater reliance on brand differentiation and 
segmentation (targeting new and specific constituent base in the market).   Given the 
degree of multiplicity present in the social market, there are sufficient observations to 
compare across organizations – that is to say the ordinal value or position of standards 
organizations represent change along the independent variable.  
Given the three-stage analytical framework that guides this research, some 
historical perspective is required in order to evaluate the motivations behind 
organizational change at different stages of its development.  While the need to show 
credibility and legitimacy will dominate an organization’s early formation, it will be 
the characteristics of the social market, the political centralization and the 
opportunities for differentiation that will be explored as later-stage explanatory 
factors of change.  Since, it is the organization’s decision process related to these 
environmental conditions that I am seeking to observe and identify, the method of 
within-case observation will be used to study the case of the coffee social market 
from its earliest stages of development through the s age of market institutionalization 




The purpose of the in-depth case analysis is two-fold: first, to test the 
assumptions around the three-stage analytical framework and the mechanisms, 
motivations and variables that promote change from one stage to another; second, it 
will allow the identification of a set of data points for the independent variables to be 
compared across standards organizations, allowing for the testing of hypotheses 
following the logic of market integration and the logic of multiplicity discussed 
above. Thus the “case” in this analysis will shift from the coffee social market to the 
voluntary standards organizations that constitute the multiplicity of standards within 
that social market.  While still qualitative and case-based in nature, the analysis is a 
cross-case small-N research method relying on a setof data and measures to compare 
across cases.  The set of hypotheses in this part of the analysis will focus on the logic 
of market integration in order to understand the motivations behind the emergence of 
competing organization, the changing nature of these organizations, as well to create 
a pattern of behavior surrounding the segmentation of standards within a marketplace. 
1.6.2 Multiplicity 
Multiplicity occurs after a social market matures and other variables begin to replace 
legitimacy as dominant factors of change.  This observation requires a snapshot of 
several social markets and evaluates the validity of certain key independent variables 
to explain differences across these markets. These ob rvations will provide the 
necessary test of external validity for the logic of multiplicity, and the perception of 




Principally, I am aiming to explore differences in multiplicity – higher or 
lower multiplicity. However, the degree of multiplicity is symptomatic of differences 
in conditions of the social market (independent variables elaborated on below) that 
lead to other realities as well.  A situation of very high centralization of power leads 
to the lowest multiplicity, but it also means that there is the highest likelihood that no 
standards exist whatsoever. If a standard does emerg , it will be because the dominant 
powers of the industry coordinated at the highest lvels, which is more likely to 
involve the coordination with states, the United Nations, or similar international non-
governmental organizations (IGO).  In other words, I am looking for higher or lower 
degrees of procedural legitimacy. Further, since on standard dominates, there is the 
lowest likelihood that market segmentation occurs, that is to say, that differing 
standards or labels will exist for different consumers.  The degree of market 
segmentation is also observable in the dependent variable.   If there is fewer market 
segmentation, but lower levels of centralization, existing standards may be more 
inclined to compete directly for constituents, thus the presence of direct competition 
is observed.  
The social markets to be tested are selected to provide variance across 
quadrants with focus on degree of multiplicity.  These include the following social 
markets: Forest, Fisheries (wild, not farmer, fish), Tourism, National Brands (several 
products), Diamonds, Infant Food formula, Organic foods, Gold Mining, Banking and 




1.6.2.1 Factors Influencing Multiplicity 
The logic of multiplicity provides a framework for understanding competition within 
social markets. Competition emerges from within the business sector and non-profit 
sector, so the logic must incorporate factors from both. In its simplest form, standards 
entrepreneurs, whether from within firms or NGOs, or independent actors, survey the 
environment within which they seek to emerge and choose the path towards the 
greatest benefit relative to costs.  As an indicator of the cost to compete within an 
industry, I evaluate political concentration within the industry.  The premise is that 
more concentration industries, where power is centralized economically and 
politically, will be more difficult to penetrate and compete within.  Instead, politically 
centralized industries will grow more centralized as standards entrepreneurs will be 
less inclined to bear the cost of creating a separate nucleus of power; unless, the 
benefits of differentiation and segmentation are high. 
To determine centralization of power, I examine five factors including: 
industry concentration as measured by portion of industry revenue controlled by top 
firms; power asymmetries as measured by Gereffi et al. (2005) model of governance 
power within markets; state based concentration measured by whether or not the 
industry is connected within and segregated by state economies; industry associations 
centralization based on the presence of major interna ional industry associations 
covering the majority of the industry, and major NGOs which evaluates the power 




The opportunities for differentiation provide the benefit side of the equation. 
The logic of differentiation is that standards will be more likely to emerge when there 
are greater opportunities to differentiate products ba ed on branding and market 
segments. While coding is done to evaluate the degree of opportunities within a social 
market, there is also a qualitative difference in the segmentation of markets that will 
inform how multiplicity will occur.  Segmentation of standards follow the 
segmentation of the industry, where product segments based on psychographic 
differences in the population of consumers will lead to product-level segmentation, 
and retailer-level segmentation based on the retail br nd power will lead to company 
level standards.   
To determine opportunities for differentiation, I examine four factors 
including: Producer/Buyer Driven based on the type of industry; whether or not 
Standards Target Consumers; either with ecolabels or other means of 
communication; whether there is strong Brand Recognition of certified product or 
service, and whether markets are segmented based on Consumer Psychographics.  
These will be elaborated on in Chapter 6. 
1.6.3 Data Collection 
Data collection will involve a variety of sources and coding methods, including a 
qualitative analysis of the coffee social market in case form, a dataset of key variables 
for the various competing standards organizations within the coffee social market, a 




analysis of these same social markets.  The original research in this study is obtained 
field research and participatory observation during 11 months at AccountAbility in 
NYC where I engaged in dozens of conversations and meeting, and was involved in a 
three-day intensive workshop where an industry associati n (the International 
Association of Infant Food Manufacturers) debated the possibility of developing their 
own standard.  Extensive interviews in Pittsburgh with Thread International, a 
standards organization in the textile social market, interviews with members of the 
coffee social market, as well as a multi-year, multi-city and state collection of data on 
coffee prices across the US. 
The Coffee Social Market Case Study up to the point f multiplicity, which 
includes the early stages and emergence of the fair trade movement, the formalization 
of the fair trade movement into an international stndards setting organization, as well 
as its initial penetration into the market place, will be researched using a list of 
primary data collected through semi-structured interviews, as well as secondary data 
provided by these organizations or available to the wider public, and other research 
on these organizations. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a list of officers working 
within the voluntary organizations in the coffee social market, as well as with 
business owners, ISEAL advisors, and CSR experts at various corporations.  
Interview notes transcribed and categorized into a research spreadsheet and used as 




source material was obtained directly from the interviewees. These include annual 
reports, strategic documents not available on-line a d internal research documents.  
The Coffee Multiplicity Dataset used in the analysis of multiplicity in the 
coffee social market was created primarily from secondary source material, with 
important components sourced from primary source material obtained from 
interviews.  New research was performed on coffee pricing in order to test a 
relationship between the stringency of standards and market segmentation.  Coffee 
pricing was obtained from over 100 locations across the United States from 2009 
through 2012 and documented in a spreadsheet used for future analysis.  
The Global Multiplicity Dataset was created from material available from an 
ecolabel dataset at ecolabelindex.com. The dataset contains information on 411 
different standards uses information from the ecolabelindex.com repository as well as 
data obtained from secondary source material from a variety of publicly available 
sources.   
Furthermore, extensive interviews across a period of over 12 months with the 
Chief Executive Office and Chief Operating Officer at Thread International, a for-
profit social venture company developing an ecolabels for socially sourced recycled 




1.6.3.1 Why was the Coffee Social Market Selected? 
Given the varied state of maturity across social markets, the ability to observe change 
across all stages, including sufficient observation of multiplicity, is not always 
possible.  I have selected one of the earliest social markets and pioneers of 
ecolabeling, the coffee social market. It provides an example of a strong, seemingly 
dominant early voluntary standard that “checked all the boxes” relative to principles 
of multilateralism and legitimacy, yet still contends with a rich and diverse group of 
competitor coffee standards, some from other NGO and others from firms.   
1.7 Outline for Remaining Chapters 
This introductory chapter has introduced the research problem, highlighted its 
significance in the field of international relations, provided an overview of the 
analytical framework used in this research, highlighted the organizations observed, 
and described the methods and sources of primary and secondary data.  
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature in order to highlight the gaps this 
research will address. Specifically, it highlights the inconsistency of using legitimacy 
as an explanatory variable for multiplicity, and shift  the focus of explanatory 
variables on the social market itself. Namely, the political and economic conditions of 
the social market and how they can explain the rise of voluntary standards.  These 
variables include the political and economic centralization of the industry within 




challenges for new standards organizations to thrive. The political centralization of an 
industry is a new variable that I introduce in this re earch and acts to formalize and 
measure the often discussed but rarely measured overlapping space between politics 
and markets. The more decentralized an industry, the more opportunity for new 
standards organizations to arise.  Likewise, since a k y driver of firm behavior is the 
opportunity to differentiate itself and its products within a marketplace, the 
segmentation of the marketplace and the opportunity to differentiate also acts as a key 
variable to understand, and predict, multiplicity within a social market. I derive a set 
of testable hypotheses from the logic of market integration and the logic of 
multiplicity, and fit them into the three stages of an organization’s lifecycle.  
Chapter 3 will review the coffee social market through its three-stage lifecycle 
to test the validity of the lifecycle to be applied to the formation of voluntary 
standards.  The chapter will also begin testing hypotheses related to the factors that 
explain change from one stage to another, namely that t e focus on creating a 
perception of legitimacy is instrumental in the early creation of the organization, but 
the factors of change quickly shift towards the economic and political conditions of 
the coffee market.  The case used in this chapter is of the earliest and dominant 
standard in the social market, the Fair Trade standard as designed and implemented 
by the Fair Labeling Organization (FLO).  
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth case-based analysis of the competing 




logic of market integration, namely that the organiz tions will tend towards market 
dynamics and steer away from the forms and functions of legitimacy as reflected in 
their governance structures, processes and procedures, leadership and strategic 
direction.  It will also provide preliminary observations on the economic and political 
factors that will best explain the rise of multiple systems.  The data derived from the 
study of these systems as documented in this chapter will be input into the Coffee 
Social Market dataset and used as input into the analysis in the following chapter.  
Chapter 5 analyzes the data derived from the observations in chapter 4. Here I 
hone in on the elements of procedural legitimacy and market integration in order to 
further test hypotheses from the logic of market integration.  Using data I compiled 
into the market integration dataset, I show gradual decline in the adoption of the 
procedures and organizational forms of early stage voluntary standards seeking 
legitimacy, with a notable exception with the 4C – the market’s explicit mainstream 
and least stringent standard. I will also show gradual increases in the elements of 
market integration across organizations, where eachnew standard takes on additional 
elements of market integration. 
Chapter 6 analyzes data across several social markets in order to test whether 
the hypotheses surrounding the logic of multiplicity withstands this preliminary test 
of external validity.  While quantitative analysis is more appropriate to test external 
validity, the number of cases for social market in he way defined in this study can 




qualitative analysis of several cases as well as the codification of variables derived 
from these cases. 
In Chapter 7 I return my focus back to the coffee social market in order to 
examine potential patterns of multiplicity within aparticular market. Since 
multiplicity appears to be the expected outcome when c rtain conditions of 
centralization and differentiation are encountered, then understanding how these 
multiple systems interact and engage with each other is a critical component of 
understanding their governing relationship with their constituents, stakeholders, and 
the citizen consumer.  Two key observations are made. First, that multiplicity does 
not necessarily mean overlap. Instead, different standards will occupy different 
market segments – a natural outcome of differentiation. Second, that there are 
indications that there may be a relationship between th  type of market segment and 
the standards themselves, where higher standards target higher-end consumers and 
lower standards target mainstream market segments.  
Adopting the liberal pluralist perspective (Galston 2002), I do not take a 
normative position on the standards or norms being observed. I will not value the 
inherent appropriateness of standards system or norm-set over another, and will not 
seek to determine the “good.”  I will also not attempt to evaluate whether standards 
have the desired policy impact, or if they are more eff ctive with state involvement.  
Instead, what is of interest is the process that competing institutions engage in to 




the constructivist analysis of norms evolution to understand how new norms are 
institutionalized within the marketplace, and how this institutionalization can change 
a marketplace. The goal is to provide some order to the complex mesh of voluntary 





2 VOLUNTARY STANDARDS, A FRAMEWORK 
In the absence of a common language for understanding what the multitude of 
different sustainability initiatives might actually mean to any one of us, the very 
promise that such initiatives are meant to bring is undermined. 




In this chapter I argue that the current state of literature and research surrounding the 
emergence and competition of voluntary standards doe  n t correspond well with the 
logic of the marketplace that they operate in. Highlighting the gaps in the literature 
provides the necessary context for the analytical framework proposed in this study. 
This chapter will review the logic surrounding the b havior of firms in the face of 
changing norms and expectations, and show how existing frameworks related to 
private authority (Buthe 2004; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Green 2013), 
transnational business regulation (Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger and Wood 
2014) and interactions between various forms of private regulation,  of non-state 
market based governance in particular (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 2008; Cashore 
2002a, 2002b; Cashore et al. 2004), voluntary clubs (Prakash and Potoski 2007), 
corporate social responsibility (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Vogel 2004; Zadek 




Hagen and Reincke 2012)_ – help advance the field, but do not correspond well with 
observations of multiplicity and interactions between standards. .   
This study builds on these studies, but contributes in several key ways.  First, I 
extend the understanding of corporate social responsibility by showing how voluntary 
standards interact with firm policies and lead to practices aligned with the notion of 
corporate social responsibility. Tying these two concepts together is critical in gaining 
a more nuanced and complete understanding of both. Second, I provide a broad 
perspective on the specific form of transnational business regulation by examining the 
interactions between standards as key influencers and f ctors that lead to social 
markets. Third, I contend that existing theories on voluntary standards focus on 
legitimacy and firm motivations (Buthe 2004; Mattli and Buthe 2011; Cashore et al 
2004; Prakash and Potoski 2007), but do not explain the unique environments that 
shape how standards evolve and change over time.  Most importantly, the notion of 
multiplicity has been described, but very little research has gone into why multiplicity 
appears to be the normal state of affairs for voluntary standards.  Beyond the dynamic 
of convergence and divergence (Reinecke, Manning and vo  Hagen 2012), I aim to 
understand the conditions that can help explain differences in multiplicity or 
competition across social markets. 
One key point of divergence from existing literature is the perspective that 
new forms of market governance must first and foremost work to develop legitimacy, 




of governance (Bernstein and Cashore 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Prakash and Potoski 
2007; Zurn 2004), before gaining power in the marketplace is inconsistent with the 
rules of social market behavior as informed by the micro behaviors of citizen-
consumers, or the strategic behavior of firms.  Instead, I argue that legitimacy is 
critical for organizations at the very earliest stages of a social market, but becomes far 
less so once the credibility of the norm writ large is established.  This is due to the 
fact that voluntary standards emerge to shift the material consequences of adopting a 
new norm, which motivates firms to incorporate it as a strategic imperative and seek 
ways in which to align their market presence to the norm.  
This opens up an opportunity for several voluntary standards to emerge 
without the need to reestablish legitimacy in the marketplace.  Once the norm is 
adopted as a strategic imperative for firms, legitimacy is considered established, and 
the market subsumes the norm. These latter stage standards, which have been 
categorized as competing standards, focus on the strategic nature of self-regulation 
and corporate social responsibility for firms and gain conversion and success by 
understanding and leveraging the opportunities inherent in the market within which 
they operate.  What motivates these new standards and explains their emergence and 
competition is therefore not legitimacy, but political and industry centralization and 
market segmentation.  These will be explained through the analytical framework 
elaborated on in this study.  In brief, this chapter will highlight the strategic nature of 




corresponds well with IR perspectives on the internalization of norms for state actors, 
provides a strong basis for the development of an altern te framework for 
understanding voluntary standards as market based governance systems.  This new 
framework will be based on two logics – the logic of market integration, and the logic 
of multiplicity – that will guide the development of hypotheses surrounding voluntary 
standards in the marketplace. I then present these ypotheses that will be tested in this 
research and provide a brief overview of the explanatory variables to be explored in 
the remainder of the dissertation. 
2.1 Two Central Questions 
a) Does the battle for political legitimacy always explain how and why voluntary 
standards behave? More specifically, how important is the open, multi-
stakeholder, democratic institutional form that aims to promote its own 
legitimacy in the development of social markets? 
b) What explains the emergence of competition (multiplicity) as important form 
of interaction among standards within the same social market?  
2.2 The Complex Web of Private Regulation 
There are many labels to describe the emerging phenom a of global governance 
through private authority. Early studies point to industry self-regulation (Haufler 
1999) as nascent forms of what would eventually become the widespread norm of 
corporate social responsibility (Vogel 2005, 2008), where corporations voluntarily 
restrain activities to reduce negative, or promote positive, social and environmental 




codes of conducts as key actors in private regulation was necessary to shift the gaze 
of political scientists towards the important role f non-state actors in international 
affairs. Among several important contributions, this focus on non-state actors added 
to the important work within the liberal tradition f international relations that sought 
to explain cooperation in an anarchic system of state .  Regime theory, popularized in 
the 1980s (Ruggie 1975; Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasne  1983; Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986), showed how cooperation among states is possible through the 
convergence around regimes, or the “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge.” (Krasner 1983) Yet, as 
Haufler notes, regime theory neglected to include private sector actors into their 
analysis (2001).  Ruggie extends the critique by observing on the literature that 
“whatever role other transnational actors might play in the context of international 
regimes […] were filtered through the prism of their influence on governmental or 
intergovernmental policy processes.”(2004 p.4) This call to incorporate private actors 
gained traction and led to a serious program of research around how private actors 
themselves begin to set the terms of the debate throug  private forms of voluntary 
standards, regulatory schemes and governance (Porter 1993, Haufler 1993, 1997, 
Cutler et al. 1999).  
The phenomenon of global governance, and even private regulation, is far more 
complex and varied, and instead is observed to be areconstituted complex web of 




whether they are corporations or civil society organiz tions, or the behavior of states 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), they can also create a webof governance on their own, and 
often in the absence of government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).  This view now 
expands the perspective of power, and the power to govern, within international 
relations beyond states and adopts a conceptual perspective that more accurately 
reflects reality: that international relations is hghly shaped by the activities not only 
of states and corporations, but of a wide variety of other actors made up of some 
combination of states, firms, and civil society.  
Abbott and Snidal moved to spread a wide net and incorporate these disparate 
forms of governance into a framework that includes organizations that are, to varying 
degrees, a mixture of state, NGO and firm interactions (2009).  They reorganized 
these private and public forms of authority under the umbrella of transnational new 
governance (TNG).  Tied in one form or another to the organizations under this 
umbrella is a diverse and divergent body of literature, with a variety of scholarship 
goals. 
This study focuses specifically on the type of governance that is interested in 
reigning in business activity.  I align with recent scholarship on Transnational 
Business Regulation (TBG) that teases away the practices, organizations and forms of 
private regulation of business from those that exist to alter state policies (Eberlein, 
Abbott, Black, Meidinger and Wood 2014); an important distinction and helpful 




which this study inherits much of its conceptual heritage. Research on the governance 
of transnational business has identified conditions for emergence with special 
emphasis on gaining legitimacy – a necessary preconditi  for effectiveness (Buthe 
2010; Cutler et al. 1999; Dingwerth 2007; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Graz & 
Nolke 2008; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Vogel 2009).  Given the inchoate and complex 
web of private forms of TBG, most studies have started where it is appropriate to 
start, by examining individual initiatives (Gulbrandsen 2008; Tamm Hallstrom 2004). 
While others shy away from focusing on private forms alone, have highlighted 
private and public partnerships (Donahue and Nye 2002; Backstrand 2008; Borzel & 
Risse 2005; Pattberg 2010) or multi-stakeholder collab rations (Abbott & Snidal 
2009).  Others, as in the body of literature on voluntary clubs, have highlighted firm 
motivations to adopt voluntary forms of TBG (Prakash nd Potoski 2005).  Certainly, 
the dominant thread in understanding the emergence of private regulation has focused 
on the process of gaining legitimacy as a means of authority (Bernstein and Cashore 
2007; Black 2008; Meidinger 2008; Richardson and Eberlein 2011).   What these 
studies do no adequately address are what Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger and 
Wood (2014) call interactions between TBG schemes.   
I believe it is worth pausing here to reemphasize that he focus on legitimation 
of private governance organizations, and specifically voluntary standards – which is a 
dominant thread in this scholarship – does not consider fully the influence of other 




market within which they operate. Yet, since multiplicity is the norm (of the over 440 
social and environmental voluntary standards in exist nce today, most of them coexist 
with other systems in the same industries and markets), understanding interactions 
between and among systems should be crucial in understanding when and how these 
organizations emerge.  
Eberlein et al. (2014) propose an analytical framework to help organize the 
debate and focus research programs around interactions. They provide a broad 
analysis of existing research, and propose a framework here existing and future 
research may fit.   Their matrix appears comprehensiv  along two axes: dimension of 
interaction, and component of regulatory governance.  Y t this framework maintains 
a dyadic perspective on private regulation wherein one organization has an impact on 
regulatory governance.  The dimensions of interaction are thorough, including the 
following questions: who or what interacts; what are the drivers and shapers of the 
interaction; the mechanisms and pathways; the charater of the interaction; effects of 
the interaction; and what change over time is there.  The potential impacts on 
regulatory governance also appear thorough, and include: goal and agenda setting; 
rule formation; implementation; monitoring and information gathering; compliance 
and enforcement; evaluation and review. My research steps back from this dyadic 
relationship between organization and governance, and seeks to understand the 
relationship between voluntary standards and how these co-evolve and co-create 




governance outlined by Eberlein et al.’s framework.  A more appropriate use of their 
framework for this study is to apply their framework to the social market as a whole.  
That said, I acknowledge the important work on the relationship between TBG 
and state regulation (Bartley 2011; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Meidinger 2001; 
Wood 2003), but emphasize that more work needs to be done in the area of 
interactions between voluntary schemes in order to understand them as unique 
organizations themselves.  Below, I begin with an understanding of firm corporate 
social responsibility to provide a context for interactions between firms and voluntary 
standards, then examine the role of legitimacy as key influencer and explanatory 
factor for these interactions.  I will argue that legitimacy is an important element for 
early stage voluntary standards, but does not explain interactions (multiplicity) in 
later stages, nor does it explain if/when new organizations emerge.   
My contribution to this literature is clear: to expand and further the study of 
interactions between voluntary standards systems, and within social markets.  I will 
demonstrate how voluntary standards co-evolve within social markets based on key 
elements of those social markets, as well as the ord r within which a voluntary 
standard emerges where early-stage standards schemes will seek legitimacy through 
its procedures and organizational forms, and latter-stage standards schemes will 
integrate more full with market dynamics.  Further, the state of multiplicity – 
increased interactions – within a social market will be determined by the political 




2.3 Theories of the Firm and Social Responsibility  
To understand how voluntary standards engage and interact with firms, we must 
understand how firms make decisions. Regulatory issue  surrounding globalization 
and corporate expansion are inextricably linked to issues of corporate governance and 
codes of conduct.  Since transnational new governance (TNG) institutions aim to 
regulate transnational business activity (Abbott and S idal 2009), and their means of 
regulation necessarily exclude hard laws and regulation, the rise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) is seen as an important respone by firms to align behavior with 
social and environmental goals.  As Abbott and Snidal put it, TNG as pertains to 
international business regulation has “the expressed goal of controlling global 
production through transnational norms that apply directly to firms and other 
economic operators.” (Abbott and Snidal 2009, p505) The rise of TNG and CSR go 
hand in hand, but the two are not one and the same.  Understanding the logic of CSR 
is critical to understanding the logic behind the emergence and growth of voluntary 
standards. 
The CSR debate falls into two dominant camps represnting competing 
perspectives on the role and responsibility of firms. On one hand is the classic liberal, 
or shareholder theory of the firm, most prominently defended by Milton Friedman, 
that insists on a uniformly profit-focused firm (Friedman 1970).  In this view there is 
no role for corporate social responsibility; any investments that do not directly yield 




to unethical behavior on the part of managers. The firm, this view holds, shall not be 
involved in acts of charity more appropriately suited for groups, private or public, 
whose objective function is the meeting of social goals and public provisions. This 
apparently draws a sharp line between the pursuit of social causes and profits.  
On the other side of the debate is the stakeholder theory of the firm. This view 
holds that firms are accountable to the varied needs and interests of a diverse set of 
stakeholders (Brenner 1992; Donaldson and Preston 1995; McWilliams and Siegel 
2001). The list of stakeholders is different for every firm but would generally include 
some degree of representation from employees, suppliers, community members, and 
customers. This perspective is at once descriptive, normative, instrumental, and 
managerial (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p66). It isdescriptive in its attempt to 
provide a model for what the corporation is.  It is normative in its attempt to argue 
how the firm should behave. It is managerial when it provides a sufficient roadmap to 
guide corporate managers. And it is also instrumental when it establishes a 
framework to guide the necessary research on – and in often supporting the claim of – 
an economic relationship between stakeholder sensitivity and economic performance. 
Examination of these two perspectives shows that they are only tenuously 
perceived as mutually exclusive or in contradiction. The similarities between 
Friedman’s perspective and the stakeholder theory are evident: if stakeholder 
sensitivity does support economic success (Barnett 2007; Cochran and Wood 1984; 




with Friedman’s shareholder theory. Furthermore, a more attentive review of 
Friedman’s position shows that the firm’s focus on profit is clearly conditioned with 
the expectation that executives conform to the “basic rules of the society, both those 
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.” (Friedman 1970, p122) 
While he does not elaborate on this notion of “basic rules of the society,” or “ethical 
custom,” it is clear that Friedman expects executives to act in accordance to more 
than just the law of the land. With this subtle stipulation in place, one can argue that 
Friedman leaves open the door for managers to evaluate societal norms and 
expectations when directing the affairs of the firm. These two propositions – that 
stakeholder sensitivity can lead to greater profits, and Friedman’s insistence on moral 
behavior beyond written law – shows that the two competing views of the firm are 
effectively overlapping in important ways.  
With this reconciliation made possible, it becomes more evident that what is 
important in the CSR debate is not how to parse the two textbook theories of the firm, 
but to observe how and why firms act. On this empirical point, there is no debate: a 
majority of Fortune 500 firms report to be engaged in corporate social responsibility 
programs (Governance and Accountability Institute 2012), and these firms often due 
so through adherence to voluntary standards regimes. The implication of the 
stakeholder theory, and a more nuanced reading of the shareholder theory as proposed 
by Friedman, both suggest, as observations of firm behavior confirm, that the firm 




1985; 1992). Changing societal norms, expectations, and conventions form the 
macro-level frame that dictates how firms – even staunchly profit-focused firms – 
behave. Societal norms, values, customs, and conventions can converge to create the 
appropriate boundaries within which profit-seeking firms operate. The learning 
organization will necessarily grow to interact within the appropriate social limitations 
(Zadek 2004, 2007). The firm takes social positions f responsibility based on its 
interaction with societal norms, conventions, and expectations for CSR.  It is thus 
more important that researchers expand their questions “beyond the purpose or 
actions of individual business to understand how [CSR] can lead to changes in the 
underlying social contract that defines the very nature of business.” (Zadek 2007) 
Let us examine a simple framework of the micro- andmacro-levels of CSR 
change in order to pinpoint the important gaps in understanding that this research 
hopes to address. At the micro/firm-level, Zadek (2006) conceives of five CSR stages 









Stage What organizations do Why they do it 
Defensive Deny practices, outcomes, or 
responsibilities 
To defend against attacks to their 
reputation that in the short term could 
affect sales, recruitment, productivity, 
and brand value  
Compliance Adopt a policy-based 
compliance approach as a cost of 
doing business 
To mitigate the erosion of economic 
value in the medium term because of 
ongoing reputation and litigation risks 
Managerial Embed the societal issue into 
their core management processes 
To mitigate the erosion of economic 
value in the medium term and to 
achieve longer-term gains by 
integrating responsible business 
practices into their daily operations 
Strategic Integrate the societal issue into 
their core business strategies 
To enhance economic value in the 
long term and to gain first-mover 
advantage by aligning strategy and 
process innovations to the societal 
issue 
Civil Promote broad industry 
participation in corporate 
responsibility 
To enhance long-term economic value 
by overcoming any first-mover 
disadvantages and realize gains 
through collective action.  
Reproduced from Simon Zadek, The Civil Corporation, Earthscan 2007 
Just as business learns to adapt to changes in the social and normative 
environment (the micro-level organizational implicat ons of CSR), so too do the 
actors, stakeholders, and institutions that form the agents of normative change in 
society (the macro- and societal-level process). Zadek suggests that emergent norms 
have the potential to evolve into sustained and enduri g institutions that impose 
changes on firm behavior.  The stages of societal le rning (Table 2.2) overlap 
considerably with the norm evolution model proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink 




stage based in the ideals of activists and NGOs that slowly gain traction and increase 
adoption within the existing community of practice.  Yet for all these authors, 
including Bernstein and Cashore (2007), whose framework I examine later, show an 
end-state where the new norm, the new standard, or the new business practice, 
becomes de fact, internalized, or institutionalized.  Yet the final institutionalized and 
internalized stage is very different across markets and situations.  We observe 
differences in consolidation, competition, and in the character of the end-state.  This 
research aims to fill this scholarly gap.  By building on the consensus developed by 
other authors, I will apply the lifecycle model to v luntary standards, and shift the 
lens squarely on the final stage of development to understand how and why these 
systems all mature in different ways.   
Table 2.2 Corporate Responsibility and Societal Learning 
Stage Characteristics 
Latent Activist communities and NGOs are aware of the issue 
There is weak scientific or other hard evidence 
The issue is largely ignored or dismissed by the business community 
Emerging There is political and media awareness around the issue 
There is an emerging body of research, but data are still weak 
Leading businesses experiment with approaches to dealing with the issue 
Consolidating There is an emerging body of business practices around the issue 
Sector-wide and issue-based voluntary initiatives ar  established 
There is litigation and an increasing view of the ne d for legislation 
Voluntary standards are developed, and collective action occurs 
Institutionalized Legislation or business norms are established 
The embedded practices become a normal part of a business excellence model 




2.3.1 Extensive and Intensive Accountability 
One central message from the organizational learning provided above is that “at no 
time does the individual business move outside of its own “logic” and basis of 
accountability. At each step, the business sees the sense within its logic of 
accountability to its owners (shareholders) in extending the boundaries of what it 
takes into account. But over time, the macro effect is that the business community 
(say, in a particular market or sector) incorporates norms of behaviour [sic] that in 
practice imply a greatly extended basis of accountability.” (Zadek 2006: 340) This 
may sound like an optimistic statement, but it follows a logic that requires as a 
necessary precondition the engagement of external bodies or organizations that will 
align intensive and extensive accountabilities for the firm, a phenomenon that 
recalibrate a firm’s cost-benefit calculus. This is elaborated on below.  
The concept of intensive versus extensive accountability introduced by 
Donahue and Nye (2002) serves to draw the line between the public and private roles 
of organizations and/or actors and provide strong theoretical parallels to the 
distinction between the two theories of the firm. Public actors are “answerable to a 
broad range of constituencies whose interests, on awide spectrum of dimensions, 
must be taken into account.” (Donahue 2008) This “extensive accountability” may 
involve a variety of success factors, metrics, and/or masters. While not all 
constituents are equal, actors or organizations exhibiting high extensive 




focused roles. Extensive forms of accountability dominate governments and also 
reflect the dominant form of accountability described by the Stakeholder Theory of 
the firm.  Private organizations, on the other hand, are answerable to a much narrower 
set of masters.  Their goals are generally much more focused and success is a function 
of one, or several, measures. These private actors are characterized and ruled by 
“ intensive accountability,” also represent the form of accountability described in the 
shareholder theory of the firm.  
Just as the two theories of the firm overlap, these accountability tendencies are 
only strict in their ideal forms. Well-run government agencies may create 
organizational metrics only loosely aligned with their extensive responsibilities in 
order to function efficiently. Likewise, market-based organizations may be induced to 
accept levels of extensive accountability in order to meet their intensive goals 
(Donahue and Nye 2002, p7). In other words, alignin their internal goals (meant to 
serve shareholders) are made to align with external societal goals (environmental 
stewardship and social good) they successfully infuse markets with a greater degree 
of extensive accountability. In this scenario, “market dynamics are not driving 
business away from an ‘intensive’ accountability to shareholders to an ‘extensive’ 
accountability to diverse stakeholders. Rather, what is happening is that intensive and 
extensive forms of accountability are becoming more similar, and ultimately 




is achieved when it is forced to realign its basis of accountability by internalizing 
accountabilities that were once external.   
This now helps us frame the important quest in understanding market-based 
governance systems and voluntary standards: in whatays do these systems act to 
align the extensive goals of their organization with the intensive goals of member 
firms? How are architectures of accountability altered in order to impose change on 
member firms and across market industries?  These nw forms of governance are 
central to understanding how macro-level institutions align with micro-level behavior 
of firms. We can comfortably say that voluntary stand rds organizations (NSMDs or 
voluntary clubs) act as meso-level agents that bridge the macro goals with the micro 
incentives. But what factors are necessary for them to develop? Are their procedural 
elements designed to gain legitimacy necessary preconditions for success? 
Understanding these institutions is key to gaining sight into one of the most 
perplexing issues of global governance.  
2.4 Legitimacy and Private Regulation  
Voluntary standards are not equivalent to CSR, but are one way that firms alter 
production methods in order to be more ‘socially responsible.’ Based on the 
reasoning above, voluntary standards gain their power from being able to align a 
firm’s intensive and extensive accountability.  Why is it then that IR literature on the 
topic of voluntary standards, non-state market based governance (NSMD), and 




establish the power to effect change (Wood 2005; Bernsetin and Cashore 2007; 
Prakash and Potoski 2010; Black 2008; Fransen 2012; Gulbrandsen 2014)? This, in 
turn, makes the struggle for legitimacy central in explaining their emergence and 
competition (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2002; Cashore et al. 2005; Cashore, Auld, 
McDermott 2007). These authors, and others suggest that “the central, analytically 
salient benefit that the members receive for producing the voluntary club’s positive 
externalities is the affiliation with the club’s positive brand reputation,” (Prakash and 
Potoski 2007, p, 777) a phenomenon that I argue is similar in intent to gaining 
legitimacy, but in this case, is done through affili tion to a legitimate club. I posit that 
a firm need not align with a club to gain legitimacy, but can do so on their own once 
the social market, write large, has matured.  
The following section examines how legitimacy has become an accepted influencer 
on the development of voluntary standards – a claim that I will argue is important 
only in early stages of development, and less important in later stages.    
2.4.1 Legitimacy and Voluntary Standards 
That a struggle for legitimacy is inextricable tied to the development of private 
regulation is a common, and arguably dominant, thread in existing scholarship 
(Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2002; Vallejo and Hauselman 2004; Cashore et al. 
2005; Wood 2005; Cashore, Auld, McDermott 2007; Black 2008; Fransen 2012; 
Gulbrandsen 2014). The notion that new private organizations seeking to impose 




reasonable, and the research and scholarship is sound. However, I argue that it 
explains only the earliest stages of development for voluntary standards, and captures 
a moment in time, rather than the evolving and changed relationship between 
legitimation and organizations of private regulation.   
Vallejo and Hauselman (2004) note that legitimacy “depends on the level of 
acceptance by the different direct stakeholders and external audiences. Issues of 
representation, inclusiveness and transparency will be critical to building the 
necessary trust for legitimacy. Additionally, legitimacy depends on the ability of the 
process to engage the stakeholders in a meaningful dialogue in which they feel 
ownership and the possibility to derive benefits. This requires full transparency, 
openness and respect.”(p.3) This belief leads them to conclude that a central tenet for 
the legitimacy of a governance system is “a process of negotiation and power 
balance.” (Ibid., p2) Distilling the observable elements required for this legitimacy, I 
list the following: a multi-stakeholder membership organization; direct participation 
of stakeholders in policy making; institutional cheks on Power; a process to report 
grievances; third party verification of compliance. 
They are not alone in tying the following two factors together as primary 
mechanisms of change: 1) that legitimacy is an essential requirement for the rise of 
private governance, and 2) that legitimacy is manifested in observable institutional 
and organizational forms.  This emphasis on legitimacy has a history in 




regulation seek to promote and enforce.  In order to property understand the 
mechanisms that influence how voluntary standards emerge and compete, this study 
starts with the underlying logic behind the evolution of norms. It is the construction 
of new norms and the powers of socialization that reach over into the world of 
rational, material and strategic consequences to motivate the formation of voluntary 
standards. Voluntary standards, with their governance structures, certifications and 
ecolabels, form the necessary organizational layer required to align intensive and 
extensive accountabilities to promote the growth of CSR among rational market 
actors. CSR and voluntary standards are distinct but highly interdependent 
phenomena.  
2.4.2 The Legitimation of Private Governance 
That change in private governance occurs through a process of legitimation stems 
from a constructivist understanding of international relations, where ideas and 
socialization, rather than material preferences, empower and influence behaviors 
(Adler 2002).  This conflicts with a material rationalist perspective, the power to 
govern comes from an ability to coerce or induce rul s.  Yet coercion and inducement 
are often unavailable and in short supply (Hurd 2007) in the international order, and 
certainly often absent in the area of private governance, where legitimacy fills the 
void.  This notion that legitimacy is necessary to empower organizations of global 
governance is widely noted, and a uncontroversial tenet of international relations 




and Mathli 2003, 2005, 2011; Esty 2006, 2007; Zweifel 2006; Zurn 2000; 
Gulbrandsen 2014; Segerlund 2010; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Held 2005; 
Bäckstrand 2006; Bäckstrand and Saward 2004; Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005; 
Payne and Samhut 2004; Scholte 2004; Vallejo & Hauselman 2004; Zurn 2002, 2004; 
Zurn and Stephen 2010).  While a struggle for legitimacy is not the only factor that 
explains the character of private governance (Meidinger 2009; Perez 2011; Eberlein 
and Newman 2008; Bartley 2011), it remains a necessary precondition for private 
governance, and will be examine in this study on this specific point: is it always a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of certain forms of private governance?  
 Legitimacy, and more specifically political legitimacy, is the “acceptance and 
justification of a shared rule by a community” (Bernstein 2005).  Political legitimacy 
helps establish the “worthiness of a political order to be recognized” (Habermas 1979, 
p. 178), and would be necessary in all forms of governance, including those with 
distinct rulers, by allowing them to be “more secure in the possession of power and 
more successful in its exercise” (Claude 1966, p. 368).  Legitimacy is thus a central 
tenet for all rule, therefore not uncontroversial for it to preclude the development of 
private rule. However, how private rule establishes l gitimacy is unique in its 
manifestation. What does private legitimacy looks li e and how can it be attained? 
According to Held, “democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern 
political life: laws, rules, and policies appear justified when they are democratic” 




political authority should extend across state boundaries, global democracy “ought 
to” follow (2011). Yet, this idea or ideal is fraught with limitations, political and 
practical in nature.  Thus, the question remains, what will provide and enable political 
legitimation in private organizations of global governance?  One scholarly 
perspective extracts the principles, norms, procedures and ideals of democracy and 
assigns them as requirements for political legitimaon of global governance. 
Buchanan and Keohane’s (2006) call for deliberation, participation and accountability 
to be the central tenets of political legitimacy in a world without global democratic 
rule, a call that is echoed by many (Esty 2006, 2007; Zweifel 2006; Zurn 2000).   
It is this focus on the principles and norms of democracy, as expressed 
through the democratic procedures and forms of governance within organizations of 
private governance that will be examined as observable ttempts to gain legitimacy. 
In brief, copying these ‘democratic’ forms of process s and procedures within 
organizations of private governance is a key element towards legitimation of these 
forms, and will be seen as evidence of struggles for legitimacy (Fuchs, Kalfagianni 
and Havinga 2009). Absence of these forms, will be seen as evidence that 
legitimation is a weaker explanation for their development within the global sphere.  
2.4.3 Voluntary Standards 
Not only is a central premise of the early research on voluntary standards that they 
“aim to establish political legitimacy,” (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, p347), but also 




rise of the competing firm-based systems in the Forest sector, the Sustainable Forest 
Initiative (SFI), challenged the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the dominant 
NGO-based standards, by challenging their legitimacy to set standards.  In response, 
they begin their own struggle to be considered as, if not more, legitimate than the 
FSC.  While their focus is on the creation of systems, their framework outlines a 
process that leads to a political settlement between firms and NGOs where the one 
standard is considered “the legitimate arena of authority.” (Ibid., p356) Yet this stage 
is an ideal form and does not reflect actual observations in the marketplace. This is 
evidence by the overwhelming presence of multiplicity across organization, where no 
such “legitimacy arena of authority” was created within one organization, but seems 
to exist at the level of the social market more broadly.  In these cases of multiplicity, 
advocacy-led standards coexist and compete alongside other advocacy-led 
organizations, coalitions of firms, and consortiums including both firms and advocacy 
groups.  Even the forest industry, the principle case examined by these scholars, the 
SFI and FSC continue to coexist and prosper without there being a need to create one 
universal program. 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007) propose that these new competing organizations 
will “move toward incorporating characteristics of NSMD systems – they engage in 
‘‘mimetic isomorphism,’’ which is to copy the domina t organization within their 
field (Suchman 1995, p589). This is premised on the logic that demands legitimacy to 




procedures aligned with the norms of international global governance related 
multilateralism – adapted to private organizations as multistakeholder forms – as a 
key element in informing how voluntary standards emerge and engage with their 
constituents. This is one key area that I will evaluate, and ultimately disagree with.  
Consistent with the dominant thread in international relations (Bäckstrand 
2006; Bäckstrand and Saward 2004; Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Payne and 
Samhut 2004; Scholte 2004; Vallejo & Hauselman 2004; Zurn 2002, 2004; Zurn and 
Stephen 2010), as well as outside international reltions (Elkin 2006,) Bernstein and 
Cashore, (2008) reassert that effective institutional design is essential in the 
emergence and development of these private forms of global governance.  Systems 
must be designed to create a learning environment in which stakeholders can ‘build 
community’ that taps into shared understanding of legitimacy among participants.” 
(p. 289) This follows their claim that these non-state forms of governance systems 
“have tapped into increasing democratic pressures on pr cedural norms” (Bernstein 
and Cashore 2007, p12). This follows the work of glba ization scholars proposing 
improved public accountability of international institutions, procedures promoting 
‘stakeholder democracy’ calling for increased collaboration and deliberation between 
business, civil society and states  (Bäckstrand 2006; Bäckstrand and Saward 2004; 
Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Payne and Samhut 2004; Scholte 2004; Vallejo & 
Hauselman 2004; Zurn 2002, 2004; Zurn and Stephen 2010). A perspective not 




paradigm of multilateralism that continues to exist (Zurn 2004, p4). Since 
multilateralism refers to governance of a decision-making mode in which 
governmental representatives from different countries coordinate their policies 
internationally, global governance by private authority based on principles of 
multilateralism will employ multi-stakeholder governance methods (Bäckstrand 
2006; Bäckstrand and Saward 2004; Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Payne and 
Samhut 2004; Scholte 2004; Vallejo & Hauselman 2004; Zurn 2002, 2004; Zurn and 
Stephen 2010).  These international institutions reult in a form of new 
multilateralism driven by global social movements that interact and learn from the 
top-down Multilateral Economic Institutions such as the IMF, World Band and WTO. 
They take on forms of multilateralism in an attempt to emulate the traditional power 
centers (O’Brien 2000).  
In this research I make several arguments that aim to continue the effort to 
appropriately conceptualize the political contests between voluntary standards and 
their impact on social markets.  First, I argue that existing research focuses heavily on 
legitimacy as an explanatory variable and end-goal, which prohibits a more complete 
understanding of voluntary standards as highly interactive and interdependent with 
market actors and forces.  Bernstein and Cashore’s (2007) original framework first 
sets aside the factors that would influence who is converted, when, how and why 
competing systems may emerge. Cashore, Egan, Auld and Newsom (2007) revisit 




traction in Finland where firms created and adopted the Finnish Forest Certification 
System instead. Observations of the Finnish model allowed them to argue that the 
Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2004) framework on non-state market based governance 
needs to be updated in two ways. First, that more attention to the type of product 
being exported provides insight into the way in which systems evolve.  Second, that 
more attention needed to be placed on the role of aparticular region within the 
broader global context (Cashore et al. 2007, p3).  This analysis provides insight into 
how the standards themselves develop.   They show how t ese factors explain why 
the Finnish sector did not align to the FSC, in contrast to the forest industry in 
Sweden; the FSC failed to “become a durable form of political authority.” (Ibid., p2)  
Continuing the efforts of expanding the analytical framework beyond 
legitimacy is a global value chain perspective (Bitzer et al. 2008; Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005). The global value chain literature (G reffi 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005) 
has focused attention on the role of power within supply chain, and the role of lead 
firms in dictating changes to rules, regulations and standards within industries. Here, 
the few is that power is exerted from within a firm and imposed on smaller suppliers 
of this firm, which in turn can have a rippling effct within and across the industry.  
This is an interesting divergence from legitimacy, where power – inherent in the role 
of lead firms – is imposed without question. Quite simply, to do business with us, this 
is how you act. This perspective is extremely helpful in shifting the scholarly gaze 




lead firm is not always the first mover, and not always the dominant actor new 
institutional arrangements of private governance (Bartley 2007).   
The lens is further expanded with a recent study by Manning, Boons, von 
Hagen, and Reinecke (2011) who aim to uncover the “relations and influences 
between standards and standards organizations, adopting firms and other 
stakeholders.”(p. 4) They explore how the national context, unique in the relations 
between firms and stakeholders, informs how multiple standards emerge.  They hone 
in on three factors. First, buyer preferences, where powerful buyers motivated by the 
preferences of their consumer segment, can have disproportionate influence on the 
adoption of certain standards.  Second, producer structures, where the prevalence of 
large producers versus small producers can influence adoption across states.  Third, 
the influence of national intermediaries – often a hybrid mix of political and 
economic organizations, most easily associated withindustry associations, act to 
promote one standard versus another.  This is an important contribution to the 
literature that otherwise ignore factors outside th tension between market actors and 
advocacy groups. This study takes an important step towards shifting the perspective 
away from the tension between NGO and industry to understand how markets 
influence standards.   
This same study introduces the concept of a ‘standards market’, which 
expands the dependent variable to include the interplay of various voluntary standards 




being defined by two countervailing forces. On one hand, standards tend to converge 
around a general set of rules, while on the other hand, standards organizations strive 
to differentiate themselves from each other.  While th y introduce the concept of 
differentiation for standards organizations, I will also examine differentiation but in a 
fundamentally different way.  Here, differentiation is not the goal of the standards 
organization, but is the outcome of a choice by standards entrepreneurs that balances 
the opportunities to differentiation amongst standards with the goal of catering to the 
strategic imperative of differentiation among firms.  It is the firms’ need for 
differentiation, guided by various market segments, that motivates the differentiation 
among standards.  
Second, that the nature of the marketplace and competition is not properly 
understood as a duality between NGOs and firms. In this view, social markets are 
defined by the interest of firms on one hand, and norm advocates on the other.  
Instead, the state of social markets is far more complex and better understood as a 
network of competing actors and interests. Social markets consists of firms struggling 
against NGO standards, as well as NGOs competing to offer different standards 
within the industry, firms with their own standards competing against each other, 
sometimes aligned with NGOs, with other firms or with no one at all.   
Third, the idea that mimetic isomorphism occurs is premised on the centrality 
of legitimacy as a driving force of social markets. That the norms, principles and 




over into the later stages of norm evolution and define the nature of the organizational 
platforms that operate to expand the norm.  What we observe in social markets are an 
array of different organizations from various backgrounds, with different goals and 
organizational forms, including 18% of all certification systems with ecolabels that 
are for profit organizations – evidence of a meaningful divergence away from 
mimetic isomorphism, or copying of the organizations forms, processes and 
procedures of legitimacy. While the earlier forms of these organizations do morph 
into similar governance forms, the latter stage organizations do not always take on 
these forms. Why is this the case? Why do some copy an open, consensus based, 
stakeholder governance model while others operate as hierarchical forms more akin 
to firms than NGOs. 
Earlier studies added a necessary dimension to our understanding of the 
motivations surrounding firm-based decisions. Yet, the assumption that it is the battle 
for legitimacy that will explain the emergence of cmpeting systems may not fit well 
with current observations. Even these authors call for a revision of their earlier 
framework to “better incorporate how actors assess the strategic importance of 
particular domestic settings for the broader global governance project in which 





2.4.4 Reputation and Branding as Legitimacy 
How is it that firms can be driven to alter behaviors to reduce negative social and 
environmental costs? Following Ronald Coase’s classic work (1960) on market 
externalities, that in fact, rational actors who can shift the costs of externalities onto 
someone else (the broader society), would be inclined to overproduce such products 
that will allow them to do so.  This leads to the con lusion that policy solutions 
should be designed to create incentives or force actors to internalize their 
externalities, in other words, to incur the costs of negative externalities.  Within a 
domestic market, states can do this by taxing certain production methods. Yet, for a 
variety of reasons, states, especially, according to Prakash and Potoski, developing 
country states, are less willing or able to impose the necessary penalties on firms to 
correct the situation.   
Responding to this gap are voluntary clubs. These organizations are able to 
encourage participating firms to change behavior by offsetting the costs of reducing 
negative externalities. According to Prakash and Potoski (2007b), voluntary clubs 
allow firms to commit to bearing the cost of reducing negative externalities in 
exchange for access to the club’s positive “brand.” A club’s brand signals to outside 
stakeholders that the firm is engaging in credible programs and policies by attaching 
the reputation of the club and its members to the indiv dual firm. It allows firms to 
share the costs of changed behavior while gaining access to the shared and non-rival 




club theory to voluntary labor standards are (1) to consider the limited credibility of 
individual strategies and (2) to conceptualize reputation as a “good held in common.” 
(2007a. p110) In order to provide this positive reputation, the club itself would need 
to establish its own reputation and credibility, in other words, the voluntary club 
would need to develop its own legitimacy – the goal out ined by Cashore et al.  
The club theory perspective offers a helpful heuristic to examine the logic 
behind voluntary standards.  This logic uniquely trea s motivation as a rational 
outcome of the interplay between the costs of market externalities and the ability to 
tap into the benefits of reputation and legitimacy.  Clubs “alter firms’ cost-benefit 
calculus to channel their private self-interest in ways that lead to a reduction of 
negative externalities.” (Prakash and Potoski 2007a, p3) Club theory makes three 
claims that raise questions critical to this study and motivate further research.  
First, club effectiveness relies on its ability to increase the club’s legitimacy as 
expressed through what they call “brand value.” This is done through three 
mechanisms, the first is to increase the number of participants in the club and 
generate a ‘network effect’ of participation. The second is to increase the credibility 
of the club and its members.  The third is to develop the procedures and processes to 
ensure protection against the principle culprit of c llection action scenarios: free-
riding.  The free-rider problem “undermines the production of environmental 
externalities and thereby dilutes its credibility” (Prakash and Potoski 2007b, p778). 




ultimately provides the value to outweigh costs of joining.  The solution lies in 
avoiding the information asymmetries that cause market failures to begin with.  This 
requires the club to ensure transparency about compliance and performance by 
establishing monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.  Likewise, a club with a wider 
network of participants, a highly credible sponsoring authority and effective 
monitoring and sanctioning systems will lead to higher brand reputation and stronger 
standing amongst stakeholders (Ibid, p778) This requi ment focuses the necessary 
element of success for voluntary systems on their ability to gain legitimacy, which is 
done through institutional designs.  
Second, while possible, it is difficult for individual firms to gain the 
legitimacy required to gain the advantages of clubs. Given that legitimacy hinges on a 
club’s ability to create network effects through wide support, and establish 
verification and auditing from independent third party evaluators, non-club standards 
will struggle, and likely fail, when competing with clubs (Prakash and Potoski 2007b: 
33). Moreover, given the open and consensus-based design of voluntary clubs, firms 
would always choose to tap into the benefits of clubs rather than fight the uphill battle 
of graining legitimacy on their own.  Simply put, clubs will be more successful that 
non-club standards, so the latter is a failing strategy.  
These first two points present a puzzle: given their logic and conclusions, how 
can we make sense of the wide diversity of voluntary programs, including those 




individual firms, and those that now even develop standards for a profit?  According 
to Bartley, scholars who adopt this thinking “imply that making transnational 
standards effective is merely a matter of getting the rules and incentives right.” 
(Bartley 2011, p30) Even Vogel observes, “the most important civil regulations are 
multistakeholder codes, whose governance is shared by firms and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and which rely on product andproducer certifications. Such 
codes face the challenge of acquiring legitimacy and of persuading both firms and 
NGOs of the value of their standards.” (Vogel 2007,  p261) 
This focus on institutional design to increase legitimacy needs to be evaluated 
given empirical observations. 
Third, that voluntary clubs enhance a firm’s corporate reputation, the 
necessary precedent for clubs to offer benefits to members.  This is a serious 
implication that may prove contentious in the face of studies that show a value for 
firm reputation outside voluntary clubs.  The contras  between the two views is this: 
that the marketplace will value a business’ reputation, and more specifically, will 
value its efforts to align behaviors according to ehical standards more when that 
business is part of a voluntary clubs.  In fact, the literature of norms evolution and, 
specifically, the norm and institutionalization of corporate social responsibility 
suggests that the product of corporate reputation – the ‘market for virtue’ (Vogel 
2005) - exists in a space that includes clubs, individual codes of conduct, ethical 




Given this important body of literature and its claims, it will be important for 
this study to evaluate the value of legitimacy, as developed through key institutional 
design elements. It will also be necessary to evaluate if, by what logic and under what 
conditions, do individual firms develop their own voluntary standards when a club 
exists in the same social market. Likewise, it will be important to understand the 
contours of a market for corporate reputation – does it exist only for members of a 
club, or can all market actors tap into this market on their own?  It is therefore 
important to understand CSR and how norms permeate m rkets as conditions for the 
relevance of voluntary clubs.   
Moreover, brand benefits from joining clubs are important, but the brand of 
the club does not always speak to the brand the company is trying to portray or the 
brand of the product they are trying to sell.  In this case, contrary to what Prakash and 
Potoski suggest (2007a), clubs do not “fail” when their brand is not strong enough, 
they just encourage the emergence of other clubs.  This is not, as this study proposes, 
a failure of the system rather than it is a evolutin of market competition co-
determining how voluntary standards develop and social markets grow.  This will 
determine the profile of a social market without relegating it to failed or successful. 
These terms are not appropriate in this analysis. 
Ultimately, the aim for voluntary club theory is to answer the question of why 




proposed by voluntary clubs. What it does not address sufficiently is the rise of 
competing systems and the rise of non-club standards. 
2.5 Social Market Framework 
Lisbeth Segerlund’s study (2010) of the rise of corporate social responsibility as a 
global norm provides a thorough review of the evoluti n of the norm based on 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm evolution model (1998). While the seminal study by 
Finnemore and Sikkink examined the behavior of state  vis-à-vis rising norms of 
human rights, and several others have taken the mantle to examine norms influence 
on domestic politics (Cortell and Davis 2000) or multilateralism (Martin 1992), and 
approach the question of how norms affect internatio l institutions (Cortell and 
Davis 1996), this dynamic is severely understudied.  Specifically, the study of norms 
on non-state actors and their impact on the development of private regulation is not 
well theorized or understood.  Segerlund applies the model to non-state actors 
influenced by new international norms.  This crossover from states to firms and 
NGOs is imperative for understanding how norms can influence actors and change 
behaviors within the Transnational New Governance universe.  
Segerlund bases her study on Finnemore and Sikkink’s norms emergence life 
cycle, but just like the original study, Segerlund focuses on socialization as the driver 
of change.  The norms evolutions life cycle claims that institutions emerge in 
response to shifting norms, but it does not expand on the logic of the institutions that 




how they result in changed behavior is a drastically understudied phenomenon.  This 
gap is even more evident when, as in Segerlund’s study, normative shifts are 
influencing the behavior of profit-minded market actors. While she examines the 
social context, she does not address the strategic context in which “actors strategize 
rationally to reconfigure preferences” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888). In order to 
know this, we must understand how new institutions emerge to alter the “behavioral 
logics that dominate different segments of the life cycle.” (Ibid: 888)  
Segerlund shows that socialization can act to steer firms in the direction of 
new norms.  But socialization without a rational justification of changed behavior is 
unsustainable in the marketplace. Self-interest, Cass Sunstein (1997) writes, not 
virtue, is the motivating force of political behavior. In the long run, a rational 
justification must be based on the rudimentary drivers of political power. Likewise, 
marketplace change will have to be rooted in those elements that drive their power: 
profits, costs, competitive advantage, etc.  It is hi  rational justification that new 
institutions must provide for firms adapting to new norms of CSR.  NGOs that 
promote voluntary standards and their associated certifi ation systems and ecolabels 
are not themselves incarnations of CSR.  Instead, what they do is provide the 
institutional structure to allow firms to benefit or be punished by their adoption of 
CSR norms and behaviors. They accomplish the necessary precedent for firms to 
change: create a market value for firm reputation and  market for virtue (Vogel 




campaigns or organized boycotts, latter stage institutions will utilize more 
sophisticated market-based mechanisms to provide the incentives required to allow 
for the widespread adoption of new norms. 
The lack of insight into the diverse set of new institutions leads Segerlund to 
accept that, after a “tipping point” where a norm becomes far more widely accepted, a 
stage of consolidation exists where the once-varied expressions of the norm begin to 
normalize and institutionalize in the same way. This stage, corresponding with 
Zadek’s Consolidating stage for CSR (see Table 2.1), shows evidence of common 
business practices, voluntary standards, and steps owards legislation. With 
consolidation complete, the norm becomes a widely accepted fact of life.  This 
inevitability towards internalization exists in the Finnemore and Sikkink model 
(1998), in Bernstein and Cashore’s model (2007), and in Zadek’s (2006) shown in 
Table 2.2 Yet, consolidation does not seem to reflect the diversity of actors, 
institutions, or norm expressions in the world of voluntary standards. And 
internalization, while perhaps true for the norm, may not correspond well with the 
diversity of standards that cater to the same norm. While Segerlund may have 
observed consolidation around norms of human rights, t e reality may point more 
towards a divergence of practices around a particular norm rather than a consolidation 
or convergence.  If there were a consolidation around what it meant to provide human 
rights, there would be one standard that all firms abide by. Instead, there are at least 




social standards related to human rights. Some follow a variant of ISO standards 
14024, the ISO Guide 65, or standards from the ILO, but all take the freedom to adapt 
the standard for their own.  While the standards for human rights do tend to converge 
around a similar set of norms, a central question remains: why not one standard?  
What seems evident is that there may be some nebulous c nsolidation around the 
norm of human rights, but there is a significant divergence around what that means in 
practice.   
Segerlund’s study takes the first step at applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
norms lifecycle to a political environment where non-state actors are the primary 
players.  However, the study maintains a constructivist analysis that emphasizes 
socialization as an explanatory factor for change.  This is the natural starting point for 
constructivist-based analysis, but must be revisited when seeking to understand the 
rise of organizations that capitalize on the changing preferences, identities and social 
context within the marketplace; a journey that demands rationalist explanations. Since 
we are aiming to explain change in market actors, market structures, dynamics and 
incentives must also be understood.  Institutions leading to a norm cascade function 
by effectively altering incentive structures for enough actors to lead to a cascade of 
adoption.  By aligning the architecture of accountability of firms and brining together 
their internal and external behavioral influences. Incentives may be purely social, in 




a study of market actors, any exemption of material factors will necessarily be 
limited.  
Standing on the foundation set by Segerlund’s study and its insights into how 
“material and rational considerations are not sufficient to explain” (2010: 33) the rise 
of CSR, I will accept that socialization and the struggle for legitimacy is a key and 
central part of early stage norm evolution and the organizations that aim to expand the 
norm. Yet, heeding the call from Cashore et al (2007) I will build upon existing 
frameworks with the goal of examining the waning role f legitimacy within social 
markets, and the increased role of political economic factors of change.  The 
empirical challenge to the assumption of institutional consolidation and convergence, 
require a slight modification to the norms lifecycle proposed by Finnemore and 
Sikkink and adapted by Segerlund, and will form the analytical basis for this study.   
2.5.1 Three-Stage Analytical Framework 
Voluntary standards organizations rise in response to changing norms, and also act to 
further the norm across a newly norm-infused market, or social market.  Their growth 
is co-dependent with the rise of the norm: as the norm grows and tends towards full 
socialization or internalization, the manner in which these organizations interact with 
the marketplace changes.  These are the organizations that shift incentives for market 
actors, gradually transforming the logic of action from appropriateness towards 





In the early stages of norm evolution, norm entrepreneurs, advocacy groups 
and activists dominate a social market.  The emerging standard organization acts 
according to the logics dictated by norm entrepreneurs, and is caught in a struggle for 
political legitimacy.  As the social market matures, the standard organization will be 
engaged in the objective of converting market actors he new norm. This process, 
corresponding to a norm cascade, has been associated with socialization, but will be 
examined here as the pivot point from an environment dominated by a logic of 
appropriateness, or socialization, towards one where the new norm can now represent 
material benefits to market actors leading to a logic f consequence.  This argument is 
based on the necessity to incorporate the logic of corporate social responsibility into 
the standard lifecycle since it seeks to align its strategies with the choices made by 
firms. Since a norm cascade is when mass conversion happens, it is the critical point 
at which socialization becomes less important and firm logics increase in relevance. 
Increasing political legitimacy was necessary for scialization prior to a cascade. 
Since the cascade is evidence of successful socialization, other factors necessarily 
become relevant after it. This is the very point of these standards organizations: to 
align the norm with market incentives, turning socialization into material advantage.  
At this stage, change is informed by the political and economic conditions of the 
social market, specifically the degree of political centralization of the marketplace.  
As I will explain later in this chapter, this variable goes beyond a simple assessment 




includes market concentration, as well as the relativ  power concentration of existing 
market and non-market actors (e.g., states, NGOs, IGOs, industry associations, etc.). 
As the social market develops, greater integration with the market occurs, and 
concerns around political legitimacy further decline. Traditional market actors 
continue to discover material reasons to adopt the norm, and likewise, new standards 
organizations emerge. Observations of a multiplicity of organizations conflict with 
theoretical claims of consolidation and conformity of institutions. Instead, what is 
observed is a divergence of standards and organizations, albeit loosely aligned with 
the new norm. Consistent with the tendency towards greater market integration, the 
factors that will explain development in this stage will be understood through market 
factors. In this case, competition among standards will reflect competition among 
traditional market actors where differentiation is key to competitive advantage.  
Differentiation aligns with market segmentation and explains divergence of standards.  
Table 2.3 Social Market Lifecycle 
STAGE 1: Emergence  
Description Norm entrepreneurs act to further their cause and alter 
conventional production methods.  
Actors Non-profit, voluntary, advocacy, philanthropy, watchdog, 
charity 
Motives Ideational Commitment 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Legitimacy 
Dominant Logic Persuasion, Empathy and ideational commitments  
Characteristics Contentious relationship between advocates and market, or no 
relationship at all. 
Impact Increase transparency, increase reputational costs t  market 




STAGE 2: Non-Market Institutionalization 
Description Dominance of state, firms, or NGOs. Increasing political 
legitimacy drives behavior 
Actors Alliances, standards formalized, non profit and advocacy 
Motives Benefits of Coordination, increasing political legitimacy 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Legitimacy 
Dominant Logic Political bargaining as legitimacy confronts market realities  
Characteristics Institutions created by advocates to change market practices. 
Policies set by NGO or lead firm or industry consortium and 
their allies. Shifting from dualistic to collaborative.  
Impact Policies set with aim to increase influence on market actors. 
Formalization of movement and certification processes enacted. 
STAGE 3: Market Institutionalization 
Description Market segmentation and supply chain opportunities explain 
divergence of standards. Competing actors rush to fill untapped 
market niche. Convergence of norm ensues. 
Actors Standards entrepreneurs  
Motives Market expansion. Norm Expansion. 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Political Centralization and Differentiation 
Characteristics Competition ensues under market rules. Standards 
entrepreneurs emerge to expand the norm through various 
market channels. Pure market players compete. Convergence of 
norm, divergence of standards. 
Impact Convergence of marketplace towards norm-set, and divergence 
of standards. 
2.5.1.1 The Stages 
Stage One - Norm Emergence 
It is under the assumption of transparency and perfect information that markets can be 
considered "efficient," and prices an accurate reflection of product value. In other 
words, it is only when consumers are fully informed can purchases be considered 




aggregate preferences.  Misleading information related to quality and production 
processes distort market demand and lead to inaccurte pricing.  In this sense, all 
markets that do not embed information about social osts and values into their 
production processes, in order to be reflected in their prices, are imperfect and 
inefficient.  Embedding the costs of environmental and/or social externalities into 
product pricing is centered on the principle of increased transparency, a prerequisite 
for the proper functioning of any market. 
Increasing transparency about undesirable methods of production is the 
primary objective of stage one actors. Social movement advocates have access to 
information, usually through their relationship to subject matter experts (Fischer 
2000), and seek to make this information more widely known in an attempt to 
promote their social cause. Norm entrepreneurs, key earl  actors in the lifecycle of a 
norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), expose the social and environmental costs of 
production through a variety of publicity campaigns against private actors. These 
agents of change set out to persuade others that the existing norm-environment is no 
longer appropriate and that new norms of behavior are required. The challenge they 
are presented with is to alter the world’s perception of what is appropriate while 
doing so within existing standards of appropriateness. One common strategy is to be 
explicitly inappropriate. From the militant tactics of anti-globalization activists in 
Seattle 1999, the spray-painting of runway models wearing fur coats, and the chaining 




garnering the attention required to shock observers out of complacency to reevaluate 
their position on relevant issues.  
The highly publicized campaigns of social advocates force the hand of firms 
to alter production methods in favor of socially responsible practices.   The threat of 
future costs or decreased profits is enough to force the hands of the responsive firm. 
Boycotts and pressure campaigns act to shed light on the socially relevant aspects of 
market transactions and act as rudimentary mechanisms to promote transparency 
surrounding elements of production not normally pursued in conventional market 
transactions - the social norms and values of production. These social advocacy 
campaigns against market actors represent the earliest form of active norm adherents 
and are the necessary elements to bring conventional market actors into the social 
market.  Adherents are motivated by altruism, empathy nd ideals and use persuasion 
as their primary method of change.  
In the earliest phase of norm emergence, norm entrepren urs are disparate and 
organized at grassroots levels rather than within te formal organizations of politics.  
That changes soon thereafter. Coordination and cooperation enable the movement to 
share resources and work more efficiently at achieving their goals.  Formalizing into 
international non-governmental organizations allows them to funnel funds and expert 
opinion, both necessary to continue their operation and develop the cognitive frames 
necessary to persuade. Norm entrepreneurs at the inernational level require an 




and Sikkink 1998, p899). This formalization of the movement into organizational 
platforms is a key element of this study since it is the organizational platforms, in this 
case the organizations creating voluntary standards, that I am most interested in. 
Given the centrality of these organizations to my study, and the need to distinguish if, 
how, and when movements formalize into organizations, I adapt the framework in 
this study by defining this step as a separate stage, Stage 2 Non-Market 
Institutionalization.  
Stage Two – Non-Market institutionalization 
Non-Market institutionalization occurs when the organizational platforms that will be 
used to further promote the norm into the international system are created and 
formalized.  Whereas the first stage of norm emergence in dominated by activists 
using “inappropriate” tactics to question the status q o, this stage is characterized by 
new methods aimed at shifting payoff structures for marketplace actors. They see 
benefits of collaborating and cooperating, and choose to align with existing 
organizations of transnational governance or create their own. For the state-based 
analysis of Finnemore and Sikkink, the once-disparate norm entrepreneurs must work 
through organizational platforms in order to gain the support of states. They align 
with UN-related organizations, the World Bank, or other NGOs in order to engage 
directly with states and influence behaviors.  Despit  being unable to coerce states, 
these organizational platforms are able to increase adoption of the norm by aligning 




clarify the contours of the norm and define what constitute its violation and the 
sanctions for breaking them.  In the context of engagement with states, these include 
those organizations tied to international law and adopt the rules and procedures of 
multilateral organizations (Finnemore and Sikkink: 900): 
In most cases, for an emergent norm to reach a threshold and move toward the 
second stage, it must become institutionalized in specific sets of international 
rules and organizations. Since 1948, emergent norms have increasingly 
become institutionalized in international law, in the rules of multilateral 
organizations, and in bilateral foreign policies. 
 
This study differs in that I am observing changes in marketplace norms, and 
while these norm entrepreneurs often lobby states for new laws, they are primarily 
trying to change firm behaviors directly. They develop standards that are voluntary, 
and use strategies, namely ecolabels, as a way to align firms’ incentives with adoption 
of the new norm.  These organizations aim to shift payoff structures of actors in order 
to achieve compliance, but unlike in the situation of states, governance systems that 
create voluntary standards use market-based incentives to alter firm behavior.  This 
provides an important split from the norm lifecycle model and changes our insight 
into these organizations of transnational new governance.  
 The character of these organizations – that they adopt rules and procedures of 
multistakeholder organizations – continues to be accepted by scholars (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2007, Cashore 2002a, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Zurn 2004).  While this 




early ones – the idea that they maintain certain procedural forms of governance 
aligned with the principles of multistakeholder organizations does not always hold 
true in this study. Existing scholarship assumes that adopting these multistakeholder 
forms of governance are an important way for market-based governance systems to 
gain legitimacy, and that the battle for legitimacy is an important explanation for the 
emergence of competing standard systems.  This study hows that while legitimacy is 
an important factor in establishing the earliest voluntary standards within a social 
market, later standards systems need not rely on legitimacy, nor do they need to 
maintain the procedural forms associated with attemp s to bolster legitimacy, 
specifically, adopting the principles, procedures and governance structures of 
multistakeholder organizations in order to be effectiv  agents of change or promoters 
of new norms.  Thus, shifting the explanation of competition away from legitimacy, I 
focus on the market-based nature of these voluntary standards as they seek to shift 
incentives for firms to adopt new norms. Only through the imposition of market 
incentives can an effective market-based governance structure exist, and a norm 
cascade be achieved.  
Stage Three - Market Institutionalization    
After achieving success in persuading others of their n w norm, a certain contagion 
occurs and takes the norm through a tipping point towards a cascade. This norm 
cascade, leveraging a process of international socialization, induces norm breakers to 




censure enforced by material sanctions.  Studies have shown how this process occurs 
in international norms of human and labor rights, the non-use of chemical weapons or 
the use of mines (Lutz and Sikkink 2001). When enough critical states endorse the 
new norm, it redefines what is “appropriate” for that relevant subset of states.  This 
contagion occurs because of a successful socializaton of states has occurred, and 
their reputation, legitimacy and international estem are on line.  In the market-based 
environment, however, a cascade occurs when the organizational platforms of the 
previous stage successfully align market incentives for firms so as to create market 
incentives for them to adopt the norm rather than fight it.  The organizational 
platforms of the previous stage shift payoff structures and change the dominant 
motives for action from a logic of appropriateness, dominated by legitimacy, 
socialization, reputation and esteem, towards a the logic of consequence7.   
It is a popular notion in the scholarly community that there can be a stage of 
consolidation of norms, institutions, and standards that precedes the final stage of 
norm evolution – that of internalization or legislation. This is an optimistic 
perspective given the belief that competing standards systems complicate the effort of 
developing widespread policies for industry (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004). This 
framework begins from a different position: that there is a gradual convergence of 
practices around a newly legitimized norm, but there will also be a divergence of 
                                                
7 The logic of consequence applies to the firms that must have market-based reasons for altering 
production methods, often at their own costs, but these incentives are always predicated on the 
evolution of the norm across the population of consumers.  For these citizen actors, the penetration of 




standards, policies, and organizations promulgating the norm.  Consolidation will be 
replaced by segmentation. Segmentation is a function of the opportunities for 
differentiation within a social market, a key explanatory factor that will be elaborated 
on in the following section of this chapter. 
As the social market develops, which is to say thatfirms adopt standards for 
their pragmatic market-related outcomes and incentiv s, and concerns around 
political legitimacy decline. Traditional market actors continue to discover material 
reasons to adopt the norm, and likewise, new standards organizations emerge. 
Observations of a multiplicity of organizations conflict with theoretical claims of 
consolidation and conformity of institutions. Instead, what is observed is a divergence 
of standards and organizations, albeit loosely aligned with the new norm. Consistent 
with the tendency towards greater market integration, the factors that will explain 
development in this stage will be understood through market factors. In this case, 
competition among standards will reflect competition among traditional market actors 
where differentiation is key to competitive advantage.  Since it is the behavior of 
firms that these standards organizations are seeking to influence, their strive for 
differentiation is very highly informed by the opportunity for firm and product 
differentiation and will be ordered according to market segments. Markets are 
segmented based on the variety group tastes, incomes, geographies, and quality 




While some may see this stage as conflict-based and counter-productive to the 
social goals aspired to in the earliest stages of market development, the competing 
systems themselves may view their roles as complementary8.  The more organizations 
are competing to offer ethically sourced coffee, for example, the greater the overall 
awareness of the issue, and eventually, the greater the social impact. The market for 
virtue is now mature, and there are a variety of ways to benefit from new norms.  
Unlike previous stages, however, the dominant struggle is not between social 
advocacy groups and market actors, but between advoc cy groups, and among market 
actors.  
                                                








2.5.1.2 Arguments, Factors of Change, and Hypotheses 
Recall that the analytical framework for this study is premised on the two logics that 
form the core argument for this study. These are: 
1) The logic of market integration: Once socialization pushes a norm towards a 
cascade, the institutions that emerge to expand the norm into the marketplace will 
seek to increase market adherence to the norm by altering the cost-benefit analysis 
of market actors. At this stage, the principles and practices of early advocacy 
groups, including the struggle for legitimacy, and the organizational forms of 
democratic governance and multilateralism, are replaced by the principles and 
practices of market expansion. Therefore, we may expect that a more developed 
and mature social market, as observed through greater multiplicity, will lead to a 
greater likelihood that organizations will adopt practices, policies and strategies 
targeting greater market integration, conformity and expansion.  Likewise, an 
increase in multiplicity within social markets will lead to a lower likelihood that 
standards organizations will adopt institutional elements intent on increasing their 
political legitimacy. 
2) The logic of multiplicity: Since voluntary standards systems, like traditional 
governing systems, aim to increase influence and compliance, we understand their 
plight as one for increased power to do so.  Actors intent on promoting and 
proliferating norms of ethical production survey the environment within which 
they seek to emerge and choose the path to power with the greatest benefit 




costs are evaluated through the political centralization of the social market, where 
greater centralization of power makes it harder for new entrants to offer alternate 
solutions (impose their own power), thereby increasing the costs of developing 
new standards. In highly centralized social markets, new entrants will be less 
inclined to bear the costs of competing against, and therefore more likely to join, 
established power centers. Therefore, multiplicity is less likely to occur. Second, 
benefits are based on the existence of a clear political and market constituency. If 
a potential new entrant can identify a unique group f people that they will 
influence and serve, the potential benefits of greater than if all constituencies are 
currently being targeted and served by existing standards. Therefore, the greater 
the opportunities for differentiation the greater the potential benefits, and the 
greater the likelihood that multiplicity occurs. 
2.5.1.3 Factors of Change 
Changes in two factors that influence how social markets evolve are explored: an 
industry’s political centralization and opportunities for differentiation. Since 
voluntary standards systems, like traditional governing systems, aim to increase 
influence and compliance, we understand their plight as one for increased power.  
Changes in their behavior are crudely explained by their drive to increase power. 
Therefore, the factors that influence their evolutin are necessarily those that will 
vary their degree of power and influence in the marketplace.  Each of these factors of 
change represents an aspect of power specific to market-based governance systems. 




dominance in one factor tends to reduce the need for strength in another factor. For 
example, if a voluntary standard gains control of an industry that is highly politically 
centralized, which can happen with the participation and buy-in of all major parties, 
or the involvement of states – say, for example the Kimberly Process – then 
differentiation become less relevant for that system. If the Kimberly Process were to 
fall apart, then product and brand differentiation may motivate actors across the 
industry to take on standards of their own.  
Each of the variables, elaborated on below, will inf uence how a system 
attracts adherents, achieves compliance, creates alliances, influences consumer 
behavior, and achieves its goals.  Since these factors are proposed to inform us of 
social market development, they will also be examined for their ability to explain if 
and how competing systems emerge. The basic premise behind these factors is that 
emerging standards systems will evaluate their opportunities to operate based on the 
barriers to entry into a social market where a) the more political power is centralized, 
the more difficult it is to compete politically, and b) the less opportunity for 
differentiation, the less benefits there are to exist. These variables, along with some 
corresponding hypotheses are elaborated on below.  
Industry Political Centralization 
Power is influenced by the political context within which a standards system operates 
and will be measured as a function of two observed el ments of the social market: 
political concentration and industry economic structure. Industry political 




number and size of major players in that industry measures the concentration of 
power. For political concentration, this includes the number and size of industry 
associations and NGOs playing a key role in the governance of the industry. 
Economic concentration is the fragmentation of the industry based on the number of 
firms that earn the majority of revenues. Both are elaborated on below. 
Political Concentration: A standard that enters a social market where industry 
players are highly organized will be faced with very different conditions than one that 
enters a highly fragmented political context.  This variable builds upon earlier studies 
that focus on a battle for legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 2008), but does not 
assume that multiplicity occurs when legitimacy fails. Instead, it is not legitimacy that 
fails, but the ability to compete politically that encourages new standards to emerge. 
A dominant political system shares attributes with a ighly legitimized system: strong 
NGO support, industry support, even state support. But, a standard system may have 
all the attributes of a highly legitimate system, but still attract competitors. This is the 
case in the ethical coffee market, where the Fair Lbeling Organization (FLO) gained 
checked off all the boxes for legitimacy, and was perceived as legitimate by 
competing standards organizations (as per interviews described in chapter 4), yet 
other systems still emerged. I argue that this occurs because there are alternate 
political powers within the coffee social market that new standard systems can align 
with, and these multiple spheres of political power increase the likelihood that 




A key attribute of industry political centralization is that power asymmetries 
occur and the main locus of power will always have more power than newly formed 
political powers.  Centralization occurs when major states are involved in an 
international non-governmental organization with standard setting objectives, as 
would be the case in the World Health Organization’s standards on infant food 
formula marketing. Centralization occurs when there is one controlling industry 
association, or an existing consortium of NGOs, aligned with major firms and states, 
creating a set of standards aimed at the industry a a whole. In a decentralized power 
scenario, there are several, credible and legitimate, sources of political power. There 
may be several prominent industry associations, or NGOs functioning within the 
market.  
Another key element of political centralization relat s to the industry 
governance structure, or supply chain power distributions, as proposed by Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005).   The capacity to govern without government – or 
governance – is highly relevant in an increasingly market-based globalized world.  
The power to regulate, set standards, and alter behavior exists within markets as a 
separate dynamic from the regulatory influence and governing power of states. 
Markets exist in hierarchical forms where certain actors – lead firms – can impose 
behavioral mandates on firms and actors subordinate to them within the market’s 
supply chain.  In other words, governance already exists within markets, even before 
the insertion of formal structures political scientsts call ‘non-state market driven 




and public interested campaigns, enter into a market int nt on changing behavior. 
According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2004), supply chain governance is necessary as 
it determines much of the following four market-criti al parameters: what is 
produced; how it is produced; when it is produced; how much is produced. 
Lead firms within various sectors (often several firms) control these 
parameters thereby imposing supply chain governance ov r subordinate firms 
wanting to engage the same market. Governance within a marketplace has power over 
what and how production will occur.  This is of central importance to the study of 
market-based governance since they aim to achieve changes in precisely that – the 
how and what of production processes and ends. The study of governance power 
within supply chains is important in understanding the power dynamics within a 
newly formed supply network.  Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) develop a 
theoretical framework to explain governance patterns in global supply chains. They 
highlight three variables that explain how global vlue chains are governed and 
change, and from these three variables, build a typology of 5 different global 
governance supply chains each representing different d grees of power asymmetries. 
On one end of the spectrum is the Market Governance Supply Chain representing a 
system with minimal power asymmetries across actors. On the other end, are 
hierarchical governance systems representing transactions internal to a global firm 
where there is near-complete control for the center ov  suppliers across the globe.  
 New voluntary standards organizations seeking to manipulate production 




changes – in other words, they seek the power to govern. Yet when NGOs enter new 
markets with the goal of establishing a social market, they enter a market with pre-
existing power dynamics and governance structures. And just as with the international 
order of states, power is not ceded easily. Supply-Side success is a direct function of 
the system’s ability to alter supply network structures to shift power to the social 
market. This power enables the governance system to align supply network actor 
goals with its own goals.  
According to Gereffi et al., there are five basic value chain governance ideal 
types, referred to as supply-chain structures in ths research, from lowest power 
asymmetry to highest (see Figure 2 below): 
1. Markets: Representing the lowest presence of power asymmetries ( he most equal 
across suppliers and buyers), where the most important element of this 
governance type is that there are very low costs for buyer and suppliers to switch 
to new trading partners.  
2. Modular value chains: Suppliers produce goods according to buyer specifications. 
Supplier owns and takes responsibility for competencies, technologies, and capital 
outlays. 
3. Relational value chains: Interactions between buyers and sellers are complex with 
high asset specificity creating mutual dependence which may be managed through 




4. Captive value chain: 
they are highly dependent on buyers. These value
high degree of control by lead firms.
5. Hierarchy: This represents a vertically integrated value
control, often within the same firm, dictates production specifications to suppliers. 
 
Table 2.4 Value Chain Typology and Power Asymmetries
Source: “The Governance of Global Value Chains.”
Sturgeon. 2005 
Economic Concentration
and size distribution of firms in an industry. The 
run into hundreds or thousands. The existence of a large number of firms in an 
industry reduces opportunities for coord
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generally speaking, the level of competition in an industry rises with the number of 
firms in the industry. The size distribution of firms in an industry is important from 
the perspective of both business policy and public policy. If all firms in an industry 
are small in size, relative to the size of the industry, it is a fragmented industry. If a 
small number of firms controls a large share of the industry’s output or sales, it is a 
consolidated industry. The type of competition in fragmented inustries is generally 
very different from that in consolidated (or concentrated) industries. 
Beyond the relevance of legitimacy and once a social m rket is already 
established through, as we observe in this study, the legitimacy of the primary mover 
in the standards market, other factors influence the s ape of the social market.  
Standards organizations themselves will shift towards market interests and the social 
market as a whole does so as well.  As an organization shifts, market realities begin to 
inform their behavior.  To understand what market variable in particular inform social 
markets, we begin with Michael Porter calls the industry environment within which a 
standard operates. Porter states “the essence of formulating competitive strategy is 
relating a company to its environment.” (Porter 1980: 3) Since this study proposes 
that standards organizations take on the attributes of firms within developed social 
markets, it follows that in order to understand social markets, it is essential to 
understand their industry environment. 
According to Michael Porter, competition within an i dustry is not mere 
coincidence, but is determined by the economic structu e of that industry. According 




industry and explain the degree of competition therein. The greater the intensity of the 
five forces, the greater the competition in an industry. These five forces are: Threat of 
new entrants; Bargaining Power of suppliers; Threat of substitute products; 
Bargaining power of buyers; Rivalry among existing firms.  
A complete examination of these five forces provides analysts a rich and 
textured array of qualitative and quantitative data from which to understand the 
competitiveness of an industry.  Given that our analysis is of the competition amongst 
standards, not firms themselves, a complete assessment of the Five Forces would be 
inappropriate.  What is of note to this study is how greater competition within an 
industry makes coordination amongst firms more difficult. Since standards aim to 
alter firm behavior, a highly competitive industry will impose significant coordination 
costs increasing the likelihood that alternative systems emerge.  However, the number 
of firms in an industry does not tell the whole story. An industry with a hundred firms 
competing for 9% of the market share with the other 91% controlled by one powerful 
firm (think of Microsoft Windows dominance in the computer operating system 
space), is very different than an industry with only 10 firms each controlling 10% of 
the market. In the scenario described, the industry with more firms is actually less 
competitive than the one with fewer firms. The number of firms within an industry 
does not, by itself, provide sufficient evidence for fragmentation. Instead of number 
of firms, the key metric that informs industry competitiveness is the fragmentation of 





A highly concentrated industry where a few firms gain  high level of control 
within an industry leads to threats of monopoly and oligopoly – both would trigger 
important and necessary policy choices to protect the public interest.  To a lesser 
degree, highly concentrated industries, where a few firms control a large portion of 
sales and production within an industry would result in less competition and greater 
opportunities for coordination amongst firms.  I extend this premise to standards. 
More concentrated industries are more difficult for new standards to emerge because 
firms can coordinate more easily to present a challenge to emerging standards. 
However, if a standard does break through the challenges presented by firms, it is 
more likely to become the de facto standard since, in order to have created the 
standard, it would have successfully aligned with the powerful firms within that 
industry; the industry’s market leaders. Other emergent standards would be faced 
with the challenge of overcoming the alliance betwen the existing standard and the 
market leaders. The costs of coordination for firms and standards organizations are 
inversely related in concentrated industries: firms have lower costs to coordinate 
whereas standards organizations face higher costs.  In other words: the more 
concentrated an industry, the less likely the existnce of a standard.  However, if a 
standard does exist in a highly concentrated industry, there is less likelihood of a 
multiplicity of standards.  
Conversely, in a highly fragmented industry, coordination costs for firms are 
high, whereas costs for standards organizations are low. Therefore we can 




voluntary standards. Furthermore, once a social market is created by the existence of 
a standard, the costs of creating a new standard drop even more, leading to a higher 
probability that there is a multiplicity of standars. 
A widely used and intuitive measure of industry concentration is the four-firm 
concentration ratio, or CR4. This measure calculates the combined share of the 
market of the four largest firms in an industry.  The higher the CR4 ratio, the more 
concentrated an industry.  Data of industry concentration based on the analysis of the 
4 (CR4) and 8 (CR8) largest firms within an industry is taken from the US 
Department of Commerce information gathered from the most recent US census and 
based on the standard North American Industry Classification System  (NAICS). 
When Industry Political Centralization is low, we observe: lower power 
asymmetries; multiple major industry associations; multiple major NGOs; 
economically fragmented industry. When Industry Political Centralization is high, we 
observe: higher power asymmetries; economically concentrated Industry; few strong 
industry associations; major NGO or state-based voluntary program; alliances 
between lead firm(s) and international NGO. 
Differentiation  
Early norm entrepreneurs use the risk of differentiating a firm for negative practices 
in the early stages of norm emergence to motivate adherence, and the opportunity to 
differentiate for positive behavior through eco-labeling is a primary motivator once a 




explaining early adherence, latter stage adherence, and the choice of which standard 
to adhere to, is a function of product-level brand differentiation. For product brands, a 
key driver of differentiation opportunities lies inthe industry itself, specifically: 
market segments.  Differentiation opportunities and market segments are discussed 
below.  
Firm brands are worth billions of dollars. Although an abstract notion to some, 
social advocacy groups have understood the immense valu of brand reputation, and 
have learned how to leverage it to achieve their ends. When norm entrepreneurs 
appear in the earliest stages of social market development, they attack a company by 
linking the company name and image to a negative social r environmental reality. If 
the linking is successful, billions of dollars of value in market capitalization can be 
lost9. Firms are extremely sensitive to brand reputation because, once lost, it can take 
years, and billions of dollars to recover. In 1999, it was reported that a group of 
Belgian school children got sick after drinking Coca-Cola from the can. The Belgian 
government reacted by banning the sale of Coca-Cola for ten days to identify and 
resolve the issue, a move that cost the company hundreds of millions of dollars in 
sales. The reaction from the state was costly, but the market reaction was what really 
hurt: investors panicked plummeting the price per share, and erasing billions of 
dollars of company value. According to a study by the Global Branding Consultancy, 
Interbrand (2010), the year Toyota issued a massive recall on faulty gas pedals, it lost 
16% of its total brand value, from $31 Billion to $26 Billion, which reflects perfectly 
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on its total market capitalization, as the total loss in share price from its peak before 
the recall to November was 16.2%, or $25 Billion in market capitalization.  
Yet, branding is not relevant merely at the corporate level. It is also an 
important variable in product reputation, sales, and positioning. A distinction must be 
made between corporate-brands and product-brands. One notable observation in 
social markets is that early stage advocacy groups target firm-brand reputation, 
whereas later stage certification systems try to offer product-brand reputation a boost. 
And much like differences in market segmentation, competing standards systems will 
emerge to offer different branding options loaded with a different set of product 
implications than those associated with a dominant certification brand.  
A market segment refers to the sub-population targeed by the business and 
can be compared to a governing body’s constituency (Goldstein 2007).  This can be 
based on a group’s demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income level, 
political leanings, etc), geography, or behavioral characteristics. Business-to-business 
market segments exist as well and can vary according to geography, customer type 
(industry, size of the organization, position in the value chain), or buyer behavior 
(relationship and loyalty to suppliers, usage patterns, and order size).  A system’s 
policies may be more relevant to one segment versus another, which may influence 
who and how franchisees are converted, and how competing systems emerge.  
Understanding the market segment that a system operates in is necessary to 
understand how competing systems emerge. Competing systems may choose to target 
a whole new segment of the marketplace with new standards rather than compete 
 
 
directly in the same segment.  Market segmentation will also inform us on who 
becomes a franchisee and why 
unthreatened by a standard 
segment will feel compelled to act.  
Market segments provide the governance boundaries for ystems. Trying to 
impose a system of standards on a group of actors in a separate market segment may 
be like trying to get another country to ratify a law passed in another country.  A 
coffee retailer that sells to working class buyers in less developed countries are likely 
to have no interest in becoming fair trade franchisees. Likewise, a food seller places 
little value on a product certified USDA organic unless they’re selling their products 
in the United States.  These market realities are key structural factors that may help 
explain latter stage development of voluntary standards, most specifically how and 
why competing standards emerge to compete.  
Table 2.5 Multiplicity Matrix 
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– actors outside the target segment may feel 







When differentiation opportunity is low, we observe: producer driven supply 
chain; business-to-business product offering; low brand recognition of products 
and/or services; market segments not based on consumer psychographics (e.g., 
geographic).  When differentiation opportunity is high, we observe: buyer driven 
supply chain; consumer-facing product and brands; high brand recognition of 
products and/or services; market segments based on consumer psychographics. A 
matrix summarizing the relationship between the standards and the state of 
multiplicity and standards competition within an industry is provided above.  
 





3 THE ETHICAL COFFEE SOCIAL MARKET 
Though its roots lie in the Alternative Trade (ATO) movement […] Today, Fair 
Trade pursues a ‘‘mainstreaming strategy’’ which aims to achieve rapid growth 
in market share by encouraging corporations, governm nts, major retailers and 
other large economic actors to support Fair Trade. 
         Taylor 2005, p 134 
 
 
The following chapter presents the emergence and development of ethically produced 
coffee through the lens of the Three Stage model presented in the previous chapter. It 
validates the framework of this study by highlighting the distinct motivations, logic 
and characteristics of each stage of growth, and endorses a key argument for this 
study: that social markets will tend towards greater market integration, transforming 
movements into businesses, activists to entrepreneus, and standards to brands.  
The coffee social market began as a movement embedded within a loose 
network of activist and disparate actors gradually transformed itself from movement, 
to political organization, to market actor. Throughout this transformation, activist and 
advocacy interests, are gradually replaced with those f markets and market actors. 
While the attempt to gain legitimacy is a crucial element to the early formation of the 
political organization in Stage 2, that goal is eventually overtaken by the need to 
provide essential business services to producers.  The principle factors explaining 
producer participation in the Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) are market-




been the case in an industry dominated by large producers.  Instead, it was the 
economic conditions of the marketplace – highly decentralized and fragmented – that 
presented the FLO with a key opportunity to empower small producers.  The 
character of the coffee social market is highly dependent on these industry realities.  
The decades-old once-disparate fair trade movement has been formalized as a 
product labeling and certification system regarded as a bellwether in non-state market 
driven governance, voluntary clubs and standards organizations. The original grass-
roots movement of alternative trade organizations (ATO) is now represented by the 
organization of 24 labeling and producer organizations called the Fairtrade Labeling 
Organizations International (FLO).  The FLO is the organization responsible for 
coordinating activities of 19 national labeling init atives across 23 countries, 3 
producer networks, and 2 marketing organizations.   
At a time when networks move to the center of global governance studies, the 
FLO stands out as a meta-network connecting a variety of networks, which in turn, 
include a variety of networked member organizations e compassing for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations. Adding to the complexity of the meta-network, within 
each sub-network exists a stream of producers, retailers, and intermediaries 
representing the unique supply chains of a product or industry - coffee, tea, chocolate, 
fruits, crafts, and other products represent distinct supply chain verticals.  While some 
general observations may be made with regard to the verall design and emergence of 
fair trade norms in economic markets, a more targeted focus will aid the analysis of 




3.1 Stage One - Emergence 
In the emergence stage of social market development, social norms are supported and 
provided by non-market actors, norm entrepreneurs who may act to persuade others 
of the value of the norm. In this stage, the norm is considered latent, but emergent 
within markets.  The dominant factors of change are legitimacy: legitimacy of the new 
norm versus the status quo. In the case of the coffee social market, very few 
opponents to the movement raised concerns in this first stage of development. 
Emerging norms surrounding the ideals of fair trade ar  best understood 
within the larger socio-political framing of global poverty. Global economic trends 
related to free trade and the ideal of comparative advantage within a globalized 
economy has been challenged as flawed in their world ide application (Florini 
2000).  The growing opposition to powerful global economic interests argues that the 
benefits of globalized trade are unequally distributed and serve to widen the gap 
between rich and poor (Goldsmith and Mander 2001; Nader 1993; Stiglitz 2002).  
Worse, as dependency theorists claim, the unequal terms of trade relegate less 
developed country producers to the inevitable fate of global serfdom (Munck and 
O’Hearn 1999).  They argue against the dominant ideal of free trade while taking on 
the mission to achieve fair trade.   Yet the fair trade network of alternative trading 
organizations began even before issues of trade related to globalization penetrated the 
popular consciousness of liberal minded activists in the North (Nicholls and Opal 




The middle of the twentieth century saw the emergence of organizations intent 
on promoting social and economic healing after WWII, including the major 
international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Many of these groups had differing 
tactical objectives but shared the unifying, although somewhat vague objective, of 
reaching out to poor communities in the “third world.” Oxfam, originally created as a 
national relief committee to persuade the British government to allow essential 
supplies to German citizens during the naval blockade of the Nazis, eventually 
broadened its scope to include the relief of suffering arising as a result of wars or of 
other causes in any part of the world (Renard 2003). Oxfam’s network of field staff 
placed it in a unique position to begin exporting crafts created by these very 
communities in need of economic development.  This trade-based approach to 
poverty reduction was consistent with the organization’s goals of helping 
communities develop the skills to enable their own development.   Producer crafts 
were purchased directly from the community and sold through volunteer-run Oxfam 
retail shops. Early retail success encouraged expansion of their “fairly traded” 
products and quickly become the organization’s main source of income. As anti-free 
trade activist movements became popularized in the 1990s, Oxfam Trading changed 
its name to Fair Trade (fully, Oxfam Fair Trade Company). In 1998, after a review of 
Oxfam’s trading practices, the organization decided to shift its buying practicing 
away from direct sourcing of Fair Trade products, to fair trade importers creating the 
earliest stages of an alternate supply chain of fair tr de production. Oxfam continues 




Contemporaneous to Oxfam’s initiatives, several other groups, many of them 
faith-based, began trading in directly sourced goods with the objective of improving 
the lives of the world’s poor.  The evangelical Church of the Brethren created 
SERRV International (Sales Exchange for Refugee Rehabilitation Vocation) to 
promote economic development through the “just and direct”10 purchase and 
marketing of goods from developed country communities. It continues to function as 
a non-profit selling approximately $6 Million worth of goods from over 30 countries 
(Conroy 2007: 304). The Mennonite Central Committee established a market for 
Puerto Rican embroidery through the SelfHelp Crafts o  the World organization.  
Known today as Ten Thousand Villages, it includes more than 160 nonprofit retail 
stores in the U.S. and Canada with sales of approximately US $20 million (ibid, 
p305). 
Later organizational manifestations of the development-through-trade 
movement, called Alternative Trading Organizations (ATOs), emerged with the more 
self-conscious goal of cutting out the middleman by providing producers direct access 
to developed country goods.  The German ATO now known as Gepa represented one 
of the earliest examples of a unique market-oriented not-for-profit organization.  In 
other words, it provided real economic value to tradi ional market actors by providing 
direct access to third-party products. Yet at the same time, its stated mission was (and 
continues to be): to promote disadvantaged producers in the South, influence 
                                                




consumer preferences in the North, and change structures of international trade 
through advocacy11. 
In 1989, several of these ATOs, including Ten Thousand Villages, SERV, 
Gepa, formed the International Federation of Alternative Trade (IFAT). It was an 
alliance of cause-oriented trading organizations seeking to increase their knowledge 
and marketing channels through collaboration. In 1994, Oxfam’s network of retail 
shops merged with other ATOs to form the Network of European World Shops 
(NEWS), consisting of over 2500 shops in 13 European countries. Also in 1994, U.S. 
based ATOs, including wholesalers, retailers, and producers, formed the Fair Trade 
Federation (FTF) with the stated goal of providing economic opportunity to 
disadvantaged artisans and farmers worldwide.  
3.1.1 Analysis 
The early stages of the Fair Trade social market consisted of some notable 
characteristics.  First, most, if not all, vendors were not-for-profits that depended 
heavily on volunteers.  Further, since many of these organizations were founded from 
within other nonprofit or religious groups, their organizational culture and goals were 
primarily philanthropic, and their approach decidedly not market-oriented.  For 
example, as nonprofits, they paid a higher price for products they sourced directly 
from craftspeople, yet sold them at prices comparable to similar products that were 
not fairly traded. Products were sold exclusively at ATO outlets with other fairly 
                                                





traded products.  While innovative supply-chain tactics were used, specifically direct 
sourcing from LDC communities, to form a market for socially responsible 
production methods, little was done to alter conventional markets, change mainstream 
consumer demand, or infuse competing market products with the same social values. 
The result was a parallel market for socially-minded production with limited growth 
potential and no influence on existing conventional m rkets.  The fair trade market 
before its institutionalization stage resembled a ch rity network rather than a social 
market.  
In the 1990s, the fair trade network of alternative rading organizations was a 
vast, well organized, community of shared norms.  There was little contention with 
regards to its broad goals and, although decentralized and independent, the mission of 
this network of traders was unambiguous and unified. Organizations achieved the 
overall goal through the organic, unplanned, creation of an alternative market for 
products benefiting a social cause and funneled ethically minded consumers towards 
their distinct marketplace.  The network was composed entirely of actors and 
organizations fully dedicated to the overall cause of the movement.  The loose nature 
of the community was not organized for political bargaining, and gathered few foes at 
that point (Murray and Raynolds 2000).   There were many years of building trust 
amongst consumers and growing at a modest organic rte, enabled it to successfully 
create a norm infused market for directly sourced crafts from underprivileged 




Preliminary observations on the emergent stage of the ethical coffee social 
market can be explained by the distinct nature of the actors and the structure of the 
network as supply chain.  Network actors in the emergent stage are advocates, 
nonprofits, and NGOs driven by an unambiguous social cause.  They represent a 
strong community of shared norms, but do little to hybridize into powerful market 
actors.  Actors in the emergent stage of this market gained supply chain advantage by 
sourcing directly from producers (this advantage may h ve been more the result of 
them having little choice but to source directly, rather than a deliberate strategy on 
their end), freeing them from the dependence on trade intermediaries. This made them 
the exclusive purveyors of fair trade goods and crafts, a market niche they filled 
collaboratively with others in the network. Since ethically sourced goods were sold 
through charity organizations and wholly dedicated fair trade retail outlets, the market 
for these norm-infused goods remained within the realm of philanthropy for the 
sellers and buyers. The relationship between producers and their buyers was based on 
principles of philanthropy (Murray and Raynolds 2000), for example 22,000 
volunteers ran and operated more than 830 Oxfam stores in the UK alone, and other 
volunteers operated the Mennonite and church run organizations. Likewise, buyers 
who were necessary to keep the project afloat were engaged in transactions that took 
place in a parallel universe to traditional markets; they were pure ethical consumers 
engaged in a non-profit marketplace. So, while their purchases in, for example, a ten 
thousand villages retail outlet, contains all the elements of a market-based transaction, 
since the retail outlet is fully dedicated to the parallel network based on philanthropy, 




where the consumer has a preference for a product, over the philanthropic actions of 
the consumer.    
On the demand side, power was gained to the advantage of their movement 
from the well-established roots and expansive distribution of outlets.  Market growth 
and the expansion of their mission were in direct rlation to the expansion of their 
network of actors. Little attempt was made to expand the provision of ethical goods 
beyond their dedicated outlets thereby inhibiting mainstream penetration.  This was a 
direct consequence of the nature of the actors within e network.  Despite the 
innovative framing of their mission with “trade not aid,” the movement constituted 
volunteers run by charities, religious organizations, or NGOs, deeply entrenched in 
the charitable motives for their actions.  The network shared a common purpose but 
did little to coordinate more aggressive initiatives to infuse markets with the values 
they prescribe. Nor did they attempt to coordinate common standards beyond the 
general intent of poverty reduction through trade.  In effect, the actors within the 
network were not guided by traditional market forces - forces which some believe 
enable self-organization (towards greater innovation and efficiencies) or spontaneous 
coordination - but by social goals. The movement was so entirely advocacy focused 
that even pressure campaigns against what they considered irresponsible production 
methods were not used. Mainstream retailers, suppliers, and producers regarded the 
movement from the outside seeing no threat to their competitive positioning among 
consumers. This induced no change within the marketplace and created no social 




Table 3.1 Stage One Summary 
STAGE 1: Emergence  
Description Descendants of an early network of charitable and fith-based 
organizations with common goals, yet under no common 
direction or leadership, formed the core of the fair tr de 
movement. Instead of aiming to alter existing norms of 
production, they developed a parallel but distinct market for 
goods that promoted their normative cause. 
Actors Norm entrepreneurs were volunteers, from non-profit, 
advocacy, or philanthropy, organizations. Notably missing were 
watchdog organizations. The reason for this is that t e fair trade 
movement did not engage in changing traditional market 
behavior until they were more formally organized in stage 2 
and 3.  
Motives The only thing binding these early disparate actors t gether was 
their ideational commitment to supporting developing country 
craftspeople and producers through trade. 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Actors sought to gain legitimacy and credibility as 
representatives of distant craftspeople.  
Characteristics No relationship with traditional market.  
Impact Developing and growing the network of like-minded 
organization seeking to promote the ideal within their 
community. Increase awareness of the ‘trade not aid.’  
 
3.2 Stage Two – Non Market Institutionalization 
Non-market institutionalization occurs when the disparate network of social 
advocates, NGOs, non-profits, and activists cooperate on the formation of a formal 
organization aimed at promoting their overlapping social preferences and altering the 
status quo. These organizations are the cornerstone of w governance studies and 




regulation, and conglomeration of firms, NGOs, and states, and non-state systems. 
While the organizations that constitute this non-market institutionalization are many, 
they come together under the umbrella of the Fair Lbeling Organization (FLO).   
The FLO formalized the disparate network of advocates, volunteers, and charitable 
organizations that were the early norm entrepreneurs for fair trade. It was in this stage 
of development that the fair trade movement gained institutional credibility and 
prepared itself for a more coordinated penetration of the market.  
In 1981 a Dutch missionary with PhDs in Political Economics and Theology, 
Frans van der Hoff, participated in the launch of Union de Comunidades Indigenas de 
la Region del Istmo (UCIRI), a cooperative of small scale coffee producers who 
pooled their resources to gain competitive advantage nd bypass oppressive local 
coffee traders. Eventually, through van def Hoff's contacts and leadership, the 
cooperative partnered with the Dutch ecumenical development agency, Solidaridad, 
with the goal of establishing a direct source alternative trading organization for 
Mexican coffee to be sold in European ATOs.   
Faced with the limited scope and reach of ATOs - asRenard notes, in the 
context of the rhythm and lifestyle of contemporary Western European societies, 
going to an alternative store to buy only one or two products represents such an effort, 
even for the most convinced consumers, that such an inconvenience tends to count 
more than the higher prices of the products (Renard 2003). Van def Hoff, along with 
Nico Roozen, a Dutch economist, and Solidaridad, launched the Max Havelaar 




into larger conventional market distribution and retail channels.  Mainstreaming 
required the establishment of some preliminary operating procedures meant to 
enhance creditability among actors outside the moveent, but also to create the 
material incentive for firms to sell their product, namely the establishment of a 
certification process and label to applied to existing coffee brands. Thus the fair trade 
labeling initiative began: a certification label for coffee that was sourced according to 
Max Havelaar fair trade standards, intended for distribution and sale in mainstream 
retail outlets.  This was the first organization that can be tied back to the theoretical 
claims of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)- that institutions emerge to alter incentives 
and push emergent norms towards a cascade of adoption.   
With this tactical shift in product marketing and distribution, fair trade pivoted 
away from the alternative trading network of non-profits, church groups, and 
charities, in favor of mainstream markets. Similar ce tification models that aligned 
with the original Max Havelaar standards and goals were soon adopted in the US and 
the UK under the Transfair and FairTrade labels (Nicholls and Opal 2005).  What 
follows for fair trade is the process of institutionalization. Formal institutions, such as 
the one at the center of our study - the Fair Trade Labeling Organization - established 
policies to operate within and across conventional m rket industries.  While Max 
Havelaar’s product line was wide, this study will focus on the most popular fairly 
traded product, coffee. 
The network of fair trade promoting organizations coordinates policies, 




Organization.  It is under this organization that the fair trade market was formalized 
and agreed upon social values are promoted.  The function of this organization is to 
promote a set of norms and social values across markets, usually requiring changes in 
the behavior of some key market actors and/or the promotion of some products over 
others.    
First, it imposes social policies on producers requiring them to comply with 
the following principles: democratic decision making within producer organizations 
(a central element for procedural legitimacy); does not discriminate against any social 
group; training opportunities, no child labor, no frced labor, access to collective 
bargaining processes and freedom of association of the workforce, condition of 
employment exceeding legal minimum requirements, adequate occupational safety 
and health conditions and sufficient facilities for the workforce to manage the 
Fairtrade Premium (profits earned from traders paying minimum prices on goods)12. 
Second, it tackles the hitherto intractable problem associated with global trade 
under free-market economic policies. This norm-set i  enforced through regular 
audits of member organizations and complies with the following policy principles: 
direct purchasing from producers; transparent and long-term trading partnerships, 
including up-front payment for goods when necessary; greed minimum prices; focus 
on development and technical assistance via the payment to suppliers of an agreed 
social premium.  
                                                




Finally, certification requires producers comply with a set of environmental 
standards aimed at promoting sustainable agricultural p actices. These include: 
"minimized and safe use of agrochemicals, proper and safe management of waste, 
maintenance of soil fertility and water resources and no use of genetically modified 
organisms. Fairtrade Standards do not require organic certification as part of its 
standards. However, organic production is promoted an is rewarded by higher 
Fairtrade Minimum Prices for organically grown products" (Ibid) 
3.2.1 Tying the Network Together 
Given the disparate nature of the early fair trade movement, the evident first-step 
towards a more formal organization is consolidation.  After Max Havelaar was 
successfully established, the loose organization of fair trade advocates around the 
world sought to tighten their relationship and improve communication and coordinate 
by establishing the International Federation of Alternative Traders. Members 
consisted of alternative trade organizations (ATOs), associations, and charitable 
organizations dedicated to the mission of promoting fair trade.  Regional associations 
with similar goals, such as the European Fair Trade Association, and the Network of 
European World Shops dedicated specifically to members focused on crafts, followed 
soon after. These organizations continue to exist today, yet the organizational model 
that gained the widest global reach in terms of membership, programs and pounds 
certified, was the business-oriented one originated by Max Havelaar in the 
Netherlands. Throughout the 1990s, a number of similar regionally-focused 




Luxemburg, Italy, the United States, Canada and Japan, Fairtrade Mark in the UK 
and Ireland, Rättvisemärkt in Sweden, and Reilu Kauppa in Finland. It is these 
certification and labeling organizations that would eventually organize under the 
umbrella of the Fair Labelling Organization (FLO).  The aim of the FLO: to establish 
worldwide standards and certification rules.   
Table 3.2 Fair Trade Development 
Date Event 
1986 Equal Exchange, North America’s first Fair Trade cooperative, established to 
import coffee from Nicaragua 
1989 Farmers and activists launch the first Fair Trade certified label, "Max Havelaar", 
offering third-party recognition and a label for Fair Trade products 
1990 Creation of EFTA , European Fair Trade Association 
1994 Fair Trade Federation formed as first network of organizations in North America 
90s The Max Havelaar initiative is replicated in several other markets across Europe 
and North America 
1997 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) established to unite the 
labeling initiatives under one umbrella and establish worldwide standards. 
2002 FLO launches a new International Fairtrade Certification Mark. The goals of the 
launch were to improve the visibility of the Mark on supermarket shelves, 
facilitate cross border trade and simplify export procedures for both producers 
and exporters. 
2004 FLO splits into two independent organizations: FLO International, which sets 
Fairtrade standards and provides producer business support, and FLO-CERT, 
which inspects and certifies producer organizations and audits traders. 
2007 The three major Fair Trade producer organizations become part of the 





3.2.2 Developing Procedural Legitimacy 
The FLO’s alliances were wide and included all major fair trade organizations.  The 
certification and labeling organizations formally coalesced under the FLO, while 
donors and advocacy groups remained official partners with the FLO. National 
labeling initiatives dominated coffee standards for s me time, and their prominence at 
the international level in the first decade of the new millennium was uncontested. In 
2004, Fair trade members and organizations gathered fo  a Fair Trade symposium that 
formed part of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Sao 
Paulo.  Nearly 200 attendees, including government officials, the most prominent 
being the Brazilian Minister for Agrarian Development, Miguel Rosetto, agreed on a 
Fair Trade Declaration that actively challenged the UNCTAD to support greater trade 
price stability and fairness in commodity markets around the world. This declaration, 
signed by 90 organizations from 30 countries, was enter d into the official UNCTAD 
record and was hand-delivered to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.    Their 
perceived legitimacy is made evident by their ecumenical reach across the vast fair 
trade network, the diversity of their members, and power of their partners.   
As correctly observed by Raynolds (2000), the struggle to forge a legitimate 
alternative to traditional capitalist markets and their “socially and environmentally 
destructive practices” (p. 297) dominated the FLOs second stage of development, and 
its successes in this area proved lasting, serving as the benchmark for political 




FLOs governance structure began with large ambitions t  unite and wide and 
diverse group of fair trade advocates under a multi-stakeholder umbrella.  When 
faced with criticisms that its structure did not weigh sufficiently in favor of the 
disadvantaged, FLO adjusted and left an indelible mark on the political character of 
the organization that remains today.  Although FLO’s original structure was designed 
to ensure voices from the original movement were heard, the shift towards 
formalization was immediately criticized as more impersonal (Taylor 2005, p140). 
While a seeming inevitable consequence of formalization, the critique is notable for 
the fact that it was voiced. Franz van der Hoff Boersma, an adviser to one of the 
original fair trade advocacy groups UCIRI (The Union of Indigenous Communities of 
the Isthmus Region)13, noted that although the FLO took important steps to 
democratize the fair trade network, it remained “a pyramid decision-making structure, 
where the top often does not communicate with the base” (Taylor 2005: 140) In the 
context of other’s comments that the institution remained dominated by Northern 
Interests, (Raynolds and Taylor 2003) we come to understand the struggle between 
the two major groups within FLO: consumer interests in the North, and producer 
interests in the South. 
FLOs response was to increase producer participation, and ensure an 
institutionalized balanced participation of other groups.  The current FLO governance 
structure includes: General Assembly:  50% Producer groups, 50% Labeling groups 
(northern marketing organizations). A Board elected by the general assembly and 
must include: 5 representatives from the Fairtrade Labelling Initiatives (LI); 4 
                                                




representatives from Fairtrade certified producer organizations (at least one from each 
of the regional producer networks); 2 representatives from Fairtrade certified traders; 
3 external independent experts. Three committees appointed by the Board: Standards 
Committee; Finance Committee; Nominations Committee. L adership Team and 
Permanent Staff. 
FLO also maintains strong partnerships with that aim to promote United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals through funding of fair trade. These include: UK 
Department for International Development; Inter-Churc  Organization for 
Development Cooperation, Netherlands; Irish Aid; Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation; Swiss State Secretariat for Ec nomic Affairs. In addition, 
it maintains formal partnerships with a variety of organizations that work to promote 
fairtrade producers and related programs in the global South.   
These partnerships, as well as the organizations key decision to separate the 
management of its certification tasks under FLO-CERT, speak to priorities and 
culture of the FLO.  The organization took the necessary steps to ensure a level of 
political legitimacy with the advocacy organizations responsible for its birth. 
Producer rights would be institutionalized, and additional producer support was 
formalized in the dispatching of Producer Liaison officers to offer commercial 
support to these constituents.  FLO used the power f its position to encourage, to 
much success, the adoption of democratic ideals throughout the supply chain through 
the creation of producer-network collaborative organiz tions.  In other words, not 




organization but the network of producers and some lab ling organizations would 
also adopt these procedural elements (Taylor 2003, p8). 
Consistent with the culture of advocacy and activism, FLO did not actively seek 
to include participation of major business organizations within their official 
governance structure.  Their advocacy-led image remain untarnished until their shift 
towards mainstreaming, leading to tensions within te network that remains relevant 
today as FT USA moves to split from FLO.  The tensio  speaks to the political 
platform of the FLO and exposes the paradox of these market-based governance 
systems.  Their market success is conditioned on converting major firms to adopt 
their principles, yet participation of these major firms, or, as is the case with FLO, 
merely increased intent to work with them, threatens the organization’s culture and 
legitimacy among the originators of the movement who claim it is a ‘business-
centered model’ and ignored the concerns of poor farmers (Jafee 2007, 226).  This 
prompted the former president of FLO, Paola Ghillani to refute that “I understand the 
concerns, but I think in our governance model we arincluding stakeholders’ 
representatives,” (Ibid, p 227) reinforcing the focus on procedural legitimacy and the 
inclusion of stakeholders as a necessary element to strengthen legitimacy.  
 Case in point for FLO: when Carrefour, a major department store in France, and 
Starbucks began promoting fair trade products, advocates forewarned of a threat to 
the nature of fair trade. These organizations were critical contributors to the explosion 
of fair trade products in the marketplace. Yet, they maintained a loyalty towards 




“fairwashing” where large firms were criticized for selling only a small portion of 
their product line as ethically sourced as a tool t promote their responsible actions, 
but doing very little to alter their traditional practices.  Fairwashing was a major 
threat to the legitimacy of the FLO, but it is a waning threat. Given FLOs tremendous 
success at luring in producers, the limits to FLOs growth was market demand.  
Supply of fairtrade certified coffee outpaced demand, a fact that drove producers to 
seek alternative paths to market (Taylor, p23). This was a key development leading to 
the emergence of alternative coffee standards organizations.  
3.2.3 Analysis  
There are two key takeaways from this second stage of FLO development.  First, 
while formalizing the disparate advocacy and volunteer-led original fair trade 
movement into an organizational platform, the FLO adopted the processes, 
procedures and structures to promote legitimacy. These include the adoption of a 
multistakeholder governance structure, the creation of a general assembly, the 
inclusion of all stakeholders in decision-making, the institutionalized balance of 
power between stakeholders from the global north wit  those from the global south. 
While it is difficult to evaluate the degree to whic  adopting this structure and 
procedures was essential to earning the legitimacy and credibility to act as the face of 
the movement, there is evidence outlined above that indicates that they fell back on 
these procedures to defend against criticisms that they were subject to traditional 
corporate powers and were failing to represent the interests of the original movement 




legitimacy extends beyond their organization to the coffee producers. They require 
farmer and producers to organize into cooperatives that must adhere to democratic 
rules and regulations, effectively, in important ways, copying the structure of the 
FLO.  
Second, managing the delicate task of appeasing advoc tes of the original 
movement and turning towards the market, the FLO had to figure out how to 
encourage buy-in from businesses that are primarily concerned with the costs and 
benefits of adopting fair trade standards. On the on  hand, the implementation of a 
minimum-price created significant incentives for producers to rush to adopt the FLO 
standard, creating an early oversupply of certified beans (I will show in the next 
chapter how this eventually led to the creation of alternative standards).  A powerful 
supplier base and consistent widespread branding intiatives allowed them to develop 
a parallel market for coffee: the creation of a whole new industry of small-batch 
roasters and traders focused on beans from small producers, popularized by FLO and 
the rise of the specialty coffee market. 
On the other hand, promoting its strong brand, strengthened by the legitimacy 
of being the one standard-bearer for fair trade, allowed businesses to charge 
premiums to sell its products, and benefit from joining the FLO.  These two key facts 
allowed the FLO to act as the necessary bridge between the social movement and 






Table 3.3 Stage Two Summary  
3.3 Stage Three – Market Institutionalization  
The policies of the previous stage established certain levels of legitimacy, began 
creating market segmentation opportunities for market actors, and set the stage for a 
fair trade brand to enter the mainstream marketplace. Changes in these key factors led 
to the further development of the social market by imposing change on market actors 
and institutions. The following section examines the dynamics change as the fair 
trade social market evolves. With a solid international alliance of NGOs in place, the 
dominant factors of change in this stage are expected to revolve around market actor 
responses to upgrading opportunities, and the development of the fair trade brand.  
STAGE 2: Non Market Institutionalization 
Description Dominance of NGOs, advocates and activists from emergence 
stage. Increasing formal organization by tying in loose network 
of partners and promoters into political alliance. Political 
legitimacy through procedures drives behavior. 
Actors Advocacy, activists and producers. 
Motives Benefits of Coordination, increasing political legitimacy, 
developing standards and unifying brand. 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Creating the organization to allow for political barg ining, 
while most importantly, asserting the organization’s place as 
the rightful legitimate representative of the fair trade movement 
Characteristics Institutions created by advocates to change market practices. 
Policies set by NGO their allies.  





Market actors generally responded positively to the introduction of fair trade. 
Producers began forming cooperatives under the guidelines required for fair trade 
participation. With the proper policies in place to secure a multitude of small coffee 
producers, fair trade fostered the spontaneous emergence of a multitude of small 
traders as the natural buyers from these smaller cooperatives. Their size, versatility, 
and openness to new brand development enabled them to form a veritable alternative 
coffee value chain that formed the core of the fair tr de social market. The following 
section outlines the third stage of social market evolution and shows how fair trade 
policies altered supply chain dynamics enabling “stepping up” of system norm 
franchisees, and supported the promotion of independent brand owners align with the 
fair trade social market.   
FLO chose to operate in a variety of industries andproducts. In order to gain 
an understanding of the relevant industry conditions a d how they impact social 
market development, this study will focus on the dominant fairtrade market, coffee. 
3.3.1 Matters of Market Integration 
The coffee industry provides an example of the more general issues related to a global 
commodities market.  Dominated by a handful of multinational corporations after the 
breakdown of an international coffee regulatory agency, coffee growers were faced 
with sharply threatened terms of trade as prices dropped in an uncontrolled 
international coffee exchange.  Until 1989 coffee was regulated by the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA), “the main intergovernmental organization for coffee, 




facing the world coffee sector through international cooperation. Its Member 
Governments represent 94% of world coffee production and over 75% of world 
consumption,”14 which sought to control prices by setting limits on country 
production.  Much like the OPEC oil cartel, the ICA's objective was to maintain a 
relatively high and stable floor on prices (between $1.20 to $1.40 per pound) by 
controlling supply and production.  When this collective agreement intent on 
maintaining the shared interest of minimal prices fll apart, private interest reigned.  
Individual producers and producer countries rushed their proverbial cows to the 
shared pasture. Production increased dramatically while global demand remained the 
same causing a sharp decline in coffee prices (from $1.16 per pound in 1988 to $0.52 
per pound in 2003) (Gresser and Tickell 2002) and risking the livelihood of millions 
of small farmers across the developing world.15  
This momentous change in global trade was not to the disadvantage of all. The 
global coffee industry is controlled by a handful of powerful multinational 
corporations who benefit from this new “free” trading regime and lower prices. While 
coffee roasting, importation, and distribution is highly centralized – five companies 
buy nearly fifty-percent of the global supply of green coffee beans (Gresser and 
Tickell 2002, p6), and eight companies control the export of over fifty-percent of the 
world’s coffee production (Nichols and Opal 2005) – coffee production consists of a 
diffuse, independent, and unorganized collection of 20-25 million farm workers. 
                                                
14 See http://www.ico.org/mission07_e.asp?section=About_Us last accessed March 24, 2014 
15 see for additional details and graphs: Daviron, Benoît et al. 2005. The coffee paradox: global 
markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development. Zed Books. p.224 and Ponte, 




Estimates indicate that seventy-percent of the world’s coffee is produced on 
plantations smaller than 62 acres, and approximately fifty-percent on family farms of 
less than 13 acres (Gresser and Tickell 2002). Thissignificant disparity in reach, 
access, capability, and wealth between producers and the large coffee companies 
provides clues to the power dynamics within coffee supply chains.  This post-ICA 
state of affairs contrasts with the prior world when managed prices reduced the 
negotiating power of some supply chain players to the benefit of producers.  
The international coffee supply chain shows how power structures can exist 
within markets. Power exists when certain actors, often called lead firms, can impose 
behavioral mandates on firms and actors within their supply chain. The study of 
power dynamics within supply chains was introduced by sociologist Gary Gereffi to 
help explain why the active participants in economic globalization - those who 
integrated into the world economy to benefit from the expansion of trade – did not 
always end up benefiting from globalization (Gereffi t al. 2005).  Gereffi's value 
chain analysis examines the distributional patterns of globalization's benefits, asking 
the important question: is there a causal link betwe n globalization and inequality? 
 His central thesis is that the distributional effects within supply chains determine 
who benefits, and who loses, from the globalization (the dispersal of manufacturing, 
distribution, and retail) of industries, and that these distributions can largely be 
explained by power dynamics within supply chains.  The winners, Gereffi claims, are 
those that can gain supply chain power to benefit their terms of trade. The 




the expertise within them results in the concentration of power, and therefore 
economic benefits, in the hands a the few - often buyer driven - multinational firms 
concentrated in the Global North (Gereffi 1994a).  
The ability to "govern" within supply chains means certain actors can 
influence, or even dictate, the terms of production (what, how, when, and how much 
is produced, and at what price). Since creating a social market requires infusing the 
terms of production with social values and norms, explaining the institutionalization 
of social markets will require analysis of how, if at all, supply chain governance was 
affected.  Since institutionalization is the necessary component for stage two 
development, and some level of supply chain governance power is required to 
influence terms of production, one can deduce that promoting social market norms 
requires the shifting of supply chain powers towards actors engaged in promoting 
production methods aligned with social market values.  A brief analysis of global 
coffee supply chains in the absence of fair trade standards is required to highlight 
changes impacted by stage two policies.   
3.3.1.1 Intermediary Domination of Small Producers  
The nature of coffee production helps shed light on supply chain power dynamics and 
the pressures on coffee producers. After being harvested, beans must be milled in 
preparation for export. Since milling equipment is far too expensive for small 
producers, and their harvests far too small to afford the services of coffee mills, 
farmers are dependent on another intermediary within e supply chain. Coffee 




processing mills.  Since farmers in developing countries often live in rural isolated 
areas with the most rudimentary infrastructures, including roads or other forms of 
public transportation, and rarely have access to private forms of transportation, any 
access to the larger marketplace, and their only opportunity to sell their goods, is 
through these local traders.  This, the earliest link in the international coffee supply 
chain, is extremely exploitative as these middlemen set prices and divvy up farmers to 
avoid competition.  This gross violation of competitive market principles is the very 
first step in the provision of one's basic cup of Joe.   
Closely related to the issue of access to mills and transportation is the problem 
of credit. Rural farmers, like most rural citizens of non-OECD countries, often can 
not secure proper titles or documentation for their land, thereby reducing their ability 
to provide collateral to obtain the credit necessary fo  the expansion of their business 
(Nicholls and Opal 2005).   This places an immovable ceiling on their business and 
provides little opportunity to overcome the exploitative relationship with local coffee 
middlemen since they remain captive to local middleman in order to gain access to 
mills and transportation – a problem additional funds could help remedy.  The 
weakness of coffee producers is explored in the sections below. 
3.3.1.2 No Access to Market Information  
Like many other commodities, coffee is traded on public exchanges in London and 
New York where the global supply and demand of coffee determine global coffee 
prices.  Access to the information and products from these exchanges provides 




commodity market's volatile waters. First, simply having access to price information - 
a basic requirement for participation in any market - allows producers to adjust 
production and stocks accordingly.  Control of production based on market prices is 
an essential element to the proper functioning of markets, and one that is flagrantly 
missing from a large portion of coffee producers.  Second, the sophisticated producer 
may have access to a variety of products to help manage risk and hedge against price 
volatility.  Commodity futures contracts, LEAPS (long-term equity anticipation 
securities), options, and other securities are fundamental tools for sophisticated 
commodity traders (notwithstanding their notorious manipulation by speculators).  
Producers representing more than 50% of global coffee production have little or no 
price information necessary for them to better manage their production and inventory 
or negotiate better prices with local middlemen, know  as coyotes (Nicholls and Opal 
2005).  
3.3.1.3 Domination of branding and definition of quality  
In contrast to the supply-side related issues noted above, the realities of brand power 
and the definition of quality coffee further exacerbate the position of small farmers 
within coffee's global supply chain.  Perhaps more related to the penetration of fair 
trade norms within the coffee industry, is the domination of roasters, not producers, in 
the provision of coffee.  Roasters own coffee brands and control marketing of coffee. 
Since the economics of the coffee supply chain (discus ed above) means that roasters 
usually have no information about production origins, branding, and the association 




production origins or production methods.  In other words, roasters did not know or 
have any economic incentive to know about the origin of the green coffee beans that 
they roast. As a result, consumers are never exposed t  this information and never 
make the link between the quality of a product and its origin.  A relationship between 
the final consumer and producer is never created.  The coffee consumers purchase are 
rarely, if ever, sourced from a common producer and the calculus of production origin 
is never made in the consumer's mind. There is thus, no "added value" related to the 
production origin or methods. The branding power deived from the definition of 
quality and value rests solely in the hands of coffee roasters.  In Gereffi et al’s 
conception (2005), since producers are bound by the dictates of buyers, retailers, 
marketers, and brand-owners - often residing in western wealthy nations - the coffee 
commodity chain is considered "buyer-driven," a term used to describe where 
governance power resides within a supply chain (2005).    
The flip side of the branding blind-spot is that the "dark-side" of production 
methods - environmental costs, the social costs related to unlivable wages due to low 
commodity prices, etc - are not incorporated into a product's price or into the decision 
calculus of consumers; social costs are not internalized but exist as negative 
externalities.   
The breakdown of coffee export controls, supply-chain domination by a few 
large multinationals, farmer lack of technical ability, and reliance on coyotes for 
market access and market information are factors that led to the weakened position of 




neutrality vis-à-vis coffee production – in other words, the lack of product 
differentiation in terms of production or origin – provides no branding power to 
producers.  Ultimate power within coffee's global supply chain is concentrated 
instead in the hands of coffee roasters and retailers. Vulnerable coffee producers had 
no ability to alter their fates when coffee prices, following the dictates of supply and 
demand (although there is room to argue that commodity speculators can artificially 
inflate or deflate prices), dropped so low that their v ry livelihoods were at risk. This 
was the environment that the fair trade certification system entered and wished to 
change.    
Ans Kolk, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Coffee Sector: The 
Dynamics of MNC Responses and Code Development: “the end of the international 
coffee regime meant a reordering of the balance of power in the coffee sector and a 
redistribution of income. From a stable system in which producers and consumers 
knew the rules of the game, the market became not only much more volatile, but trade 
and industry in the consuming countries gained considerable power to the detriment 
of producing-country governments, farmers and local tr ders.  Coffee thus 
transformed into a more buyer-driven commodity chain (Gereffi 1999). Likewise, for 
the consuming countries the value added for coffee increased, while the value added 
and prices for producing countries decreased. For producer countries, earning in the 
early 1990s amounted to $10-12 billion, with a value in retail sales of $30 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2003, p. 24). A decade later producers only receive $5.5 billion, while 
retail sales come to $70 billion. These figures show that producer income has fallen 
 
 
concurrent with increased consumer spending on coffee in Western countries, related 
to growing interest in specialty coffees. 
Table 3.4 Traditional Coffee Supply Chain % Value Captured
Source: Nicholls and Opal, “Fair Trade: Market
The transformation of the fair trade movement from a network of NGOs, volunteers, 
and philanthropic organizations 
emergence - into a market
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-Driven Ethical Consumption” , 2005. 
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-based solution for the problems addressed in fair tr de 




adopted by other national initiatives, and coordinated at the international level 
through the FLO.  
3.3.1.4 Spontaneous Emergence of Norm Franchisees 
Yet if the fair trade initiative was merely a vast network of NGOs and firms 
coordinating a set of values-based standards it would not necessarily suffice for the 
infusion of conventional markets with social norms; many such standards 
organizations already exist that may or may not lead to norm institutionalization.  
Instead, what distinguishes fair trade from standards organization or voluntary self-
regulatory schemes is how the formalization of fairtrade certification and labeling 
fostered the spontaneous emergence of a variety of market and non-market actors that 
further expanded the penetration of social norms into conventional markets.  These 
fair trade norm franchisees are either converts to the social market or have share its 
social cause and have aligned with the fair trade network to further promote the 
market.  In either case, whether they be not-for-prfit social advocacy groups working 
to support producers hoping to sell fair trade products, church fellowships that 
promote the norm within their community, or for-profit retailers which, be the very 
act of selling their certified products, norm franchisee activities, by definition, act to 
further develop the social market and as a result, promote a social norm if production.  
Analysis of this institutionalizing stage of evolution, and the factors that lead to the 
emergence of its relevant institutions, is necessary to understand the evolution of 




Changes to the coffee supply chain, and consequently, the market for fair 
trade products, was formed in no small measure by the explicit policies, standards, 
and procedures, put into place by the network of fair tr de certifying bodies.  Since 
the aforementioned issues are a consequence of the na ure of the coffee supply chain, 
so too will the solutions and standards be a functio  of its unique supply chain. The 
FLO and the policies and procedures it implemented represent the first institutional 
form of the social market beyond the disparate NGO-advocacy network of ATOs. 
Future forms of institutional development may be explained from this first form. 
Examining how these enable the fostering of additional market and non-market 
institutions promoting the fair trade market, norm franchisees, is an important and 
necessary part of understanding the institutionalization of social markets more 
generally.    
The changes below were a function of the social goas f the groups, and the 
distinct nature of the coffee supply chain.  Their aim was to alter production methods, 
and their possibilities and limitations are defined by the existing supply chain.  How 
they chose to achieve their goals, namely, how theychose to coordinate their efforts, 
reduce obstacles, and manipulate incentives will define how future market 
development progresses.  Let us now examine market nd non-marker actor responses 
to stage two policies to understand the factors that lead to their integration into the 




3.3.1.5 Adoption of Fair Trade Policies 
Each intermediary player was important in promoting shifts in power: traders, 
exporters that purchased from producers, the co-op that helped producers organize, 
the lenders that gave to producers, traders, exporters, etc, the roasters that developed 
new brands, these are all norm franchisees that expand the network of norms into 
conventional markets.  Core requirements for licensed coffee importers are 
summarized in the following five requirements. First, ign TransFair USA's 
License/Certification agreement to allow you to become an authorized importer, 
selling Fair Trade Certified green coffee to roasters. Second, Purchase green coffee 
from producer organizations certified by TransFair's umbrella organization, Fair 
Trade Labeling Organizations International (FLO). Third, pay at least the 
international Fair Trade minimum price to coffee cooperatives (US$1.35 per pound 
for conventionally grown coffee; US$1.55 for certified organically grown coffee). 
Fourth, submit reports on a monthly basis detailing all Fair Trade purchases and sales. 
Include supporting documentation (contracts, bills of lading, and invoices) for all Fair 
Trade purchases made directly from producer groups. Finally, on request of the 
producer organization, make available up to 60% of the value of the contract in pre-
financing or other credit facilities. 
Core requirements for licensed roasters are the following six requirements. 
First, sign TransFair USA's Fair Trade Coffee License Agreement to license you to 
display TransFair USA's Fair Trade Certified label on your Fair Trade products and 




TransFair USA. Third, submit quarterly reports to TransFair of Fair Trade Certified 
green coffee purchases and roasted sales. Fourth, pay a certification fee to TransFair 
USA based on Fair Trade Certified green purchases. Fifth, producers must organize 
into cooperatives made them more attractive trade partners for importers. These 
suppliers of coffee beans were now able to manage their product from harvest 
through milling, and ensured importers a consistent r liable supply.  Moreover, 
providing importers one-stop shopping with access to beans from a number of 
producers reduced cost and complexity otherwise requir d to source from small 
farmers. Finally, a prerequisite to certification of importers is their commitment to 
long-term relationships with cooperatives. 
3.3.1.6 Producer Compliance  
The incentives for producer membership in the fair trade network are relatively 
strong. With the promise of minimum prices, access to new markets, and their 
liberation from coyote dependence, producers have significant economic reasons for 
complying with fair trade standards and joining thenetwork.  Yet, the incentives go 
beyond this.  By requiring the maintenance of long-term relationships between traders 
and producers, FLO policies triggered the development of something more significant 
than would be possible with the simple imposition of minimum prices: it enabled the 
fundamental alteration of supply chain powers to the advantage of the producers and 
opened up opportunities for traders.  
The supply-chain power relationship between local intermediaries and small 




coffee is an easily codifiable commodity and is characterized by low complexity, the 
supplier capability was so low that the power asymmetries between producers and 
traders downstream from them were vast (Gereffi 2005). Producer lack of market 
information, transportation, and scale opened up supply chain opportunities for local 
traders, who, like any market actor, is ready to fill a supply chain gap left open by 
other actors. Prior to farmer collective action and the formation of cooperatives, local 
intermediaries were economic lifelines to peasant frmers who had no access to mills 
and the larger marketplace. This reality was not missed by the coyotes who saw the 
game between themselves and producers as zero-sum, and pressured farmers on 
prices to increase their own margins. Here, simple market-access - being the sole 
gateway in a supply-chain upon which others depend - grants one a certain level of 
market power not available in the theoretical conceptions of perfect markets.   
By requiring, and encouraging (through a variety of producer support 
programs) the organization of producers into farmer-owned cooperatives, the once 
disparate individual farmer can share resources, gain access to transportation and own 
or control milling operations. Coordination among farmers, promoted through fair 
trade participation and support, allows producers to absorb the value-add once 
provided by coyotes, replacing that exploitative relationship with fair trade aligned 
exporters and/or importers. The immediate financial incentive is clear. Under the fair 
trade chain, producers retain 11% of retail prices v rsus 7%. However, since the 




are retained to the eventual benefit of the farmer and community (Muradian and 
Pelupessy  2005).   
Yet, problems of coordination and collective action persist and simply 
dictating rules of engagement does not assure compliance and participation. Fair trade 
policies went so far as to address these issues throug  the provision of necessary 
auxiliary actors, training and liaison officers provided through FLO's Producer 
Services and Relations Unit (PSRU), and coordinatio with credit providers.    
Fair trade aligned producer support programs and the policy of long-term 
relationship based contracts, strengthened farmers standing vis-à-vis potential credit 
providers. Overcoming the finance hurdle helps freethe producer from the grips of 
the powerful local intermediary who, in addition to being their sole link to the greater 
coffee market, may also play the role of small lender in times of need (Nichols and 
Opal: 108).  Fair trade requires that participating traders and importers make pre-
financing options available to producers as needed (Ibid: 110). The term "pre-
finance" is the provision of credit in the form of a pre-payment of a percentage of 
exports (usually 60%) to be received sometime in the future.  The remaining payment 
is made once goods are delivered. There are two ways in which traders provide pre-
financing to producers. The first, the trader provides payment for a portion of an 
invoice prior to receiving shipment. Funds in this option will come from the buyer's 
cash reserves. The second option involves a third pa ty lender.  Here, the trader helps 
set up a line of credit at the lending institution f r the purposes of advancing cash to 




invoice to the producer. When the buyer receives th entire order, they send payment 
in full to the lender, who will keep a portion of this payment equal to the amount 
advanced plus applicable finance charges, and forward the remainder to the producer. 
   
Provision of financing to bolster producer operations provides another 
example of supply-chain power shifts with the fair trade market. Here, the power 
inherent in being the solitary access to capital and fi ancing for producers is taken 
away from the coyote and given instead to an ally of the fair trade network of 
organizations or participating neutral parties. In other words, shifting power from 
non-aligned market actors to fair trade norm franchisees enables fair trade to impose 
its policies and promote their norms.  In this case, power asymmetries, as understood 
through Gereffi's framework, when to the advantage of social market norm 
franchisees, can act to advance fair trade policies.   
Complying with fair trade certification practices and standards can be costly. 
Since banks rarely provide credit for these endeavors, certification costs can become 
an insurmountable hurdle to many potential producer partners. Lack of credit within 
the certification systems is a significant barrier to their growth.  
Increasing the availability of credit can increase th  supply of ethically 
produced products around the world, and expand the benefits of these systems to 
thousands of developing country producers around the world. Credit can also be used 
to fund important intermediary market-actors that distribute, market, and brand 




3.3.1.7 Why access to credit is a problem 
Producers encounter an array of issues that limit the r availability to project financing. 
Part of the problem is due to increased costs and trouble for potential lenders (e.g., 
high transaction costs, costly site visits, difficulty in assessing risks and difficulty in 
accessing credit information about producers), while others have to do with problems 
inherent in the producers themselves (e.g., difficulty meeting bank requirements to 
provide information, no collateral, improper land titles, no assets or difficult to 
collateralize). Other problems are inherent in the nature of the transaction between 
producer and supplier, including uncertainty of demand, and the short-term nature of 
contracts. While other problems are due to the uncertain and seasonal nature of 
agriculture production.  
The Fair Trade labeling initiative set policies in place that encouraged the 
provision of credit and led to the vast participation of producers around the world. 
These include: 
 Relationship Based Contracts: In order to gain certification, commodity buyers must 
guarantee long-term relationship-based contracts with suppliers. 
Minimum Prices: Fair trade certification requires the payment of a minimum fair 
trade price to suppliers. 
Chain of Custody: Fair trade labeling, branding, and chain-of-custody requirements 





As a result of these policies and strategies, a number of alternative credit 
organizations have emerged to provide credit to fair tr de certified producers. These 
include, but are not limited to the following: 
Table 3.5 Fair Trade Credit Organizations,  
Organization Type 
CORDAID NGO 
Douque Coffee Fair 
Trade Buyer 
Fair Trade buyer 
Ecologic Finance Environmental NGO Fund 









Shared Interest Specialist Finance Provider 
Triodos Faire share fund 
TWIN Trading Fair Trade buyer 
Verde Ventures Environmental NGO Fund 
Adapted from “Fair Trade: Market-Driven Ethical Consumption” Nicholls and Opal, 2005. 
3.3.1.8 Who is The Consumer? 
All the producer incentives in the world would be worth little without buyers – the 




while common understanding is that consumer demand will drive change, this study 
asks the more fundamental question: who is the consumer?   From a producer 
perspective, they need a buyer of their green coffee b ans to step into the supply 
chain void left open from their severed relationship w th local coyotes.  The producer 
does not seek out end-consumers on their own but mus rely instead on intermediary 
coffee traders – importers and roasters – to purchase from them, and work on 
increasing demand at the consumer level. Note the two necessary conditions: first, 
that intermediary coffee traders would be interested in buying from producers, and 
second, that these traders also act to increase demand at the consumer level. If 
demand existed at the consumer level, but there werno traders interested in buying 
from producers, or supply chain logistics made it impossible to do so, the market 
demand would remain untapped.  On the other hand, if producer incentives were 
sufficient enough to gain widespread support, and a few traders – perhaps those with 
aligned social goals – were encouraged to purchase from these producers, but did 
nothing to promote the product in the marketplace, th n consumer demand would be 
non-existent, or remain freeze at niche levels. In the fair trade case, we will observe 
how traders emerged to capitalize on specific market demands, and then acted 
through brand differentiation to promote fair trade products to consumers.  
Traders, importers, roasters and other fair trade int rmediaries come from 
diverse backgrounds and respond to a variety of incentives - both economic and non-
economic - to form the backbone of the fair trade social market. Preliminary 




evolved to adapt to new fair trade policies; second, new non-profit and/or alternative 
trading groups with strong social advocacy roots; third, conventional market actors 
capitalizing on the market segmentation opportunities provided by fair trade sourcing. 
 Just as in the analysis of production compliance to fair trade, these traders survive on 
their ability to leverage newly formed supply chain relations or to shift supply chain 
powers. In the latter case, their strength comes from their pivotal position within the 
chain that allows them to create and control powerful branding for fairly traded coffee 
products.  Moreover, we will see, consistent with the analytical framework for this 
research, as the social market developed, trader organizations shifted from primarily 
cause-oriented non-profit organizations to for-profit conventional market actors.   
ATOs 
The oldest ancestor to today’s impressive network of fair trade buyers, activists, 
producers, and advocates is the Alternative Trade Organization (ATO).  While earlier 
ATOs may have purchased directly from a small community or producer, today’s 
ATOs adjusted their practices to fit within a more complex and sophisticated supply 
chain. For the most part, however, ATOs remained within the intermediary area of the 
supply chain focusing on importing from a common importer or, in some cases, 
roasting. These supply chain adjustments were critical to their survival, and were 
necessary for the survival and expansion of fair trade.  Stage two policies and 
procedures needed to consider the overlapping interests of ATOs to ensure they 
remained aligned with the system and were able to promote the fair trade label while 




ATOs evolved from cause-oriented alternative buying organizations, to 
mainstream economic actors competing within traditional markets and supply chains.  
Many early stage ATOs were founded by charities and religious groups and remain 
non-profits today, while many have evolved into variants of hybrid models to 
accommodate their mainstream economic successes. In 2002 38% of the members of 
the Fair Trade Federation, the ATO membership organization in North America, were 
non-profits (Nichols and Opal 2005: 96), leaving a full 68% as variants of for-profit 
or hybrid organizations.  The morphing into hybrid organizations was an innovation 
the ATOs developed to help deal with the market-oriented priorities of their 
organization while ensuring their social mission not be compromised. One model is to 
have a not-for-profit organization own guardian shares of a for-profit ATO. This 
structure is adopted by two prominent ATOs, Traidcraft PLC, the trading arm of 
Traidcraft Foundations, and Cafedirect, the UK’s leading Fair Trade coffee brand. 
Both of these ATOs recently issued public share offrings, while retaining important 
guardian shares by their parent not-for-profit arm.  Another model is to share 
ownership with one or several producer organizations, as Equal Exchange did in 
2004. Other examples of this model exist in other Fai  Trade product verticals, but 
Equal Exchange’s innovation overlaps with two other organizational structures. In 
addition to being producer owned, it is employee owner, and shareholder owned, 
although the 370 outside shareholders, representing $2 million in equity, do not 
expect any increase in share value, and await returns around 5% annually – numbers 
that reflect the tempered form of capitalist enterprise these hybrid ATOs have evolved 




ATOs transformation was not limited to the legal struc ure of their 
organization.  Instead, their evolution away from producer-focused model to a 
consumer-focused model mirrored the shift in Fair Trade goals outlined in stage two.  
Just as the system’s legitimacy increases with greate  stakeholder inclusively, the 
collaborative governance structure allowed for the lockstep evolution of strategies. 
ATOs that remained producer focused and stuck in a purely non-profit and NGO 
model were plagued with inefficiencies and big losses. In 2000 Oxfam, for example, 
was overcome by the basic economic realities of the new Fair Trade world. A study 
by Mckinsey & Company discovered in the case of onef its products that sold for 
$36, Oxfam had to spend $54 dollars to get it to market (Nichols and Opal 2005: 
100). The most striking thing about his fact is notthe amount of money they were 
losing on this product, but that it took a study by an outside firm to come to this 
determination! The law of creative destruction went to work on the ATO world 
allowing some to die and others to thrive.  The twom st important successes in the 
coffee market, grossing more than $70 million of fair trade beverage sales in 2009, 
are Cafédirect and Equal Exchange.  
Formed out of an initiative between Traidcraft, Oxfam, Equal Exchange UK, 
and Twin Trading, Cafédirect aims to deliver fair trade coffee, tea, and cocoa to 
mainstream markets. Its success reflects both the expansion of fair trade and the 
market-oriented approach of the organization.  Working with a network of over 39 
grower associations representing 280,000 farmers, their annual sales for the 




success has allowed them to positively impact the lives of over 1.8 million people by 
investing more than $7 million of their profits back into producer communities in the 
past five years. On the other side of the Atlantic, Equal Exchange, formed in 1986 in 
the US and converted into an employee owned venture in 1990, grossing more than 
$35 million in sales in 2009, it is the largest and ol est fair trade company in the US. 
The very existence of economically sophisticated ATOs placed necessary market 
pressure on their competitors. Their success led to the proliferation of trader norm 
franchisees seeking to emulate ATO success and compete in the high quality, and 
high margin, fair trade coffee market. Expanding our understanding of how 
traditional market actors reacted to the fair trade ph nomena and the success of these 
and other ATOs will help us tease apart the impacts of our three factors of change in 
understanding social market development in this market-centric stage of growth.  
"ATOs have developed rapidly in the past twenty years, moving from 
supplying niche market products driven by what producers could make, to offering 
high quality mainstream products that have taken market share from more traditional 
players. Their success has encouraged competitor brands to re-examine their supply 
chains and address worker and farmer poverty, both y launching Fair Trade products 
and through their own company initiatives." (Nichols and Opal 2005: 104) These 
shifts in the marketplace are very much a function of the policies that the FLO put 




Importers Roasters Distributors  
Coffee importers, roasters, and distributors form the heart of fair trade policy, and 
impose significant change to two factors of change: value chain segmentation and 
differentiation.  The central narrative emerging from stage three analysis of this social 
market is that producer upgrading, facilitated by franchisees up the entire supply 
chain following fair trade policies, informed the pnetration and expansion of fair 
trade coffee across markets. Fair trade’s goal to liberate coffee producers from the 
exploitative relationship with coyotes was made possible by the induction of pivotal 
intermediary traders aligned with fair trade goals through certification.  
Role of Traders in Brand Creation – (Brand Holders) 
Long term relationships imposed by FLO enabled the marketing of coffee on the 
basis of the actual farmer. Consistent sourcing from the same farm allowed for the 
creation of a brand based on single source coffee with farmer face and pictures of 
farm used in branding.  This product differentiation, made possible through fair trade 
targeted branding, represents an opportunity for smaller roasters to enter a market 
once dominated by large roasters. They were now able to link their small-roast, 
sometime single-sourced specialty coffee, with the social value of fair trade branding. 
It is critical that these small independent roasters were able to own the brand of the 
coffee they sold.  This is in sharp contrast to a supply chain dominated by a few 
brands owned by the largest firms.  Smaller roasters capitalized a new definition of 




Daviron 2005):  territoriality, consumer-producer connectivity, single sourced, 
personal attention to coffee growing that included a focus on unique favors and 
attention to detail.  These are the changing conventions of quality. While fair trade 
did not create the specialty coffee craze or these n w conventions of quality, it helped 
promote its ideals by allowing small roasters to leverage the fair trade branding for 
their own purposes. 
In traditional coffee markets, roasters blend coffee from a variety of sources 
and sell to consumers under a brand name that provides no specific information about 
the quality or origin of the coffee. The brand reputation is used “as a proxy for 
variance in material quality.” (Daviron and Ponte 2005: 220) There is essentially no 
relation between the origin and actual quality of a coffee and the brand that sells it. In 
fact, the only consistency in the product being sold is what is shown on the label – 
coffee beans and quality have essentially no relationship to the brand. With few 
exceptions, mainstream coffee was sold to consumers who had little to no information 
at all about the coffee itself. According to Daviron and Ponte, the greatest “threat to 
mainstream roasters’ dominance of the global value chain comes from changing 
quality conventions” (Ibid: 220) Therefore, just as the principle of transparency fuels 
early social advocates to campaign against market externalities, the intermediary 
traders and new franchisees of the fair trade supply chain have been able to leverage 
transparency as a means to conventions of quality and brand differentiation. 
Transparency surrounding production methods should form the basis for any 




of production should be taken into account when making purchasing decisions. 
Coffee traders were able to take this one step further by altering the conventions of 
quality related to coffee. Not only were ethical production methods relevant, so too 
were the origin of the coffee bean, from geography right down to the very farmer that 
grew the bean whose photo dominates the packaging.  This unique differentiation 
strategy allowed fair trade franchisees to redefine quality coffee as that which was 
both, 1) symbolically distinct because of the qualities of the bean and the care with 
which it was grown, and 2) materially distinct due to its ethical production methods 
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, p127).  
These two important attributes, along with the ownership and responsibility of 
brand development lying in the hands of fair trade franchisees, provides the necessary 
differentiation opportunities for this stage of social market evolution.  
"Fair Trade Certified coffees are among the best", says industry expert Bob Fulmer, 
President of Royal Coffee (a leading specialty coffee importer in the US). Coffee 
Review consistently ranks Fair Trade Certified coffees high for taste. 
These new smaller traders were, not only able to, but they had to, develop new 
brands associated with fair trade, and the way theydid this altered the conventions of 
quality surrounding coffee, giving reasons for the price premium, and forcing 
traditional brands to respond. Aligning fair trade opportunities with roaster incentives 
through brand differentiation provides a robust explanation for why producers have 




between fair trade, specialty coffee and the notion of quality is best described through 
the words of the Specialty Coffee Association of America16. 
The SCAA’s mission is to be the recognized authority of specialty coffee, 
providing a common forum for the development and promotion of coffee excellence 
and sustainability. We do this through our commitment to quality; spirit of 
cooperation; dedication to continuing education for ou  members; sensitivity to the 
environment; consciousness of social issues; encouragement of sound business 
practices and ethics; and promotion of the value of specialty coffee to consumers. The 
SCAA recognizes the Fair Trade business model as being consistent with our mission 
and how we accomplish it. We endorse the Fair Trade model as one effective way to:  
improve the lives of the coffee producers on whom we rely for our own livelihoods ; 
encourage a consistent, long-term supply of the high quality Arabica coffees on 
which our industry depends; create environmentally and socially sustainable 
prosperity in the developing world  
Retailers 
As is common for advocates of CSR related norms, prominent MNCs are often 
targeted to adopt norms through pressure tactics. This was also the case, but to a 
much lesser degree, with early fair trade development.  Prominent MNCs 
representing important coffee brands were pressured by advocacy groups such as 
Global Exchange (also a fair trade retailer) to sell fair trade brand coffees.  Using 
                                                
16 SCAA (2008). Fair Trade Position Statement. California 




rudimentary pressure tactics culminating in coordinated nationwide protests in 29 
cities, Global Exchange was able to convert Starbucks into carrying fair trade coffee 
in 2000 (Strauss 2000). Since that important retailer’s turning point, other large 
retailers have decided to sell fair trade brands.  Given the opportunity to align with 
fair trade conventions of quality, some major retail rs, such as Marks & Spencer (in 
2004 it announced that it would serve only fair trade coffee in its 198 Café Revive 
outlets, representing an 11% share of the UK-branded coffee bar market) and Green 
Mountain Coffee Roasters (having seen an increase of its fair trade coffee sales from 
7% in 2001 to over 12% in 2003, accounting for a 92% increase in fair trade coffee 
sales compared to a 15% increase for the total company. It has recently set a goal of 
increasing fair trade sales to 25% of total company sales) converted its organic 
coffees to fair trade in 2003), went beyond partial conversion and decided to commit 
to fair trade coffees (Nichols and Opal 2005, p85).  
3.3.2 Analysis  
In this stage of social market development change was far more influenced by market 
factors than political legitimacy. Two key developments were observed. First, FLO 
policies resulted in a decentralization of the market leading to an influx of producers 
and traders joining the FLO for pragmatic reasons.  Producers gained power through 
upgrading, and the 5 dominant roaster – once the only highly centralized powers in 
the supply chain – were challenged by small roaster and traders importing beans from 
the millions of small producers across the globe.  S cond, the FLO brand increasingly 




Industry conditions, specifically the fragmentation f producers and traders, 
best explain the patterns of adoption of fair trade principles by market actors. Coffee 
production consists of a diffuse, independent, and u organized collection of 20-25 
million farm workers. Estimates indicate that seventy-percent of the world’s coffee is 
produced on plantations smaller than 62 acres, and approximately fifty-percent on 
family farms of less than 13 acres. FLO provided ‘upgrading’ opportunities for these 
producers by developing an alternate supply chain characterized by relationships and 
tied to fair trade norms.  This upgrading opportunity provided a strong incentive for, 
and encouraged tremendous adoption by, producers.  Adoption by producers broke up 
the traditional coffee market dominated by large roasters, and spawned the emergence 
of smaller specialty roasters, the largest of them  - cafedirect and equal exchange - 
evolved from ATOs, that were able to nimbly accommodate input from a dispersed 
network of smaller producers.  While coffee was always a consumer driven industry, 
the upgrading of small producers shifted power away from the oligopoly of roasters 
that existed before FLO.  
Wide Product differentiation was also possible because of the wide array of 
coffee products and brands offered to a diverse consumer market. Small roasters were 
welcomed into more a consumer driven industry with a more diverse set of brands 
and ranges of quality. With a diverse consumer base, sellers were able to create a 
range of brands and pricing and are able to pass the cost of minimum pricing onto 
consumers under the premise of introducing higher quality. Some sellers, such as 




became dedicated franchisees, meaning they were fully committed to selling all of 
their products as certified free trade. Other sellers, such has Starbucks, were able to 
gain the benefits of being considered “socially responsible” without altering their 
entire product. Differentiation based on fair trade standards is made possible through 
the power of the fair trade brand – small traders lverage the brand to expand into 
new markets, and large retailers, such as Starbucks, leverage the brand to appear more 
socially responsible while not having to make signif cant changes to their own 
business, including not having to alter their existing product line.  This segmented 
consumer market allows large buyers to ‘test’ fair trade certified coffee without 
having to commit to major changes in their existing business practices. 
Market institutionalization is defined by market structures. FLO was able to 
offer a specialty product by converting small, fragmented producers, motivated by 
market incentives and the opportunity to offer a diverse consumer segment a variant 
of quality coffee a diverse and highly fragmented consumer base.  If producers were 
not fragmented, the power dynamics in the industry would have forced a convening 
of the standard-setters and large multinational firms, and third stage social market 
development would have looked very different.  If co fee were not sold directly to a 
fragmented consumer base, there would be little opportunity to differentiate fairly 
traded coffee from regular coffee, placing further constraints on social market 
development. 






STAGE 3: Market Institutionalization 
Description Policies that create supply chain opportunities, market 
incentives for new niche players vs conversion of existing 
actors, branding capabilities, support from non-market actors 
Actors Hybrid organizations , independent organizations 
Motives Promote social norms through market growth 
Dominant Factor of 
Change 
Centralization (specifically the decentralization of the industry), 
Differentiation 
Characteristics Hybrid institutions bridging gap betw en market and advocates. 
Supplier upgrading left open an important gap within t e 
supply-chain: specialty coffee buyers to buy from these 
suppliers. These actors were now given opportunity t develop 
and promote themselves within the coffee marketplace. A 
stepping out for new intermediary coffee traders. 
New intermediary traders remain within specialty coffee 
segment, but expand this segment dramatically over the years.  
Market segmented to accommodate high-end coffee drinkers 
with distinguished palette, an expansion of the earlier stages 
where the segment was limited to socially conscious coffee 
drinkers. 
Brand differentiation linked inextricably to mosaic of 
intermediary traders.  Fair trade understood as high quality 
specialty coffee. 
Explosion of new specialty coffee industry, with large fair trade 
presence, based on quality differentiators.  
Expanding consumer recognition of fair trade brand li ked with 
high-end quality and ethical production. 





Factors influencing the development of a social market change through its lifecycle.  
Whereas the battle to gain political legitimacy is critical during early stages, latter 
stages are influenced primarily by market factors having to do with existing industry 
conditions and differentiation in the marketplace. The best way to explain FLO’s 
formal organizational structure is through its attempt at gaining political legitimacy 
with its alliance of early stakeholders.  Likewise, there is no way to fully understand 
the development of the fair trade coffee market outside the industry structures within 
which it operates, or the opportunities for product differentiation leveraging the fair 
trade brand.  
The following chapter will extend the analysis to the final stage of growth where 
observations can be made of competition and collaboration in the coffee standards 
market.  There we will explain both divergence and convergence of coffee standards 





4 COFFEE MULTIPLICITY 
Well-ordered social markets supplement conventional channels of political 
expression and popular control by creating distinctive arenas of governance in 
which citizens participate directly, through their market choices, in influencing 
the behavior of powerful economic entities often resistant to other forms of 
social control.  
Fung 2002, p 150 
 
 
Since the formalization of fair trade movement through the fair trade labeling 
organization (FLO), a number of alternative standards have emerged offering 
certification of ethically sourced coffee. The previous chapter showed how the FLO 
progressed through the stages of the social market lifecycle: Emergence, Non-Market 
Institutionalization, and Market Institutionalization. This chapter examines the rise of 
multiplicity that occurs in the Market Institutionalization stage.  I examine six ethical 
coffee standards (WFTO, UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance, 4C, Direct Trade, and 
Fair Trade USA) to understand the factors that led to their emergence as distinct 
organizations, versus becoming members within the FLO.  I focus on two possible 
outcomes within each case: 1) observations of a battle round legitimacy (not 
present), and 2) the adoption of market practices ver us those of advocacy groups – in 





Observations in this chapter show how fair trade advocates who challenged 
the FLOs mainstreaming strategy 1) never attacked, nor presented a serious threat to 
their legitimacy, 2) did not always copy the procedural elements of the FLO, and 3) 
were not necessarily representing industry, but insead came from the original 
network of advocacy groups responsible for the early emergence of the fair trade 
norm. I observe that competing standards organizations 4) took advantage of various 
opportunities within a politically decentralized industry to 5) offer different standards 
for different consumers, thereby creating a pluralistic set of standards aligned with the 
varied preferences of consumers. These observations pr vide insight into the general 
logic of market integration, and provide the necessary context and background for the 
analysis in the following chapter where I create two index values for legitimacy and 
market integration to show how legitimacy wanes andmarket integration (elaborated 
on in the following chapter) increases.  These observations also begin to uncover the 
driving mechanisms behind multiplicity, which I elaborate on in Chapter 6. Mainly, 
that the centralization of a social market and opportunities for differentiation are what 
provide insight into the patterns of multiplicity across social markets.  
The pre-FLO coffee supply chain was highly centralized, but as was 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, changes in the coffee industry following the 
breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and the disaggregation of 
coffee sourcing made possible by producer upgrading e abled by the FLO, has 
caused a dramatic decentralization of the market. As was previously discussed, the 




international agreements, and producers vulnerable to plummeting prices. This 
provided a timely opportunity for fair trade advocates to instill minimum pricing and 
encourage large-scale conversion of producers to the fair trade standard.  This, along 
with policies that enabled producers to circumvent coffee intermediaries, enter into 
long term relationship-based contracts with new fair tr de traders, and upgrade power 
in their supply chain, enabled the decentralization of power away from the five 
powerful roasters that control nearly 50% of the coffee market.  
Several highly established and powerful organizations that span a variety of 
interests operate within the social market.  Even the FLO, the earliest and dominant 
standard, did not capture the entire array of potential stakeholders in this expansive 
global marketplace. Even organizers of the Internatio l Federation of Alternative 
Traders (IFAT), emerging from within the early fair trade movement, had enough of a 
constituency that it decided not to join the FLO.  This combination of decentralization 
and tremendous diversity in market segments results in a highly diverse industry of 
standards. So diverse, in fact, is the coffee social market that we begin to observe the 
creation of formal collaborations across standards, and the creation of umbrella 
organizations, such as ISEAL, to help coordinate for this highly complex social 
market. Political decentralization now defines this social market. 
4.1 No Battle for Legitimacy 
The FLO gained widespread support from producers and dvocacy groups and 
worked to integrate stakeholders into a democratic de ision-making process very 




its advantage by narrowing the gap between small producers and consumers. 
However, it was not long before other systems emerged. As each new standard was 
introduced, the certification of ethical coffee became more established and 
widespread.  As this social market evolved, the procedural elements of these 
organizations aimed at incorporating the many voices of the advocacy world into the 
standards became less relevant. Instead, these standards became tools for brand 
differentiations influenced primarily by varying target consumer segments. Once the 
social market is established, the legitimacy of the market based organizations that 
deliver on it are not placed into question, and the tension between advocacy and 
market is replaced by a mosaic of advocacy and market actors developing new 
standards aligned with market rules and dynamics.   
While standards organizations do seek to gain political legitimacy in the early 
stages of a social market, the struggle for political legitimacy provides some insight 
into the rise of systems early on in the development of a social market, but cannot 
explain the rise of latter stage standards.  As the social market pioneer, and early 
descendent of the activists and advocacy groups who first established the fair trade 
movement, the FLOs legitimacy was never challenged by other activists. 
Furthermore, since the market actors they were engaged in were poor farmers from 
the global south who were benefiting from adherence to the FLO standard, fair trade 
was also not challenged by firms17. Despite an absence of political challenges, several 
alternative standards organizations emerged - the rise of alternate and competing 
systems had nothing to do with a battle for political legitimacy.   
                                                




There were, and remain, two principle critiques of fair trade as exercised by 
the FLO, but neither of these were led by a cohesive and unified front. Nor did these 
critiques present a serious threat to its existence o  grounds of a lack of legitimacy.  
First, early activists and advocates of fair trade criticized the FLO for its 
mainstreaming strategy (Locke, Reavis and Cameron 2010; Moore 2010), which is to 
say its willingness to certify products from companies that were not fully aligned with 
the fair trade ethos.  Recall that the fair trade movement began within and across a 
loose network of advocacy groups, churches, and activists, and their products were 
sold at non-profit outlets such as Ten Thousand Villages shops. Criticisms emerged 
from within the group for its strategy to prioritize market expansion and sales through 
traditional retail outlets, but opposition did not lead to competition. Instead, as we 
will see in this chapter, the critics organized the International Federation of 
Alternative Traders (IFAT) to distinguish those organizations that sold fair trade and 
were wholly dedicated to its mission. This early example of multiplicity was indeed a 
reaction to the challenge of political legitimacy, but it does not explain the emergence 
of other systems.  This was a separate organization to FLO that did not certify 
products, but organizations. It did not split from FLO, but remained an official 
advocacy partner (Fairtrade 2013).  
The second principle critique was that fair trade’s minimum price policy 
would lead to an overproduction of coffee and a drop of coffee prices thereby hurting 
non-fair trade producing farmers (Economist 2006; Griffiths 2010; Mohan 2010; 




higher than market prices will encourage more farmers, seeking to fair trade 
compensation, to increase production beyond what the market may demand. This led 
critic Brink Lindsey of the Cato Institute to asset that these schemes are “doomed to 
end in failure,” a prediction made in 2003 that hasyet to occur (Brink 2003). What 
did prove true early on was that there was an over-supply of fair trade certified coffee 
relative to demand. Yet, as we will see in this chapter, this did not de-legitimize fair 
trade or FLO among consumers, and it did not lead to confrontation with industry 
actors who sought to undermine the system.  Instead, it encouraged the emergence of 
new systems that sought to deliver more certified coffee to more consumers while 
relying on market prices instead of FLOs minimum prices.  These new organizations, 
such as UTZ and the 4C, did not confront the FLO or challenge its legitimacy but 
chose to align with them to achieve the same goal: t  increase sales of ethically 
produced coffee. 
There is no evidence that the rise of other systems had anything to do with the 
procedural or constituent (since none of their competitors sought to gain more 
constituent legitimacy) legitimacy of FLO.  Nor is there any indication that a lack of 
perceived legitimacy existed. During semi-structured interviews, interviewees were 
asked the question “do you view the FLO as credible and appropriate?” Without 
exception, all viewed the FLO and credible and appro riate. All of the people 
interviewed thought FLO was the standard-bearer. None felt that they needed to 
fundamentally change the way FLO operated, even FT USA, that split from FLO for 




getting standards to farm workers) insists that the FLO system should be maintained 
and encouraged.   
4.2 The Rise of Multiplicity 
The following section examines the organizations that emerged within the coffee 
social market to assess the patterns of development away from legitimacy and 
towards two key market conditions: its centralization and opportunities for 
differentiation. The case of the coffee social market examined in this chapter will 
show that, underlying the emergence of each new standard is an evaluation of costs 
and benefits by a standards entrepreneur (or group) that will need to conclude that the 
benefits and opportunities for a new standard system outweigh the benefits of joining 
an existing system.  This calculus is most influenced by the centralization of power 
within the social market: a factor that considers the economic concentration of the 
industry, as well as the concentration of political power by NGOs, states, industry 
associations and other actors of new governance; as well as the opportunities for 
differentiation: a factor that considers the proximity of the social market to 
consumers, and the state of market segmentation and corresponding consumer 
constituents.  This chapter will show that legitimacy is far less a factor in influencing 
the rise of alternative standards schemes. Instead, the increased openness and 
decentralization of a social market, as well as increased opportunities to provide new 
forms of standards to a diversity of consumer constituents that explains the rise of 




4.2.1 World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) 
The mainstreaming strategy adopted by the FLO and outlined in the previous chapter 
created tensions within the fair trade movement. The original movement, composed 
mainly of a network of churches, alternative trade organizations, and other activists, 
united in their advocacy for a fairer trade regime focused on partnership and 
relationship-based trade between producers in the global south and buyers in the 
north.  To these groups, developing closer ties with traditional market actors in an 
attempt to increase commercial presence was anathem to their original cause.  Yet, 
these tensions between the fair trade “purists” and the organization’s leadership did 
not lead to any significant rifts or battles over lgitimacy. Instead, advocates that 
hesitated at the mainstreaming of fair trade continued to adopt fair trade standards, 
but chose to differentiate on the basis of fair trade exclusivity. Why? Because, I argue 
that the costs of battling the FLO were higher than the benefit of simply going 
directly to the consumer themselves. 
WFTO represents this split in the fair trade movement against mainstreaming. 
Started in 1989 as the International Fair Trade Association (IFAT), WFTO certifies 
companies rather than products and seeks to distinguish firms that are fully dedicated 
to the fair trade cause from those that may be engaged in fairwashing – selling some 
fair trade products to manipulate public perception of their brand but continue to 
promote mainstream market values through the rest of their product line. WFTO is a 
network of over 350 organizations, ranging from small producer cooperatives to large 




to selling 100% fair trade products.  It is a network f what author Laura Raynolds 
calls mission-driven organizations (Raynolds 2009), which sit in contrast to the 
commercial-motivated franchisees.   Member organizations are expected to adhere to 
the 10 broadly stated principles of fair trade (below) as well as a code of practice 
inspired by the principles.  
Despite the continued mainstreaming of FLO and ethical coffee consumption 
more generally, the WFTO, led by advocates and activists, continues to stand firm in 
its position against commercialization as a principle objective within the movement.  
This is evidenced in its recent letter commenting o Fairtrade USAs split from the 
FLO: “In effect, the certification systems have changed Fair Trade to such an extent 
that sales of products are the main measure of succe s instead of the welfare of 
producers [...] This action seems more to satisfy and enrich the very p ople whose 
actions caused Fair Trade to be established in the first place at the expense of the 
small farmer/producer.  The Fair Trade supply chain should be relational in nature, 
with equal input and ownership by all parties, the c anges proposed by Fair Trade 
USA would reduce this to a conventional supply chain with a price premium that will 
concentrate all the power at the top”18.  
While its origins are in the advocacy of fair trade, “an applicant doesn’t have 
to sell FLO certified products to be registered as F ir Trade Organization-FTO.”19  
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According to Michael Sarcauga of the WFTO, “we are not certifying, we are 
registering organizations that complies our Principles. The basic explanation is that 
certification is expensive for organizations and we ar  trying to help small producer-
organization. For us Fair Trade is transforming organizational practices to follow Fair 
Trade Principles, checking buyers more instead of pr ducers without saying that 
producers do not need to comply FT practices.” Given this as its goal, what attempts 
were made to bolster its own legitimacy through prope  institutional design and 
collaboration with stakeholders? 
4.2.1.1 Matters of Legitimacy 
While the reach and recognition of the WFTO is quite small relative to the FLO, the 
original split represented a fundamental shift in approaches – a split that provides a 
real-life case study comparing the outcomes of mainstreaming versus an adherence to 
the realm of the mission-driven advocacy.  On one hand, an insistence of staying 
within the advocacy and activist realm, and on the other hand, capitalizing on market-
based opportunities for growth and commercialization.  
Notable to the WFTOs structure and procedural legitimacy aims, it provides 
little evidence of a rigorous governance structure that transnational new governance 
organizations are believed to strive for.  While there is a board elected by 
stakeholders, their stakeholders are not organized into a general assembly where 
issues are discussed in an open manner. Instead of being formalized in the governance 
structure, participation of stakeholders is voluntary. There is also no revision of 




stakeholder list is predominantly advocacy groups or traders that represent a narrow 
niche of potential actors. Traditional businesses or industry associations are not 
represented. Most notably, there is no third party verification of business operations. 
Instead, organizations agree to be monitored by the WFTO to ensure 100% adherence 
to fair trade principles as set forth in their 10-point standard list. The WFTO 
represents a significant divergence from the principles of procedural legitimacy 
defined by other scholars and adopted in this study. Even though the WFTO claims 
“the high ground” on ethical practices surrounding coffee, its practices are still 
aligned with improving the market incentives of actors rather than bulking up their 
organization with legitimacy enhancing procedures. This is most obvious with their 
adoption of an ecolabel as well as maintaining a closed network of members to trade 
with each other, and sharing marketing efforts20.  This shift towards the market and 
away from a battle for legitimacy is consistent with hypothesis of this study that an 
increase in competition among standards organizations will lead to a lower likelihood 
that these organizations will adopt institutional elements intent on increasing their 
political legitimacy.   
This advocacy based organization aimed to distinguish its members as being 
more exclusively tied to the origins of the movement. It did not attack the original 
movement, but instead remained as a partner and collaborator. Interviews with 
WFTO representatives confirms the organization’s continued support and respect of 
FLO and acknowledging that while they remain true to the original goals of the 
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advocacy-led fair trade movement, their organization survives alongside the FLO not 
against it21. Their members are mainly, although not solely, memb rs of the FLO 
network.  The WFTO status provides an additional credit of ‘legitimacy’ without 
undermining FLO efforts. They are, in essence a brand within a brand within a brand 
– a fact that confers certain practical market-based benefits. 
4.2.1.2 Matters of Market Integration 
The FLO encouraged the emergence of ATOs and specialty roasters and traders 
focused solely on the sale of ethically sourced coffee.  When it expanded its scope 
and shifted towards mainstreaming, the risk arose that these ATOs could not compete 
with larger, traditional for-profit firms, or even specialty for-profit roasters. The 
WFTO sought to address this market risk by developing a labeling system that 
allowed ATOs to differentiate themselves for their thical commitments.  It was a 
strategy designed to encourage the survival and succe s of ATOs.  
While the WFTO declares itself outside the mainstream, its strategy of upping 
the credibility of certain vendors is nothing less than a means to the same end: greater 
consumer awareness and product differentiation, a claim confirmed by its own 
representative.22  It is a market-based strategy to enhance the competitiveness and 
survivability of fair trade dedicated organizations. WFTO members benefit from 
increased coordination across the network and seek to distinguish their high level of 
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commitment to the fair trade cause through WFTO labeling, a mark they hope would 
lead to loyalty and premiums among a more discerning consumer niche. They 
represent a group that seeks to develop an alternative trade ethos completely separate 
from conventional markets. This includes organizations committed to fair trade 
advocacy, support organizations, and also trade organizations that are fully dedicated 
to selling fair trade. WFTO members also benefit from a variety of services that are 
offered with the aim of facilitating market-based success. These include: 
Business Support Services: Members have access to Shared Interest's Financial 
Services for Producers. Shared Interest provides a Cle ring House for credit, advance 
payments and various financial services to producers, nabling them to grow their 
business at favorable rates. 
Supply and Demand: WFTO members' only website is its Supply & Demand section, 
where anyone seeking Fair Trade goods can post a dem nd notice. The WFTO has a 
reputation as a reliable source of Fair Trade products, and many of these requests 
come from outside our membership. Members can also advertise their products here. 
Learning and Development: WFTO members have specialist marketing experience 
and expertise to share. Every year, the WFTO brings members together for inspiration 
and learning at its Global and Regional conferences. 
Encouraging Regional Initiatives: Regional conferences provide the venue for 




This strategy goes beyond mere advocacy to ensure ma ket viability of their 
members.  The WFTO had the primary goal of differentiati g ethical producers from 
the rest of the market through a separate labeling initiative.  Moreover, it provided 
another value proposition to members through its exclusive offering of member 
support services, trade agreements among member, learning and development and 
regional initiatives to encourage additional cooperation.  This proposal is unique to 
the ATOs and organizations that the WFTO targeted in their mission, and speaks to 
the additional fragmentation of the coffee industry caused by the FLO. 
Notable to the WFTOs opposition to FLO mainstreaming strategy is that it did 
not wage a campaign attacking the legitimacy of the fair trade standards, nor did it 
challenge its existence. Instead, it sought an opportunity to differentiate itself from 
the FLO by being the standard for the original advocates and purists.  The WFTO 
operates in parallel to the FLO and seeks to provide a ditional recognition and 
legitimacy to mission-driven fair trade organizations – a recognition that they hope 
would further support the organization’s marketplace goals. 
Who is the WFTO reaching with their stronger ethical position?  As noted 
above, they seek to strengthen the position of ATOs and like-minded organizations 
now under market threats from mainstream suppliers.  But, with the introduction of 
their WFTO ecolabel, they are also targeting a more ethically minded consumer than 
the FLO23.  The WFTO label aims to communicate a more pure fair trade 
commitment than the fair trade coffee sold at Starbucks. It indicates that the fair trade 
                                                





norm is being adopted not merely by producers, but by every organization along the 
supply chain24.  This differentiation targets a consumer base that is morally aligned 
with the anti-mainstreaming coalition within the original fair trade movement. These 
consumers are considered more ethically stringent than he average FLO consumer, 
and place less emphasis on quality of coffee than on quality of standards. This is 
reflected in WFTOs lack of emphasis on the quality of its standards as a pathway 
towards higher quality. Analysis of WFTO documentation on-line and data gathered 
through interviews provide no indication that quality of product is a priority.   
WFTO is the only standard whose dispute with FLO could be considered a 
threat to its authority. Yet instead of attacking the authority of the group, or splitting 
off completely, it created a network within a network and supplemental standard to 
the FLO.  This is a higher standard.  Is it reflected in the marketplace? The factors 
that influenced WFTO’s entrance into the marketplace were the need to maintain the 
purity of advocacy cause; the need to provide networked benefits to other purists; the 
need to differentiate its members from companies that sold fair trade products but did 
not fully adopt the fair trade ethos. 
4.2.2 Rainforest Alliance  
The Rainforest Alliance (RA), known primarily for its focus on promoting 
biodiversity in the tropics, entered the coffee certification game by making the 
association between coffee production and wildlife refuge in forests.   Their 
                                                





relationship with the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), which claims to be 
“the oldest and largest” coalition of NGOs working to improve the production of 
agricultural commodities in the tropics, led to thed velopment of several standards 
and associated eco-labels certifying environmentally sustainable production.  The 
earliest certification-based eco-label, the ECO-OK seal for bananas, was eventually 
replaced with the Rainforest Alliance Certified seal th t remains today.  
Although the RA is connected to FLO through ISEAL, and has recently 
embarked on a joint mission to develop tools enablig farmers to more efficiently 
adhere to multiple standards, it has never engaged s a potential member, nor is there 
a history of unsettled rifts between the organizations.25  The RA was never part of the 
original cohort of NGOs promoting fair trade norms, nor was there a “history of 
attempts to merger.”26  RA did not emerge out of a dispute around standards or 
objectives, but adopted coffee standards as a means to encourage the sustainable 
maintenance of agricultural lands it oversaw in Latin America, a function if its 
established network and relationships in that area.  
Originating, in 1991, as an advocacy group dedicated to reducing rainforest 
destruction, RA first adopted the sustainable farming cause through a partnership with 
a group of biologists in Guatemala. Together, they b lieved that they could achieve 
their environmental goals by working with commercial farmers to reduce negative 
externalities of their production processes.  By 1991, with banana production as their 
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primary target, the partnering NGOs developed a certifi ation scheme and 
corresponding eco-label for this ubiquitously farmed commodity.  One year later, in 
1992, the group began developing standards for coffee production.  Before long, the 
disparate network of NGOs came to realize the need an benefits of greater 
collaboration.  In 1997, the RA along with a host of other groups focused on and 
based in Latin American created the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN).  In 
2001 the RA adopted the Green Frog seal for certifid products and began promoting 
the seal and its products globally.    
There is no official position on the differences betw en RA and FLO, but 
there is one on their similarities.  Along with UTZ, another coffee standard system 
examined below, Rainforest Alliance published a joint statement with Fairtrade 
declaring their commitment to a shared goal of “transforming the world's production 
systems and value chains to make them more sustainable.”27  
4.2.2.1 Matters of Legitimacy 
Although the Rainforest Alliance claims that its standards meet “rigorous social and 
environmental” standards, given the objectives of SAN, it is unsurprising that the 
standards are far more focused on environmental rather than social sustainability.  
This opens the RA up to critique when compared to the fair trade social standards, 
especially related to RA’s refusal to guarantee a minimum price for farmers.  
However, this split from fair trade does not preclude RA’s membership in the 
                                                





International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling (ISEAL) 
Alliance, to which the Fair trade labeling organization is also a member.  Complying 
with ISEAL codes of good practice for setting their social and environmental 
standards is believed to strengthen the legitimacy of the SAN standards and RA 
certification.  In conformity with ISEAL codes that include guidelines for including 
stakeholder input into standards creation, in 2007, the SAN created the International 
Standards Committee (ISC), an independent body of advisors that decides on the 
contents of the standards.  Through regular consultation with the ISC and other 
stakeholders, including public forums, the SAN works on continually improving their 
standards and certification process. However, it is important to note that the RA is not 
a multi-stakeholder organization.  
The SAN itself is a multi-stakeholder deliberative body that seeks to enable 
open, transparent and inclusive consensus building, complying with the requirements 
other scholars have established for a legitimate process.  Like the FLO, the SAN 
consists of a General Assembly made up of representatives (one each) from their 
member organizations.  Although memberships organizations consist only of the 
small network of Latin American advocacy organizations that founded the SAN or 
were added soon thereafter, the Rainforest Alliance, and one India-based 
organization.  There are a total of 9 member organizations. Three members are 
elected to the Executive Committee by the Board of Directors, also composed of 
representatives from these member organizations.  The Standards Committee is 




others, approved by the Board of Directors, represent a variety of technical experts, 
academics, and advocacy groups from around the globe.   In addition to this 
governance structure, SAN holds regular Public consultations during the Standards 
development process.  Here the International Standards Committee opens up draft 
revisions of standards to a much broader and self-id nt fied group of interested parties 
and stakeholders.  
Lacking from the governance structure, despite “public consultations,” is an 
institutionalized defined process to receive farmer input.  A stakeholder is defined as 
one who is impacted by the actions of an organization, and in the case of SAN 
standards, this absolutely refers to the farmers who have or plan on seeking RA 
certification.  Further exacerbating this exclusion s the short list of members that 
make up all other governance bodies of the SAN, consisti g of 9 advocacy-based 
organizations notable for their heavy geographic bias in Latin America. There are 
also no representatives from the retail side of the equation.   
Certification is performed by a network of 3rd party certification bodies, which 
along with other institutional elements of their governance structure, speak to an 
organizational design based partly on the principles of procedural legitimacy outlined 
in this study. Given the early origins of the RA, its advocacy-based organization and 
elements of institutional legitimacy do not conflict with the hypotheses in this study.  
The organization emerged during the very earliest stages of the environment 
production norms in agriculture and adopted the coffee standards before the FLO was 




trade initiative, it was one of the originals. But a battle between RA and FLO never 
occurred. Instead, the RA focused on agricultural networks in Latin America and 
expanded its scope to include plantations that would not be served by FLO.  Also, its 
lack of focus on social standards or a minimum wage – both provided by FLO – did 
not make way for a de-legitimization of the standard. Instead, it managed to grow, 
and continues to, with a slightly different market strategy than FLO. 
4.2.2.2 Matters of Market Integration 
What is considered a limitation for the SAN was also, at one point, their aison 
d’etre.  While the FLO emerged out of a far more international network of 
organizations, with buyer-organizations in the US and Europe sourcing from African 
craftspeople and farmers, the bodies that developed into the SAN were located in 
South America and operated by locals. One principle critique from activists, who 
refer to the Rainforest Alliance certification as “fairtrade lite,” is that RA certified 
large plantations instead of smaller producers. Yet this strategy, which aligned with a 
goal to cover large agricultural areas for the largest environmental impact, has also 
led to some impressive growth in production supply supporting the increased 
production demands of the largest roasters and encouraging large and medium-sized 
companies to engage with Rainforest Alliance early on in their program.  For 
example, in 2005 Kraft Foods announced a multi-year arrangement that includes the 
purchase of over 5 million pounds of RA certified coffee to be sold in Europe and 




Certified farms in 26 countries covering a total of over half a million hectares 
(approximately 1.4 million acres).  
In addition to gaining access to new markets, producers are supported through 
an RA sponsored financing program. RA is a member of the Finance Alliance for 
Sustainable Trade, an independent non-profit organization that provides financial 
support for producers engaged in sustainable production.  Their mission statement, 
“To enable greater producer access to credit and related financial risk management 
tools through the promotion of sustainable trade finance, development of joint 
projects and improved coordination and cooperation of socially oriented lenders, 
producers and other stakeholders,”28 allows RA to compete with the FLO for 
producer alliance.  
The RA, already in existence when FLO was created, chose not to merge with 
the FLO to provide coffee-related certifications, but instead leveraged its existing 
network of farmers, advocates and activists to create its own separate standard and 
eco-label.  Given the power of the RA alliance and its brand, it was able to venture 
directly into the coffee social market with its own label without having to build an 
additional network of advocates and support. In other words, it did not need to fight 
for additional political legitimacy. RA offers its program as different than FLO 
through a statement on their website claiming their focus on how farms are managed 
rather than poverty alleviation29. Although consumers may not be as informed to 
these differences, they will likely notice the differences in how each “brand” is sold. 
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RA certified coffee will find its way in mainstream coffees from Kraft or Nestle 
including supermarket sold instant coffee blends and blends made for office coffee 
machines. Given its more narrow focus, lack of minium pricing, and acceptance of 
large plantations (versus FLOs focus on small producers) RA standards may be 
considered less stringent set of standards than FLO, and this is reflected in their place 
and perception in the coffee market.  While the RA ‘brand’ carries a reputation for 
ethical production related to environmental impact, its lack of minimum price and 
certification of larger plantations makes it a target to attacks against fair trade 
advocates. The more stringent ethical buyer may be reluctant to support RA in the 
marketplace, and the more discerning coffee drinker may also be less willing to 
purchase mainstream instant coffee brands certified by RA. This segmentation of RA 
for lower standards and lower-end coffee aligns with the hypothesis in this study 
around product segmentation, lower standards will align with lower market segments, 
and higher standards will align with higher market s gments.  According to Elizabeth 
Wenner, director of sustainability for Kraft Foods, RA is “business-driven 
sustainability,”30 a declaration that emphasizes its shift towards the market and 
potential critique from advocates and activists.  The factors that influenced RA’s 
entrance into the marketplace were an ability to leverage existing governance 
organization and relationships with producers; the ne d to focus on environmental 
issues; the need to allow a vehicle to promote production for their larger farmers. 
                                                




4.2.3 UTZ Certified 
UTZ Certified (UTZ) originally developed as a product safety traceability system for 
the Ahold retail group repositioned itself in response to gaps they identified in the fair 
trade coffee market (Nichols and Opal, p 248). Given the barriers to entry into the fair 
trade model, specifically minimum prices and the cost of certification, the founders of 
UTZ were struck by the limits of growth in the fair trade coffee market.  The 
problem, as they saw it, could be narrowed down to two key factors31. First, premium 
prices for fair trade coffee severely limited buyers of fair trade to a small segment of 
the population of more affluent and socially oriented consumers.  Second, the costs of 
certification would limit the numbers of farmers tha  would be able to, or willing to, 
consider producing fair trade coffee.  And perhaps even more critically, despite the 
structural constraint on supply, there remained far mo e supply of fair trade coffee 
than there was demand in the marketplace.   
Capitalizing on the excess of fair trade certified coffee, UTZ realized that by 
eliminating the requirement for premium prices, these sustainable and ethically 
produced coffee beans may be made available to a much wider segment of the 
consumer market. UTZ was therefore able to capitalize on the foremost critique of 
fair trade’s premium price guarantee - over production of fair trade coffee – without 
ever needing to organize an alliance of like-minded civil society groups or argue the 
point in a multi-stakeholder forum.  While this is a split from fair trade in terms of 
pricing, it maintains a commitment to ethical production, including high labor 
                                                




standards. The problem of pricing, UTZ maintains, i resolved through the 
marketplace where consumers would ultimately be willing to pay more for ethical 
coffee, a premium that would eventually flow back to producers.  
While UTZ founders had goals that were aligned to the fair trade movement, 
they chose to approach their goals in a different way. Rather than join forces, they 
developed a parallel standards organization that they believe complements the 
objectives of the FLO. By making certification more accessible to producers of all 
sizes, and eliminating the minimum price requirement o  buyers, UTZ seeks to 
“mainstream” ethical coffee, and “create a world where sustainable farming is the 
norm.”32 In 2003, Eric Onstad of Reuters introduced the organization to the world 
with “Just as Starbucks popularized cappuccinos for mainstream America, a new 
group wants to put "ethical" coffee on supermarket shelves across the globe.”33 
Rather than focusing on the particularities of standards, UTZ develops what 
may be considered a baseline for standards, and focuses on consistency, verifiability, 
and transparency.  This “baseline of standards” is considered lower or a “watered 
down” version of the more stringent FLO standards (Conroy 2007). The objectives 
UTZ seeks to achieve are greater participation by a wider array of producers rather 
than the narrow group targeted by FLO.   Also, by offering a web-based traceability 
application, UTZ and UTZ buyers can tout the traceability of its coffee to ensure that 
every step of the production process was verified according to minimum standards of 
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responsibility.  Traceability is important because it helps reduce the space between 
consumer and producer (Conroy 2007) leveraging a key facet of ethical production, 
and enables the upgrading of producers (Gereffi et. al 2005). 
UTZ aims to implement the worldwide standard for socially and 
environmentally responsible coffee production by targeting the mainstream market.  
This means shifting away from relying on high-end or s cially conscious consumers 
willing to pay a premium for ethical coffee, but to get mainstream brands to deliver 
the same high quality coffee at the same price, with the added benefit of ensuring 
transparency around its production method. “The high ground has been staked out by 
organic and Fair Trade coffee, but there is a limit to how far those segments are going 
to grow,” said Utz Kapeh director David Rosenberg. “The question is what is going to 
happen to the other 95 percent that is not in that niche.” 
4.2.3.1 Matters of Legitimacy  
UTZ founders never challenged the fair trade regime represented by the FLO, but 
instead sought to complement it with a system that would seek “to create a world 
where sustainable farming is the norm.”34 In order to achieve this goal, according to 
Stephanie de Heer, Farmers must be able to implement good agricultural practices 
and manage their farms profitably with respect for people en planet, Industry must 
discover the rewards and incentives to invest in sustainable production, and 
Consumers must be able to enjoy and trust the products they buy. UTZ was the 
                                                




brainchild of “two business partners,”35 that identified a need to promote and expand 
the sustainable coffee market.  While they adopted some of the fair trade norms and 
standards, their origins were not as activists or advocacy groups, but business.  Their 
strategy was to bridge the supply of sustainable products with the larger marketplace.  
UTZ’s governance structure and stakeholder membership reflects this explicit 
prioritization of industry and consumers along with farmers, which contrasts with 
FLOs focus on farmers. 
After operating for several years, UTZ formalized a multi-stakeholder 
governance structure in 2010, and while the structue i self mirrors closely that of the 
FLO, its list of stakeholders reflects a consumer-minded focus and greater intimacy 
with industry36.  Similarities with the FLO include: a clear commit ent to a multi-
stakeholder environment; the election of stakeholders to a Supervisory Board; the 
participation of stakeholders in the election of the UTZ Executive Team; the 
participation of the supervisory board in the nomination of the Standards Committee; 
the establishment of a separate Advisory Committee of experts. 
The principle difference is two-fold: the type of stakeholders, and there is no 
General Assembly. UTZ governance explicitly calls for the inclusion of participants 
along the entire coffee supply chain, including large roasters, brands, and retailers.  
While this can be considered a more comprehensive list of stakeholders than FLO, 
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their lack the institutional checks on power that threatens a skewed level of influence 
and control from large retailers and brands.  UTZ itself expresses the philosophical 
differences through the “principles” of their governance structure (UTZ 2013, 
p2):“The governance of UTZ CERTIFIED is under-pinned by the following guiding 
principles:   
Expertise & Objectivity: Supervisory Board Members a e chosen on the basis of their 
expertise, experience and objectivity. Supervisory Board members do not represent 
the stakeholder group of which they may be part, bu rather to act in the overall 
interests of UTZ CERTIFIED.   
Strong Mandate to Directors: UTZ CERTIFIED operations are led and managed by 
the Directors and their staff, without undue interference from the Supervisory Board  
Participation of stakeholders: The Standards Committee and Product Advisory 
Committees provide the forum for stakeholders along the value chain, from producers 
to buyers to be involved and influence the operations f UTZ CERTIFIED.”  
The notable results are first, a Commercial Director, part of the Executive Team, 
staffed by a highly experienced business executive to interface with the industry 
representatives; second, a Field Director, part of he Executive Team, staffed by 
MBA with notable experience in Business Consulting; five out of eight members of 
the Supervisory Board who represent, or have spent most of their careers with “big 
business” and the coffee industry, and member repres nting farmers and producers, 




In contrast to Bernstein and Cashore’s claims (2007), this complacency with 
industry was not the result of business-initiated competitors to the FLO, but was 
created as a wholly independent group seeking similar normative goals by using 
alternative market strategies.  As hypothesized in the primary thesis of this research, 
the evolution of the social market and growing acceptance of the norm of ethically 
produced coffee, leads to shifts away from advocacy-based strategies towards market 
strategies.  
UTZ is an ISEAL member, has joint statements with RA, SAN and FLO, and 
works in collaboration with Solidaridad. The industry as a whole was able to gain 
legitimacy through collaboration and a meta-standard c eated by ISEAL. This 
relieved the new standard, from the obligation to establish its own legitimacy through 
stringent governance procedures. International organizations working on UTZ 
implementation include: Solidaridad, a key organization emerging from the original 
fair trade social movement; Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung, a foundation committed to 
supporting fair trade organizations; GIZ, the German government’s agency 
committed to promoting sustainability; ACDI/VOCA, an international economic 
advocacy organization focused on supporting cooperativ s and community run 
economic organizations. Sponsors include also include a number of international 
advocacy organizations and state-supported groups, such as Irish Aid; Svenska 
Postkod Stiftelsen, the Swedish Postcode Foundation is a beneficiary of the Swedish 
Postcode Lottery and support projects that work towards a better world; Hivos, the 




and environment, Human rights and culture; Agentschap NL, the Department of the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture & Innovation that implements 
government policy for sustainability, innovation, and international business and 
cooperation. 
Despite its clear divergence from FLO standards and, as critics insist, a 
strictness of standards that ensure the goals of ethically traded coffee are met (Purvis 
2006, COOP Coffees 2008), UTZ was able to foster a network of state-based, NGOs, 
and private sector supporters.  Notable also was its inclusion into the ISEAL alliance 
with the FLO and RA. None of this development emerged out of conflict with the 
original system. Instead, a team of socially minded, business savvy, entrepreneurs 
capitalized on an opportunity created by the FLO.  Their shift away from a more 
robust multi-stakeholder organization, as exemplified by FLO, is paralleled by their 
shift towards greater market integration.  As UTZ notes, “While we are not-for-profit, 
we organize our activities in a business-like structure.”37  
4.2.3.2 Matters of Market Integration 
The stark imbalance between ethically produced coffee and demand for this coffee 
influenced the creation of UTZ. According to Bob Thompson, former director of Fair 
Trade Mark Canada, in 1995 Fair Trade producers had a production capacity of 
250,000 metric tons of coffee, while demand stagnated at 11,000 metric tons, or 
around 13 percent of total production (Thomson 1995). So significant was this 
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disequilibrium between supply and demand that in 2002 FLO had to halt registration 
of new members (Vizcarra 2002). UTZ organizers believ d that this imbalance was 
the result of two related phenomena: 1) fair trade’s minimum price guarantee imposed 
a higher price on certified coffee that was restrictive to most consumers, and 2) 
detracted interest from mainstream coffee buyers and retailers that could buy in larger 
quantities.  Their solution: drop the minimum price requirement, and let the market 
sort out oversupply through price adjustments.   
Leaning towards the market: they insist on allowing buyers and sellers to 
agree on price and transact in a “market-driven way.”  UTZ does not guarantee a 
minimum price to farmers, which keeps prices down and enables traders and retailers 
to provide the product to a wider segment of the consumer market. If fair trade coffee 
is criticized for being within the scope of opportunity only for those who can afford 
the premiums, UTZ may be offered at little to no price premium and can therefore be 
supported by a wider consumer base.   
The shift away from minimum price guarantees was, according to Hans Perk 
of Solirdaridad, a reflection of UTZs explicit embrace of market realities.  Aligned 
with this was the understanding that any increase in pricing would necessarily be tied 
to product quality, and that increases in profits for producers should a function of 
business efficiencies.  A focus on product quality and business efficiencies raises the 
challenge to farmers to become professional busines partners with UTZ, a 
philosophical shift from FLO whose minimum pricing and farmer support was closer 




Given its strategy to capitalize on particular supply chain opportunities left 
open by the FLO, UTZ did little to “brand” its coffee to consumers.  Its strategy was 
decidedly stealth relative to consumer awareness. A Han de Groot, one of the 
founders of the organization notes, "the percentage of p ople who are interested in the 
Utz Kapeh principles is a maximum of about 10 percent. The other 90 percent do not 
care too much or are not aware. We don't want to give the other 90 percent the feeling 
that we have changed our coffee, which we haven't. We have to be very careful that 
the 90 percent keep buying the coffee because they like the quality." (Onstad 2003) 
Less interested in persuading consumers of the ethical value of their coffee, 
UTZ has sought to cater to large buyers who are intres ed in sourcing from 
sustainable supply chains, but are not in the specialty coffee business and will not 
seek to brand their ethical or specialty coffee for a premium.  In contrast to the 
original advocacy-based fair trade movement’s network of ATOs, buyers of UTZ 
coffee include the major roasters such as Sara Lee, who to date has purchased more 
than 240 million lbs. of UTZ coffee, and has committed to purchasing at least 770 
million lbs. over the next five years (UTZ 2010,  p20). 
Whereas fair trade gained market success by having ATO develop consumer 
awareness of ethical coffee through their brands, UTZ seeks to penetrate the market 
through existing brands. 
 “Although the labels have similar goals, we all have a different approach in 
how to reach these goals. The advantages of the existence of different systems are 




competition. The third, which we will call societal risk management, is related to the 
subject of sustainability and the difficulty to know what the best system is in the long 
term. Finally, the existence of choice makes it easier for many companies to take the 
plunge and choose for sustainable sourcing. We do however seek collaboration in the 
area’s where this is possible and benefits all parties involved.”38 
To argue that UTZ is not doing enough to promote a high standard of ethical 
production of coffee is to ignore the benefits of their high volume mainstream 
strategy. “One way is to define a high price, implying that the possibilities of selling 
significant volumes to the market are limited; volumes significant enough to turn this 
ethical price into a real price for producers. The c oice of Utz Kapeh is to formulate - 
within a competitive market - a realistic set of improved trading conditions, 
permitting substantial volumes to be traded against these improved conditions. This 
way the formula “Price multiplied by Volume” actually leads to an increase in 
producer income. The implementation of a robust cerification program can drive 
improvement in quality and efficiency and lower costs for unnecessary use of 








                                                







Figure 4.1 Production and Sales of UTZ Certified Coffee
Source: Adapted from UTZ Certified Annual Report
Standards were developed based on the international standards for agriculture 
based on EUREP-GAP Protocol for Good Agricultural Practices, which UTZ 
modified for coffee production
8000, and the labor standards and worker rights are based on internationally accepted 
norms of the ILO.  Linking to these highly credibly international standards guidelines 
ensures a level of legitimacy to its own standards, but UTZ makes no contention that 
its standards are meant to be easier and less costly than FLO standards 
willingly achieve by lower requirements.  This mainstream product fits well with its 





 (Ponte 2004). Social guidelines are based on SAI 





relationship between the stringency of the standard and the market niche is observed, 
and will be examined more thoroughly in the following chapter.   
The factors that influenced UTZ’z entrance into the marketplace were: 
partnership with Conservation International mitigated the need to recreate a 
governance body promoting open and consensus-based decision-making. Although 
the degree of ‘legitimacy’ was low; the need to take advantage of an oversupply of 
certified coffee; the need to encourage pricing and branding based on quality. 
"The high ground has been staked out by organic and F ir Trade coffee, but there is a 
limit to how far those segments are going to grow. The question is what is going to 
happen to the other 95 percent [medium to large-scale estates] that is not in that 
niche." (Sweet Marias 2012) 
4.2.4 Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) 
Pushing the mainstreaming of sustainable coffee production to the furthest point yet, 
the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) emerged to create an industry-
wide baseline standard for sustainable coffee production.  The association emerged 
to solve the problem outlined in a study prepared for the UN’s Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), “Despite the recent boom in sale  of certified coffees, the share 
of these coffees in total sales by the world’s main coffee roasters – with the exception 
of Starbucks – remains limited. Certified coffees account for between 0 and 6 percent 
of than the world’s largest coffee roasters, including Nestlé, Kraft, Sara Lee, Procter 




volumes indicate that established brands are unlikely to market certified coffees on a 
large scale in the near future as they prioritise [sic] cost efficiency and are prepared to 
absorb only minimal additional costs.” (Pay 2009) 
Much like UTZ Certified, the 4C appreciates the social and environmental 
advances that can be attributed to the rise of coffee certification systems and aims to 
deliver these benefits to a much wider group of producers.  Faced with a shortage in 
supply across the coffee industry, 4C adopted a strategy to increase the supply of 
certified coffee.  This strategy led to their contrversial approach to develop a set of 
standards that are easier to comply with to increase the supply of certified coffee in 
the marketplace. This new baseline supply opens the path for larger retailers to sell 
certified coffee without incurring the costs associated with certification.  Unlike UTZ, 
4C is far less interested in promoting “quality” coffee that can seek market premiums 
than it is in increasing the baseline for all coffee.  Rather than promoting and 
rewarding better practices, 4C aims to “exclude worst practices” and achieve an 
average level of sustainability as a start. Once on the path towards sustainability, 
guided by the Rules of Participation document, membrs explicitly commit to the 
continuous improvement of coffee quality and sustainable production processes. A 
commitment to "continuous improvement" allows the organization to demand lower 
prerequisites and makes the system comparatively eas  for producers to enter. Their 
focus is explicitly not to develop the highest environmental or social standards, but 
instead aim to work with farmers to establish a firm foundation from which 




4.2.4.1 Matters of Legitimacy 
The 4C association was spearheaded by the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the German Coffee Associati n (DKV). Shortly 
afterward, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the British 
Development Cooperation and the European Coffee Federation (ECF) joined the 
project.  More than 70 representatives from over 20 countries – mostly 
representatives for coffee farmers launch an initiative to create the new association. 
They established goals similar to the original fairtrade movement, namely to improve 
farmer competitiveness by providing guidance and tools n sustainability production 
methods and transparency of market information. 
Immediately upon launching the initiative, a multi-s akeholder committee is 
formed to formalize the goals, structure, and rules of the 4C.  In 2006 the organization 
is formally established, with the original list of 37 members increasing throughout the 
years.  As is standard for these multi-stakeholder organizations, 4C is comprised of a 
General Assembly of all members, a decision-making body, in this case called the 
Council, elected by the General Assembly.  The Council represents members from the 
three groups – industry, civil society, and producers – with a legislated bias towards 
producers.  The Executive Board, Technical Committee, and Mediation Committee 
comprise the other representative groups that are appointed by the Council. 
Notable from the list of members are UTZ and Rainforest Alliance, as well as 




coffee. Even more striking, on September 17, 2012 FLO joined the 4C Association! 
In a statement published on 4Cs website, Lee Byers, Senior Adviser on Coffee and 
Tea at Fairtrade International said “We joined the 4C Association to continue making 
sure the voice of small coffee farmers is heard on a global stage. The 4C Association 
is an ideal forum for meeting with other important ctors in coffee”39. UTZ and RA 
collaborate with 4C and support the upgrading of farmer certification from 4C to 
higher standards represented by each.   The collaboration with RA goes even further 
as RA certified coffee is eligible for marketing as 4C coffee. 4C full membership in 
ISEAL, inclusion of competitor standards, and cross-membership of RA, UTZ and 
FLO is evidence not of a battle for legitimacy, but of an acceptance for the role of a 
multiplicity of standards within their industry.  
4C accepts that it establishes the lowest standards of any coffee certification 
scheme, but does not fight to keep producers at the standard.  Instead, it coordination 
with other standards organizations, works to promote higher production standards. In 
2010 the 4C cooperated with the SalvaNATURA Foundation in a pilot exercise to 
enable 132 farmers to upgrade their practices from the baseline 4C Code of Conduct 
to SAN Standards promoted and certified by RA. Discus ions are underway to 
conduct a similar project comparing the 4C Code of C nduct and UTZ. This will 
enable Colombian producers to step up from the 4C baseline standard to UTZ 
Certified.40   
                                                
39 see http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/news/current-news/article/fairtrade-international-joins-the-
4c-association.html 




4.2.4.2 Matters of Market Integration 
The 4C association works through “units,” established by member organizations that 
coordinate activities with local traders, roasters and farmers to implement the code of 
conduct within the unit.  The unit is a loose partne ship of separate companies and 
producers, representing an alternative relationship-based trading unit to the 
cooperative and contracts-based organization promoted by fair trade. Farmers in these 
units are expected to work closely with other companies in the unit and will select 
farmer representatives, or group leaders, to support this end.41 Independent 3rd party 
verification confirms that a 4C unit is making progess according to the 4C code of 
conduct. Once certification is achieved, a 4C unit can trade its coffee among other 4C 
members as 4C compliant coffee. The 4C code of conduct refuses to set minimum 
prices or guarantee price premiums to farmers, but works on improving farmer 
income through other variables such as: coffee quality (through training), improving 
yields, and cost reductions.  Much like the coyote problem discussed in chapter 3, by 
eliminating oppressive local traders that capitalize on the lack of market transparency 
to farmers, units help promote farmer terms of trade by rewarding better quality. As 
of July 2010, there were 89 registered 4C units in 29 different countries. 
Premiums are not coded into their standards, and while they claim to rely on 
market forces to provide price premiums where approriate, it is also notable that the 
4C Rules of Participation for members includes the statement that members 
                                                
41 4C Association website video. http://www.4c-
coffeeassociation.org/index.php?id=198&PHPSESSID=9edcsuk5rqnne8e85lk95v1cn3. Accessed 




“acknowledge that the application of sustainability practices according to the 4C 
Code of Conduct may have an impact on the costs of production,” and that buyers 
understand and agree that “suppliers of 4C Compliant Coffee need to be adequately 
rewarded for their efforts”42 It is therefore an expectation, though not a requirement, 
that some premium be paid to producers of 4C certified coffee regardless of whether 
or not retailers can extract a premium from consumers.  
Additionally, while degrees of compliance or grades of production are not 
coded into the standard process, 4C promotes a culture of continuous improvement 
and provides anecdotal evidence that implementing 4C standards leads to overall 
improved production. EDE Consulting in Vietnam is witnessing continuous 
improvements in production after implementing the 4C codes, they noted that farmers 
have seen the benefits of keeping detailed records to track spending, receipts, and 
they have reduced the use of fertilizers and the usage of water, so they end up saving 
in production costs (D’Haeze 2009).  
This strategy of working through units has achieved impressive scale.  With 
production potential almost doubling from 8,109,000 bags in 2010 to 15,906,957 bags 
as of April 2012, the 4C appears to have addressed with rigor their original objective: 
to increase production of certified coffee. Yet, their success in increasing production 
has now led to a mismatch between supply and demand. Verification was for free, 
paid by membership fees but the demand side was weaker. They have now made a 







strategic switch to focus on demand side and cease ncouraging increased production. 
One clear change was that they no longer paying for the audits43.  
Table 4.1 Supply Figures 4C 
Source: Provided by Veronica Perez 4C Association, email conversation, April 25, 2012. 
In addition to these figure, 4C is also successfully moving towards “stepping 
up” (Gereffi et al. 2005) of producers.  According to the information supplied by 
Veronica Perez, as of April 2012, 15 4C Units licens d under the benchmarking 
scheme with the Rainforest Alliance with a production potential of 860,897 bags of 
4C Compliant Coffee. 
4C does not certify products and does not employ a chain of custody tracking 
system, so can not verify the contents of each bag of coffee.  Beans originating from a 
certified farm are mixed with uncertified beans to form the necessary blends for pre-
existing brands. This means products can not be labeled as certified, so there is no 4C 
eco-label. Since the consumer has no insight into the certification of their coffee, 4C 
coffee can not be targeted to ethical consumers. Some 4C members, such as Nestle, 
Chibo, and Strauss disclose the volume of their coffee that is compliant, but this is 
done through regular sustainability or CSR reporting rather than directly to coffee 
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2008 8,034,995 53 54,961 190,192 
2009 10,068,100 60 64,985 217,625 
2010 8,109,000 67 72,774 214,756 
2011 12,120,000 71 93,228 361,120 




consumers. Thus, the linking of ethical production and brand awareness or quality is 
absent in 4C certified coffee. The ethical nature of their coffee does not contribute to 
the perception of the coffee, or to product differentiation.  4C highlights the 
relationship between lower standards and brand differentiation – this is a baseline 
standard targeting mainstream coffee consumers. The factors that influenced 4C 
entrance into the marketplace were: the need to bring together large retailers and 
producers under one common baseline standard; the need to offer ethical coffee for 
consumers without a premium; the need to offer a baseline standard not linked to 
brand or quality. 
4.2.5 Starbucks Coffee and Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E) 
No analysis of the specialty coffee industry would be complete without Starbucks. 
MNCs are often the target of advocacy groups and norm entrepreneurs working to 
promote a new norm within the marketplace, and Starbucks was no exception to the 
fairtrade coffee market. Using rudimentary pressure tactics culminating in 
coordinated nationwide protests in 29 cities, Global Exchange, a pioneer Alternative 
Trade Organization and member of the WFTO, was ableto convert Starbucks into 
carrying fair trade coffee in 2000. Global Exchange had spent more than a year 
orchestrating a campaign against Starbucks, because the firm refused to introduce the 
sale of certified coffee saying the beans were of dubious quality. This effort was part 
of a much longer, multiyear strategy to improve the benefits from trade for producers 
in the global South through various mechanisms, including a certified “fair trade” 




letter of intent with TransFair USA, a fair-trade crtification organization, to offer 
certified coffee in all 2700 Starbucks outlets in the U.S. On October 4th, 2000, 
certified fair trade coffee began to be sold at Starbucks.  These tactics are not new to 
the fair trade movement, although interesting to fairtrade, the advocates are also the 
market actors. These hybrid organizations and norm franchisees are best exemplified 
through Equal Exchange and the other ATOs. Analysis of events after the conversion 
of Starbucks to fairtrade helps shed light on the evolution of standards in the 
marketplace.  
After years of selling fair trade certified coffee in their stores, mainly in the 
form of whole-bean bags, Starbucks embarked on its own certification system known 
as Coffee and Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E) standards.  Although claims are made that 
Starbucks and Conservation International have been collaborating since 1998, it was 
only in 2008 that the two organizations began measuring and evaluating the 
improvements through systematic and verifiable methods. As expected, these firm-
based standards are not without their critics.  In 2008 Rodney North of Equal 
Exchange was interviewed by change.org about the CAFÉ standards and made these 
general comments44: there is a lack of transparency about which beans are CAFÉ 
certified and which are not as no labeling is used to istinguish them; Starbucks wrote 
their own standards, although North acknowledges that “a lot” of input was received 
from other stakeholders; Starbucks continued to source from plantations instead of 
relying uniquely on co-ops; it requires producers to ell their beans to large corporate 
exporters, which inhibits the growth and development of co-ops into exporting 
                                                




agents; it does provide advance credit (although this seems in contradiction to 
Starbuck’s claims); it does not guarantee a minimum price; for their choice of using a 
point system which pits supplier against supplier to advance in the supplier rankings; 
Starbucks created a system for itself rather than promote industry wide adoption of 
standards. 
The battle over the stringency of standards was started by Equal Exchange and 
included, in 2004, a list of recommendations to Starbucks on how to improve its 
CAFÉ standards45.  Most notable in Equal Exchange’s critique is the lack of 
exigencies related to the actual social, environmental or governance standards. 
Instead, its focus was on two major issues: First, procedural improvements were 
demanded, specifically related to establishing minium requirements rather than the 
scoring system, verifying the verifiers, continuous review of the standards by a group 
of experts which includes Equal Exchange, develop public education programs 
around the social, economic, and environmental costs f coffee production; Second, 
the need to increase attention to the benefit of the small producers.   
The Starbucks CAFÉ Practices Program evaluates the production of coffee 
according to four categories: Product Quality, Economic Accountability, Social 
Responsibility, and Environmental Leadership. The first two categories are 
prerequisites to participation in the program. The program stands out from other 
systems with its detailed and systematic points system. Through a clear and 
transparent matrix and point system, members along on the supply chain are able to 
                                                




see exactly where they stand relative to various special supplier statuses. Preferred 
Supplier status is awarded if a minimum of 60 percent of possible points in each 
applicable criteria, and an overall score of 60 percent is scored.  Strategic Supplier 
status is awarded to those who scored a minimum of 60 percent in each applicable 
criteria area, and an overall score of 80 percent. Preferred pricing and contract terms 
extended to Preferred Suppliers. Strategic Suppliers also receive a $.05/pound 
premium on first year’s crop.  Notable in their stand rds is the primacy of quality and 
economic viability. These “standards” are not scored on a scale like criteria in the 
Social Responsibility or Environmental Leadership categories. These criteria are: 
Product Quality (green preparation prerequisite, cup q ality prerequisite); Economic 
Accountability (demonstration of financial transparency, equity of financial reward, 
financial viability)46. 
This highlights a clear reordering of priorities over the original fair trade 
system, as well as an obvious distinction from the mainstreaming standards.  
Starbucks stresses the inseparability of quality and economic viability from their 
sustainability standards by defining sustainability as “an economically viable model 
that addresses the social and environmental needs of all the participants in the supply 
chain from farmer to consumer.”47 
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February 2014 




4.2.5.1 Matters of Legitimacy 
Starbucks developed standards guidelines with Scientific Certification Systems (now 
doing business as SCS Global Services), a leader in third-party environmental, 
sustainability and food quality certification, auditing, testing and standards 
development.  SCS Global Services performs verificat on for a long list of other 
standards organizations including the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Program for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), Marine Stewardship Council, Home 
Depot Eco Options and several others. Starbucks also undertakes an assessment of the 
program in collaboration with Conservation International (CI), an eco-advocacy 
group that focuses on the scientific roots of conservation.  CI partners with major 
organizations like Wal-Mart, McDonald’s and Starbucks to support their embrace of 
progressive environmental practices.  The benefits to these large business 
organizations are subject matter expertise as well as legitimacy.   
Starbuck is also careful not to insulate itself from the larger network of 
advocates.  It has been reaching out to small-scale farmers through its Small Farmer 
Sustainability Initiative (SFSI). Launched in 2009, it is a three-year pilot program in 
partnership with Fair Trade USA and the FLO that, according to Starbuck’s 
“leverages [their] shared commitment to support small-scale farmers.” (Starbucks 
2010) The partnerships are important to protect against attacks from advocacy 
organizations, but they are also notable for what it is not: a multi-stakeholder 




Legitimacy and alliances are increasing and standards e under constant review and 
being improved.  
4.2.5.2 Matters of Market Integration 
Starbucks remains ambivalent about Fair Trade, identifying it as the only issue that is 
“very important” to “external stakeholders,” but less important to the company 
(Raynolds 2009, p1084). “The company’s mission—to be the “premier purveyor of 
the finest coffee”—reflects little affinity with Fair Trade, never mentioning producers 
or equity concerns. For Starbucks Fair Trade is a type of coffee, not a business model, 
and the one certified blend is simply listed in a menu of 39 varieties” (Ibid.) In 
contrast, the CAFÉ standard reflects Starbucks’ understanding that “long term 
business success is linked to the success of the millions of farmers who grow and 
supply coffee to the company” (CI 2012) The explicit link between the sourcing of its 
coffee and its business goals indicates, as Raynolds notes, the subordination of social 
and environmental norms to industrial market conventions (Raynolds 2009, p1084). 
Starbucks, more than any other standard, makes the focus on quality not only a 
priority, but provides the rationale for embarking on the comprehensive standard 
program.  They claim to take a “holistic approach” to the standards used for ethical 
sourcing of coffee, in order to “create a long-term supply of the high-quality 
beans”(Starbucks 2012). “We know our success as a company is linked to the success 
of the thousands of farmers who grow our coffee. That’s why we’re working to 




purchasing practices and by investing in farmers and their communities”(Starbucks 
2012). 
For Starbucks, the rationale for standards is its ability to achieve vertical 
integration – a management process that provides firms with access and control of 
upstream production. Benefits of vertical integration nclude better control of costs, 
quality and delivery of goods critical to its business (Williamson 1971) At least one 
of these benefits – quality – is made explicit by Starbucks: “our comprehensive set of 
more than 200 social, economic and environmental indicators – with quality as a 
prerequisite” (Starbucks 2012) Integrating Fair Trade coffee was the first step 
towards an ethically produced product line for Starbucks, but CAFÉ will now be how 
the company sources the majority of its coffee. 
Starbucks revolutionized the coffee market in the United States and the world 
by bringing specialty coffee to the masses. While its inspiration was found in a small 
one-of-a-kind specialty coffee roaster in Seattle, Starbucks coffee is big business 
today. In the mainstream mindset, Starbucks is specialty coffee. Yet for the 
discerning coffee drinker, Starbucks is coffee for the masses.  This paradox provides 
insight into Starbucks’ segmentation: it is the mainstream purveyor of specialty 
coffee. While it does serve the ethically minded consumer, it caters to a much larger 
segment of the population and must therefore align its product offering with a diverse 
population.  CAFÉ standards represent an important shift for the coffee social market, 
where a mainstream traditional economic actor incorporates ethical standards into 




designed for the ethically minded consumer – it represents an important maturation of 
the social market where internalization of the norm becomes so pervasive as to 
penetrate traditional markets (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
Given the internalization of the ethical coffee norm, why did Starbucks choose 
to start its own standard rather than partner, in mass, with an existing standard?  
Based on interviews with Starbucks representatives, this choice is explained 
succinctly by Anne Weiss, Starbucks project manager, “committing fully to a 
standard would become so critical to our business operations that we would have to 
control every aspect of the standard, including operations and brand identity.”48 
In order to put this decision in perspective, and to help explain the decision, 
we must compare and contrast with other large retailers of coffee.  Nestle and Kraft 
decided to adopt other standards, higher or lower, d pending on the brand of coffee 
they were selling. In contrast, the Starbucks brand was only one – there are no sub-
brands of coffee within Starbucks. And this brand was strong enough to not rely on 
the brand power of a standard in order to elevate its legitimacy. This raises an 
important point about the power of a brand and multiplicity that will need to be 
further explored.  
The factors that influenced Starbuck’s entrance into the marketplace were: 
partnership with Conservation International mitigated the need to recreate a 
governance body promoting open and consensus-based decision-making. Although 
                                                




the degree of ‘legitimacy’ was low; the need to contr l the supply (quantity) and 
quality of their beans; the need to maintain brand independence 
4.2.6 Direct Trade 
Roaster and growers work together through long-term trading partnerships in a 
relationship-based coffee based on the principles of Direct Trade. The trading process 
is transparent — farmers gain bargaining power through knowledge, and receive a 
price that reflect the shared commitment to high quality sustainably produced beans.  
While the standards for Direct Trade are not derived through deliberation of a multi-
stakeholder consensus-based organization such as FLO, and is not plugged into other 
legitimacy bolstering organizations such as ISEAL, its supporters insist that its focus 
on direct support of the farmer and its commitment to higher-than-fair-trade pricing 
makes Direct Trade coffee the premier standard in the coffee social market. 49  
Although specialty roasters Intelligentsia Coffee and Counter Culture pioneered 
Direct Trade, the practice of direct trade - where sellers purchase beans straight from 
producers - is being taken up by quality and ethically minded coffee sellers across the 
world.  Direct Trade coffee is associated with high-end specialty and gourmet roasters 
and retailers across the globe.  
Direct Trade standards emerged as a high-end quality focused alternative to 
FLO certified coffee. Standards are based on broad gui elines, including a focus on 
quality, grower commitments to healthy environmental and social practices, higher-
                                                




than-fair-trade pricing50, transparency and openness in transactions between sell r and 
buyer, including regular visits to the farm to support harvest and growing strategy and 
quality monitoring.51 
4.2.6.1 Matters of Legitimacy  
Direct Trade stands out as focused on both the mostpremium segment of the coffee 
market, with ethical standards that claim to go above FLO, but also for lacking the 
organizational structures, processes, procedures or partnerships required to strengthen 
its legitimacy. It contains elements of a loose network of advocates, intent on 
improving the livelihoods of farmers and lacking a centralized governing body, while 
at the same time being distinctly market-based withits focus on quality, and absent of 
collaborations, support, or partnerships with established advocates of the coffee social 
market.  This paradox presents the sharpest foil in the legitimacy-based explanations 
for standards development.  
The decentralized nature of the direct trade regime may at first appear to 
present challenges for empirical observations.  Yet this decentralization is in fact a 
central element to be observed. It converges towards  norm of ethical coffee while 
shedding the institutional elements that have come to define the social market. There 
is no multi-stakeholder organization that sets standards, there are no institutional 
checks on the power of the business, no membership organization at all, no process 
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for reporting grievance, and outside the individual effort of Counter Culture52, no 3rd 
party verification of compliance.  
Yet discussions with Direct Trade practitioners yield a slightly different 
perspective on its legitimacy. For them, it is the large bureaucracies of other standards 
organizations that lack the processes and procedures required to best support farmers. 
Instead the direct and constant engagement between buyer and farmer represents the 
most valuable form of stakeholder engagement. “Only Direct Trade provides the 
required flexibility and individual attention to see true impact on the lives and 
livelihood of farmers”53 
This tension between traditional elements of procedural legitimacy and Direct 
Trade standards provides an interesting foil to attempts to evaluate standards on their 
own merit. While this may appear to be a paradox and in conflict with existing 
perspectives on voluntary standards, it may very well represent the most poignant 
example of the future of social markets.  
If a standard lacks the procedural elements required to establish a baseline 
across organizations, how can its standards be evaluated? What is its relative position 
vis-à-vis other standards?  On what merit can a standard boldly claim superior 
standards? Insight can be found in Direct Trade’s market segmentation.  
                                                
52 Counter Culture has tried to address this fundamental weakness by hiring a 
U.S.D.A.-certified firm, Quality Certification Services (QCS), to partner with 
Counter Culture and run the program. This gives the customer at least some level of 
reassurance that the standards are truly being met.  
http://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/content/direct-trade. Last Accessed June 2012 




4.2.6.2 Matters of Market Integration 
Starbucks established the mainstream specialty coffee market, and in doing so left 
those seeking true gourmet coffee with few options.  Likewise, as FLO 
mainstreamed, the WFTO focused on the purity of their partner, and UTZ, 4C and 
RA, all – to one degree or another – sought to certify beans from larger and more 
industrial plantations, few options remained for an ethical standard whose central 
focus was the direct empowerment of the farmer.  The ironic twist is that this was the 
original purpose of the fair trade movement, but now with the mainstreaming of FLO, 
it is being framed as the supply chain intermediary that must be circumvented if a 
truly fair and equitable trade is to be established54.   The growth of certified coffee 
left the existing coffee supply chain with two openings that Direct Trade sought to 
resolve: 1) strict intermediaries in the coffee market for certified coffee, and 2) no 
standard for the highest quality coffee and most discerning consumer.   
As observed in the previous chapter, an early and necessary strategy in the fair 
trade movement was to eliminate intermediaries in the coffee supply chain in order to 
shift power from coyotes, importers and exporters back to the coffee producer.  Since 
its founding, FLO has adopted a mainstreaming strategy and grown to such 
significance that it is itself now considered an important intermediary55.  In the Direct 
Trade model, the roaster bypasses the exporter and importer and works directly with 
the farmer to negotiate pricing and develop a product for roaster’s market segment.  
The roaster tries to develop the best bean to capture the most value and pass that 
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value, in the form of higher prices, to the farmer.  This process parallels the earliest 
form of the fair trade model, without the FLO bureaucracy.  
In a non-state market based governance framework that pits market actors 
against advocates and NGOs (Bernstein and Cashore 2007), a group contending the 
legitimacy of a standard would wage a political battle against the organization 
upholding that standard.  In the framework proposed in this study, a variety of 
standards coexist and the battle is waged in the marketplace. In this case, the 
movement to go back to fair trade’s roots and deal irectly with the farmer is led by a 
group of coffee traders who also aim to provide the highest level of coffee quality.  
This suggests, yet again, a potential relationship between the purity of a standard – its 
level of stringency relative to other standards – and its market segmentation.  
Between a standard’s political segmentation and its market segmentation.  
Direct Trade practitioners claim to represent the standards most in line with 
social norms of the coffee social market, while also occupying the highest end of the 
market segmentation scale. UTZ claims to allow quality to determine price premiums, 
and Starbucks insists quality motivates the development of its standards, but only 
Direct Trade beans cater to the highest end of specialty and gourmet coffee 
consumers. Direct Trade coffee is promoted by a triad of pioneering coffee roasters 
recognized as introducing a ‘third wave’ of coffee to the world. The third wave 
distinguishes coffee producers from a ‘second wave’ commonly understood as the 
development, led by Starbucks, which brought specialty coffee to the mainstream. 




sold at $5 a cup, or $18 per pound, coffee sold as Direct Trade caters to the most 
distinguished coffee buyer with the deepest pockets.   
Fair trade coffee once represented the highest achievement of ethical 
production, but was limited to a small and select group of ethical buyers willing to 
pay a premium. Now Direct Trade occupies that niche.  It delivers an artisanal 
experience that hearkens back to the early days of the air trade movement, catering 
to the distinguished high-end buyer.  It differs, however, from early fair trade, in one 
important way: its central message to the market is not the ethics of its product, but 
the quality of its product.  The intertwinement of quality and ethics is a central 
observation of this study and an important element the proposed social market 
framework. 
In the broadest terms, these coffees should be understood as a true 
collaboration, with both sides investing a great deal of time, energy and ideas 
to produce something great. At the end of this process, the coffee farmer who 
grows an award-winning cup is an artisan, and should be regarded as such. 
We believe human effort is the most critical factor in quality coffee and that 
the growers who do the best work should get the best price and individual 
recognition. (Intelligentsia Mission Statement)56 
4.2.7 Fairtrade USA 
A pertinent and critical event related to this case and its analytical framework 
occurred during the writing of this chapter. Effective December 31, 2011 Transfair 
USA, a national member organization of the international Fairtrade Labeling 
Organization, split from the umbrella FLO (Sherman 2012).  The shared statement 
                                                




from the two organizations provides little information,57 however interviews with the 
Chief Impact Officer of the dissident organization revealed much more.   
In contrast to the dichotomous model presented by other scholars (Bernstein 
and Cashore 2007) that pits industry against the goals of advocates and environmental 
groups, this split occurred within the once cohesiv umbrella organization 
representing the dominant fairtrade network of organiz tions.  While a full analysis of 
this split would make significant and important contributions to our understanding of 
the politics of new governance, my study will focus on understanding this event in the 
context of our analytical framework.  
4.2.7.1 Matters of Legitimacy 
The most notable influence on FT USA’s decision was the apparent inconsistency in 
FLO policies vis-à-vis farm workers versus cooperative farms. The position held by 
FLO not to certify larger plantations meant that farm workers within their plantations 
were not able to benefit from better labor conditions, thereby reducing the standard’s 
scope of impact.  The tension surrounding the certifica on of large plantations and 
farmers is not new to FLO, and represents a principle rift with other certification 
systems. UTZ and RA aim specifically to certify these large plantations while tapping 
mainstream markets for certified coffee. Public statements suggest FLO is not against 
certifying larger producers on principle, but that additional efforts would need to be 
                                                
57 “Fairtrade International (FLO) and Fair Trade USA (FTUSA) share a belief in the importance of 
empowering producers and workers around the world t improve their lives through better terms of 
trade. However, as we look to the future, we recognize that we have different perspectives on how best
to achieve this common mission.” 
http://www.fairtrade.net/single_view1.0.html?&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=235&cHash=abf6bda987. Last 




made to implement such a change (Fairtrade 2011). They are transparent about their 
efforts to investigate how they may open certification to a “more diverse” array of 
producers, which should not come as a surprise to industry observers as they currently 
certify farm workers and larger producers in a variety of other product-lines and have 
been doing so for years.   
There are two factors inhibiting certifying farm workers and larger producers.  
First, FLOs commitment to its multi-stakeholder governance requires an open and 
notoriously lengthy amount of deliberation with stakeholders before such a change is 
made.  In their case, it is a process that is heavily influenced by organizations 
representing small-producer cooperatives. Second, 70 percent of the world’s coffee is 
produced by small producers working on plots of less than 25 acres of land 
representing approximately 10 million small-scale farmers.  The first factor is a 
function of FLOs procedural legitimacy and their commitment to their stakeholders 
while the second is a function of coffee’s industry conditions.  Given the size of 
banana plantations FLO is willing to certify, one can only assume that plantation 
certification is not a fundamental principle.  The political conditions within FLO that 
prohibit change (viz. heavy representation of small producers) would also not exist if 
the coffee industry were not so reliant on small producers.   
FTUSA began expressing a desire to expand the farm worker certification 
programs from other products to coffee years ago.  Working through the appropriate 
channels within FLOs governance structure, they expressed a concern that FLO 




from the standards.  They “aren’t reaching enough farmers”58 so FTUSA proposed 
pilot programs to test the expansion to farm workers and non-cooperatives. Insisting 
that they “shared the same goals,” a claim that FLO public statements do not contend, 
FTUSA tried to take FLO down a path of program innovation and expansion.  
Pointing to conversations had with form workers andcooperatives at the 2012 SCAA 
Annual Specialty Coffee Conference & Exhibition held in Portland, Oregon59, FT 
USA considers the expansion necessary to promote bet r practices for the children, 
neighbors and friends of FLO-certified cooperatives.  Experimentation and innovation 
is required to help these people.  
FLO insisted that it “wasn’t the right time to expand into coffee.”60 The 
process of deliberation, standards development and stakeholder consent, along with a 
proclivity towards advocacy and its corresponding ideals, precludes action from the 
organization representing the “gold standard” of cof ee certification.  These obstacles 
are notably absent in the FT USA organization.  Insisting on being “collaborative-
based” but not “consensus-based,” FT representatives out their balance of diversity 
and independence as a reason for their ability to seek innovation and achieve results61.  
Their diverse board, advisory council and coffee innovation council gives the 
organization access to expert advice and input, but they distinctly do not subject 
themselves to the multi-stakeholder demands of the FLO.  It is worth examining this 
independent governance structure a little more. 
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Unlike international multi-stakeholder organizations that are comprised of a 
very small secretariat or permanent staff, FT USA is staffed with an impressive list of 
highly experienced professionals. Notable also is the extent of industry experience 
among the highest ranks of the organization.  Of the top 6 ranking officers 5 have 
business degrees, 4 have MBAs, and all had long careers in industry before moving to 
Fair Trade.  Of all 13 people listed as Senior Managers, 2 have bios that indicate a 
background primarily in fair trade or producer support.62 While no immediate 
conclusions can be drawn from this information, it points to differences within the 
constitution and procedural legitimacy of FT USA that will be explored further later 
in this chapter.  
The rest of FT USA’s governance structure also highlights how it differs from 
what scholars have observed as the democratic tenets of multi-stakeholder 
organizations.  In addition to its Senior Managers, FT USA lists their Board of 
Directors, Advisory Council and “stakeholder engagement” as key components of 
their governance structure (or process in the case of stakeholder engagement).  A 
cursory evaluation of their BoD lists 3 members from stakeholder organizations, 2 
from philanthropy or advocacy organizations, and 6, including the President of FT 
USA, from business or other organizations.  The Advisory Council consists mainly of 
experts from across the business world, academia, and other (one actress). One 
exception is Barbara Fiorito who is the former Chair of FLO International (2005-
2008).    
                                                




4.2.7.2 Matters of Market Integration 
There is no evidence that business interests – retailers or producers – pressured FT 
USA into a confrontation with FLO.  As previously noted, there was input from 
individuals within cooperatives that argue to extend benefits to their friends, family 
and neighbors who work on plantations, and from roaster – small and large – that 
blend from a variety of producers and want to certify all their beans and products63.  
While we are not able to confirm, one can assume that ese opinions are not 
concealed from FLO representatives.64  FT USA’s position is that their work, 
including standards, must balance and optimize for three points farmer and workers, 
business and consumers.  In this model benefits to workers, business and consumers 
need not outweigh the potential costs to cooperatives, but only increase the overall 
benefit to all involved.  This point – that increasing benefit to business and consumers 
will ultimately benefit producers – is the hypothesis driving FT USA’s departure from 
FLO.  They emphasize this point in their mission statement declaring, “the rise of the 
Conscious Consumer will cause a fundamental shift in the way companies do 
business and create a historic opportunity to reward companies that embrace 
sustainability.”65  Their shift to accommodate market actors, large firms, plantations 
and consumers directly, as a way to indirectly benefit the original targets of the 
movement they were part of is explicit.  This is a very clear shift towards the market 
that is reinforced in the makeup of their senior lead rship where 85% of them come 
from industry or have business backgrounds, including Masters of Business 
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Administration.  This includes my interviewee, their Chief Impact Officer, who was 
previously Vice President of Innovation at The Clorox Company, the multinational 
company selling such household names at Clorox Bleach®, Pine-Sol® and Fresh 
Step® cat litter66.  
The conversation with Mary Jo Cook highlighted two key points worth 
emphasizing.  First, an important and active member of the FLO (FT USA) felt that 
the organization was politically captured by interests of small producers to the 
detriment of the overall cause.  Second, that politica  bargaining within the highly 
legitimate, long-established, multistakeholder organiz tional model does not preclude 
the failure of political bargaining and the emergence of multiplicity.  The costs of 
bargaining in these organizations may still be high enough that the benefit of splitting 
off outweighs the cost of bargaining.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the six principle alternative standards organizations in the 
ethical coffee social market.  I focused on observing differences across organizations 
as they relate to the development of legitimacy through the application of 
multistakeholder organizational forms and procedures, as well as the relationship of 
these organizations to the market.  
What I have shown is that first; there is little evidence to suggest that a battle 
for legitimacy within the social market occurred.  Contrary to Bernstein and 
                                                




Cashore’s framework (2008), industry actors did little to challenge the FLO’s 
formalization of the fair trade movement. Instead, given the incentives for both 
producers and retailers, the organization faced little, if any, opposition.  Alternative 
systems that did emerge were primarily from other advocacy-based organizations and 
non-profits, not industry. And when an industry-heavy organization emerged to 
develop alternate standards, as in the case of the 4C, it did so with the explicit intent 
to occupy the lower-end of the standards sphere, with the intention of collaborating 
with FLO and other standards to assist organizations to upgrade to their more 
stringent standards. Therefore, battles for legitimacy do not explain the rise of 
multiple systems. To reinforce this point, the one case where a true battle for the 
direction of the FLO was fought – between FLO and FT USA – the splinter group 
(FT USA) did little to try to enhance its legitimacy through multistakeholder 
organizations forms and procedures. Instead, it focused on catering to the needs of 
consumers.  Legitimacy for ethical coffee and the fair trade movement was settled 
with the FLO, now FT USA could focus on market integration and expansion – using 
that as a means to deliver the cause-oriented impact it llegedly aligned with. 
This emphasizes the second key observation: that org nizations did not always 
mimic the organizational forms of the dominant organiz tion in their industry.  That 
is to say, they did not take on the procedural elemnts of stakeholder-based 
organizations. This challenges the assumption of ‘mimetic isomorphism’ established 
in organizational theory that organizations will copy the most prominent entities in 




Deephouse 1996; DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 2000; Tolbert and Zucker 1999; 
Zucker 1987).  It also reinforces the first point above, that matters of legitimacy – 
established through organizational forms – are less critical to latter stage 
organizations within social markets than they are to the social market’s earliest 
organizations. 
Finally, that each of these organizations gradually took on greater forms and 
practices of market actors, an indication of greater integration with the market.  
Specifically, they all adopted the market incentive of ecolabeling, creating their own 
“brand within a brand” with one notable exception – the 4C, an organization that also 
happened to have been most aggressive in taking on the forms of multistakeholder 
organizations.  Why was this the case?  While this question is best addressed in future 
research, I can posit from the logic of this research, that it did so because it was most 
dubious in terms of legitimacy. It was very intentio ally a lower standard aimed at 
converting mainstream roasters, and could not seek l gitimacy directly from 
consumers since consumers of 4C certified products, as I show in the following 
chapter, are not ethically motivated consumers. For the other organizations, it appears 
as though the more they sought credibility directly from the market, the less they 
sought legitimacy through legitimate forms (that is to say, multistakeholder forms).  
This may indicate a zero-sum game between procedural legitimacy through 
multistakeholder forms and legitimacy through market m ans – that is to say, that as 
one increases, the other decreases.  While this specific formula between the two is not 




the social market develops, organizations take on greater market forms eschewing the 
forms that were taken on by the movements original advocates and activists.  
The following chapter continues to review this relationship between social market 
maturity as observed through increased multiplicity, and the phenomena of seeking 
legitimacy through procedural organizational forms, and integration with the market 
through market forms and practices.  I will provide additional detail on what is meant 
from legitimacy and market integration (what metrics are used as proxies for these 
social phenomena), and develop a dataset to evaluate how these change across 
organizations.  I also examine potential hypotheses around the patterns of multiplicity 
– that they do not compete directly, but serve various consumer segments through 




5 FROM ADVOCACY TO MARKETS, ACTIVISM TO CONSUMERISM 
While social movements may extol the virtues of global civil society, the space 
has been and is largely dominated by the extensive formal and informal contacts 
of transnational business and their allies. 
        O’Brien 2000, p 15 
 
 
The previous chapter examined six alternate standards o ganizations in the ethical 
coffee social market to examine how these organizations change over time.  Through 
case-based analysis of each organization, I observe that as the social market matures, 
standards organizations increasingly eschew organizational forms and procedures 
intent on maximizing their legitimacy (as observed through procedural legitimacy), 
while pursuing market forms and practices instead.  In this chapter, I delve further 
into each of these six cases to further examine the logic of market integration. I 
accomplish this by producing a dataset of market integration that measures relevant 
data points to create two index values representing he dependent variables: 
legitimacy and market integration. Further, building on the thesis that multiple 
standards organizations do not actually compete directly with each other, but cater to 
different political groups (consumer groups) by occupying different spaces across a 
variety of market segments.  I explore these in an attempt to revisit in more detailed 




First, I posit that if legitimacy is less important i  a more developed social 
market, then we should expect the emphasis on legitimacy to decrease with the 
introduction of each new standard. Second, since legitimacy is less important in 
explaining the rise of standards, subsequent systems are less motivated to align with 
the procedural and political elements of legitimacy. This demonstrates a shift in the 
power and influence of the original social movement dominated by advocacy groups 
and activists who emphasize and align with these elem nts of procedural legitimacy. 
Instead, new standards organizations emerge within a social market that must respond 
to the strategic social construction of actors and provide a market-based motive for 
the proliferation of a new norm set. Greater multiplic ty within a social market will 
lead to a greater likelihood that organizations will adopt practices, policies and 
strategies targeting greater market integration, coformity and expansion.  Finally, in 
the following chapter, I ask if there is a logic or pattern within multiplicity itself.  
Since I posit that the opportunities for differentiation determine if new standards 
emerge, then they will emerge according to a pattern of differentiation predetermined 
in the social market.  This addresses the final hypothesis derived from the logic of 
multiplicity, that lower, less stringent standards are more likely to align with 
mainstream market segments, whereas higher standards are more likely to target 
higher-end market segments.  
This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I briefly describe a shift towards 
market integration within systems.  In other words, o the standards themselves make 




within which they operate?  Second, I examine the shift away from legitimacy across 
systems and within the social market as a whole.  I do this by identifying key 
variables broadly discussed in existing literature that reflect and express aspects of 
procedural legitimacy within an organization. For each variable, I identify the values 
that would express more legitimacy versus less, and ssign a numerical value to 
represent this expression of legitimacy. I then tally these values up in a simple 
summation in order to derive a final “index value.” To be clear, I am assigning 
ordinal values to observations of legitimacy and market integration observed within 
the organizations of the coffee social market already examined and discussed in 
previous chapters.   According to Le Roy (and of course, a key and uncontroversial 
element to political science research in general) “ordinal measurement is the 
classification of observations into a set of categories that do have direction.” (2012 p. 
56). In other words, I will be assigning values based on a variable’s contribution to 
the phenomenon to be observed (legitimacy and integration within the market), and 
these can be compared one to another based on their increased or decreased 
adherence to the phenomenon. The limitation of the assignment of ordinal values is 
that we can not assume that the interval, or difference, between values is not equal or 
informative.  
As previously discussed, variables related to legitimacy are derived broadly 
from literature that discusses how key institutional, organizational, and procedural 
elements are adopted to bolster an organization’s legitimacy by aligning it with 




forms inspired by multilateral organizations of global governance (Bäckstrand 2006; 
Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Buchanan 2003; Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Payne 
and Samhut 2004, Vallejo & Hauselman 2004). The concept of market integration is 
new. However, the idea that certain practices or procedures align more with 
traditional market behavior rather than the norms, principles, ideals and practices of 
advocacy or activism is not controversial.  In both cases, an assignment of ordinal 
value will suggest that observations of the variables will have more or less of the 
categorical value of legitimacy or market integration than others.  Therefore, the 
summation of these ordinal values allows for a systematic and uncontroversial 
comparison across standards organizations. This is what I am referring to as the index 
– a summation of ordinal values that indicate more or less alignment with the concept 
of legitimacy or market integration.  
In it important to note that neither index is not intended to reflect an accurate 
representation of some ‘value’ for legitimacy or market integration. The resulting 
numerical value for legitimacy or market integration can not be compared other than 
to indicate ordinal representation – in other words, which organization has more, or 
less, legitimacy/market integration. This is a broad review of the phenomena of 
legitimacy and market integration rather a precise reflection of value.  The indexes 
are broad and contain a number of data points that can be critiqued and questioned. I 
invite this critique and encourage further refinement of this exercise.  This chapter is 




tabular form of the information already reviewed in the case-based analysis of 
previous chapters. 
In brief, the chapter shows that early stage organizations take on democratic 
forms, while later stage organizations do not.  Instead, they take on the forms, 
processes and strategies of market actors, further distancing themselves from the 
activists and advocacy groups of early stages. Thisis made most apparent with the 
development of Direct Trade, the movement within a movement, that delivers the 
highest social standards all while eschewing the processes and procedures of 
democracy intent on displaying legitimacy; they are a uniquely market-based 
standard. Another key example is that of FT USA – a splinter group from within the 
FLO that exited with the explicit intent of focusing more equally on businesses and 
consumers. I conclude with analysis that shows how product segmentation mirrors 
standards, in that higher standards are offered to higher market segments, while lower 
standards cater to mainstream markets.  I define market segments using a 
combination of qualitative factors, as well as a quntitative analysis of coffee prices 
across the United States. 
5.1 Supporting The Logic of Market Integration 
This section shows that the organizations within the social market gradually tended 
towards greater market integration; new standards introduced into the social market 
took on more market attributes than the previous standard. What does it mean to 
integrate more fully with the marketplace? First, it means that the standard will adopt 




activist-led organizations, including consumer-oriented tactics aimed at bolstering 
success and expansion within the marketplace.  Thisis different than advocacy 
strategies, which use a variety of negative-ad campaigns, political maneuvering and 
open-consensus based stakeholder inclusive tactics to promote their version of an 
emerging norm. It will mean that the organization may have been started by a 
consortium of traditional business firms, or that individuals leading and working for 
the organization will have more experience working in traditional business 
organizations than as activists. The organization will partner with business 
organizations, or develop explicit marketing and branding strategies designed to 
expand growth and sales.  More detail on market integration measures is provided 
below. 
5.1.1 The Market Integration Dataset 
One key contribution of this study is to widen the analytical lens on voluntary 
standards from the individual standard organization o the social market as a whole 
while aiming to observe how these organizational chnges relate to each other within 
the social market – in other words, how do these organizations interact, co-evolve, 
and co-create the social market. This requires a methodological shift in perspective; 
the creation of new dependent variables that consolidate information about all 
organizations within a social market, and the measurement of independent variables 
hitherto not sufficiently considered in the study of v luntary standards. I do this 
through the creation of a political legitimacy index and market integration index 




The market integration dataset provides a snapshot of the voluntary standards 
within the coffee social market in August and Septemb r of 2012.  I use a variety of 
sources to create the dataset including several interv ews with representatives of the 
standards organizations, as well as practitioners in the social market from roasters, 
intermediaries and retailers of certified coffee. I also leverage information gleaned 
from informal contacts and conversations in 2011 with experts in the field of 
certification, including consultants and members of the ISEAL Alliance (The 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling).  I also gather 
information from publicly available data on the stand rds and the organizations 
available on the Internet.  Having been the subject of much research over the past 
several years, these organizations have become quiteff cient at making data and 
documents available, as well as making themselves aailable for interviews, with one 
exception.  The FLO has set a policy not to respond to individual requests for 
interviews, but instead has focused on making much of their information available 
online.  While this dataset aims at quantifying data for changes within the social 
market, it remains limited by the number of cases to be analysis, specifically the 
number of standards organizations within the social m rket: eight.  Thus, the data can 
only be described for general patterns, but tests for tatistical significance would have 
to be performed in future research.  
5.1.1.1 Factors Influencing Outcomes 
The ordinal value, or position of standards organiztions in time, represents change 




change in the observed phenomenon. One key premise of th argument is that aspects 
of the organizations change as a social market develops. There is one key point in 
time that was already surpassed in the social market – that the social movement has 
been formalized into a voluntary standards organization.  This represents the second 
stage of social market development. After this stage, the social market enters into a 
stage of market institutionalization, which is to say that it begins to shed the elements 
of advocacy and activism while taking on the characteristics of market actors, albeit 
with the new norm-set internalized into their operations and strategies.  Yet there are 
degrees of social market development even in this final stage. As the social market 
continues to develop, the legitimacy of the market is further affirmed, and the need 
for organization-level political legitimacy wanes.   
Change happens temporally – the longer a social market, built upon the tenets 
of a newly established norm-set, operates, interacts, and delivers on its promise, the 
more legitimate the market becomes, and the more the organizations will have to 
contend with the dynamics and constraints of the market.  In a social market where 
comparisons can not be made across several organizatio s, an important factor of 
change is time. The change also happens in an ordinal fashion.  As each new standard 
emerges, it pushes the social market further towards legitimacy and integration with 
the market, and removes the conditions that would force new organizations to comply 
with the requirements of legitimacy set by the original social movement.  New 
organizations will be less likely to take on the procedural elements that original 




greater reliance on brand differentiation and segmentation (targeting new and specific 
constituent base in the market).   Given the degree of multiplicity present in the social 
market, there are sufficient observations to compare ac oss organizations.  
5.1.1.2 Observations of Procedural Legitimacy and Market Integration 
The market integration dataset is intended to address the general thesis of market 
integration – that social markets tend away from legitimacy and toward market 
integration. Thus, the two observations that the dataset is expected to show are an A) 
index for the value of legitimacy (accounting for attributes of procedural and 
constituent legitimacy), and B) an index for the degre  of integration towards the 
market, including the adoption of market norms, incentives and actors. These two 
indexes relate to each other in that they are two expressions of the same general thesis 
stated above: that social markets will gradually – that is, as organizations within the 
social market develop and grow, and as the social market itself matures and sees new 
standards organizations enter the market – tend away from the norms, practices and 
obligations of activists, in favor of the norms, practices, people and dynamics of the 
marketplace. This means two things. First, standards organizations within social 
market will show less reliance on developing the processes, procedures and practices 
associated with increasing legitimacy through open, consensus-based, democratic 
forms. They may also, in some cases, eschew non-profit forms in favor of pursuing 
the goals of standards organizations through for-prfit organizations. Second, new 
standards organizations within a developing social m rket will adopt practices of the 




strategies, they will align, collaborate and partners with for-profit firms, they will 
invite leadership into their organizations with busine s rather than advocacy 
credentials.   
These two indexes are two facets of the same dynamic – as organizations 
eschew legitimacy, they approach and adopt market practices. Perhaps they no longer 
need to seek legitimacy once the social market is established because norms are 
internalized, and the advocacy group has prevailed in changing hearts and minds 
Perhaps the scenario is much less optimistic, and the reality is that they market has 
subsumed the social movement and trained it to align with its rules. Perhaps, neither 
of these proposals reflects reality, and instead stndards organizations continue to 
seek legitimacy, but they do so by going directly to the consumer – the demos of this 
new political sphere.  
Procedural Legitimacy  
The adoption of elements meant to increase organization’s legitimacy, as measured 
by elements of procedural and constituent legitimacy is expected to decrease across 
social markets where the earlier standards will adopt higher levels of procedural 
legitimacy and later standards will have lower leves of legitimacy.  
I focus on procedural legitimacy to limit the index to a composite of values 
that are more quantifiable and objective in nature than other aspects of legitimacy, 
such as perceived legitimacy or pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  As I have 




adopted from existing literature on the institutional design of new governance 
(Bäckstrand & Saward 2004; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Buchanan 2003; Held & 
Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Payne and Samhut 2004; Scholte 2004; Vallejo & 
Hauselman 2004) are a good proxy for the battle for legitimacy as a whole based on 
existing scholarly arguments which suggest the imperative a key institutional and 
organizational elements that characterize a battle for legitimacy (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2007; Vallejo and Hauselman 2004). Specifically: the range and type of 
members in an organization, the procedural structures that ensure stakeholder 
participation, deliberation and accountability, scope and diversity of stakeholders, 
institutional checks on power, as well as independent v rification of standards.  
A note on assigning values to variables: the data values are intended to 
provide an ordinal representation of cases expressing more, or less, procedural 
legitimacy.  Each data point will be valued at 1 for the greatest representation of 
procedural legitimacy, and 0 for the least.  Data points that are not binary, will be 
represented in fractional form consistent with the condition above, that the greatest 
representation of legitimacy will be valued at 1.  
1. Stakeholder Participation 
A key element of any democratically inclined political organization (Buchanan 2003), 
as well as a cornerstone of corporate social responsibility programs (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995; Freeman 1994) is the inclusion of key stakeholders into an 
organization’s decision-making process.  By examining documentation detailing the 




available from the Internet, I evaluate the degree to which Stakeholders represent 
Membership. In other words, is the list of members representative of people and 
organizations that are impacted by the organization’s efforts?  In its purest ideal form, 
perfect stakeholder participation means that all stkeholders are represented in the 
organization. On the opposite end, stakeholders have no voice in the functioning of 
the organization. A 1 is assigned to the legitimacy index for organizations where the 
majority of stakeholders are represented in membership, a 0.5 value is assigned when 
it is mixed, and 0 is assigned when stakeholders are not represented at all in 
membership. It is inherently difficult to define with a level of accuracy required of 
scientific evaluation the full spectrum of stakeholders for any organization. The 
practice is necessarily subjective and debatable. Evaluating whether the majority of 
minority of stakeholder are represented is also necessarily subjective, and intent 
merely on showcasing more or less stakeholder participa on. No stakeholder 
participation, on the other hand, is straightforward nd not subjective.  
 Beyond membership, another key element for stakehold r participation is 
whether it is formalized into the bylaws, rules and regulations of the organization.   Is 
the organization’s leadership required to hold a vote n new standards with 
stakeholders? Is there an opportunity for stakeholders to provide input on new 
standards and rules before they are formalized? Are there regular stakeholder 
meetings where deliberation occurs?  These are examples of institutionalized 
participation of stakeholders. If stakeholders are llowed to participate in these 




assigned a lower value (0.5) to the index than if it is institutionalized (1). If there is no 
opportunity for stakeholders to participate, then no value (0) is assigned to the index. 
The coding values for stakeholder participation are summarized below. 















2. Institutional Checks on Power 
Institutional checks on power are not new for political organizations. These checks 
are set to increase the required ‘accountability’ of n n-state organization of global 
governance, and act to mitigate issues inherent in undemocratically elected political 
organizations. New governance organizations are known to copy long-established 
forms of institutional design stemming from the early days of republican thinking. 
For voluntary standards organizations, these include the ability for stakeholders to 
elect their leadership. What is democratic participation without the requirement of 




stakeholders can elect the organization’s leadership, and no value for those where this 
is process is not formalized.  Likewise, as is exemplified in the United Nations 
general assembly, the existence of a General Assembly where stakeholders, members, 
and organizational leadership can engage in bargaining, deliberation, and 
communicate grievances, goals, and strategic direction of the organization is central 
to procedural legitimacy – in which case, an organiz tion is assigned a 1 for the 
existence of a general assembly, or a 0 where none exist.  
 Much like the institutional design of bicameral legislatures, that have been 
said to induce structured equilibrium for democrati institutions (Goodin 1996, p11), 
voluntary standards organizations have adopted the concept of a board to offset the 
majoritarian and populist tendencies of the general assemble.  There are two 
observations to make regarding a board. First, organizations with a board are assigned 
a 1 for increased procedural legitimacy, whereas ones without do not. Second, if the 
stakeholders elect the board, additional scoring (1) is allotted.  
Finally, even if all stakeholders are engaged in organizational matters, there 
may exist an inherent asymmetry of power in the distribution of stakeholders.  This is 
quite apparent in the FLO, where stakeholders range from the retailers, roasters and 
traders situated in the rich western states, to the farmers and farmer representatives 
(from various farmer cooperatives) located in the less developed countries.  A 
standards organization that allows for standards to be captured by powerful interests 
instead of those people they are intended to serve would diminish the legitimacy of 




Initiative (SFI)67. Established by an alliance of powerful firms in opp sition to the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), activists aligned with the FSC argued that the SFI 
could not properly serve the interests of forests given the institutional arrangements 
skewed towards the interest of the powerful multinational corporations. In response, 
in 2001 the SFI established the Sustainable Forestry Board to oversee the standards, 
and while the original list of stakeholders, aside from the powerful corporations 
behind the program, were not made public, in 2002 in moved towards a chambered 
structure similar to the FSC with equal representation given to environmental 
organizations, forest organizations and SFI industry participants (Meridian Institute 
2001).  The same concern was taken into consideration t the FLO where a formal 
structure was put into place to institutionalize balanced of participation across poor 
southern stakeholders and rich western roaster, traders and retailers. An 
Institutionalized Balance of Participation may be noted in the organization’s 
governance documents or other publicly available documentation, and balanced in 
practice, which is evaluated based on my observations of the organizations practices, 
would receive a score of 1. It may be noted as part of the organization’s intent, but 
not balanced in practice, as in the case of UTZ which claims a balanced participation 
but is heavily weighed against producers and receiv a medium score of 0.5, or not 
noted or balanced at all, which would receive no score.  
Existence of General Assembly:  
Result Value 
                                                
67 See http://forestethics.org/news/sfi-certified-greenwash-report Last accessed, January 2014; 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2012/05/16/us-airw ys-pitney-bowes-drop-sustainable-forestry-
initiative/ Last Accessed, January 2014; http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/05/sustainable-forest-


















Institutionalized Balance of Participation: 
Result Value 
Noted and Balanced 1 
Noted but Not Balanced .5 
Not Noted 0 
 
3. Constituent Legitimacy and Diverse Membership 
A Wide Membership acts as a proxy for the degree of acceptance of the norm-set as 
represented by a particular organization. Members can range from less than 3, for 
organizations that do not aim to seek great legitimacy through wide membership, to 
over 50 for those that do seek to attract a wide list of members. This range is based 
not on an absolute evaluation of an ideal scope of membership, but on real-world 
observations about he possible range of members. Likewise, if the organization itself 
is a member or another umbrella organization, such as the ISEAL (as in the case of 




(PEFC – as in the case of the SFI), Inclusion in Umbrella Organization acts as a 
legitimacy boost for individual standards organizations. 
 In addition to the reach and quantity of members, the type of members can 
influence the perception of legitimacy of an organiz tion.  This weighed heavily on 
the early response to the SFI, an industry-led standard, and even on the FLO when it 
started cooperating with mainstream multinational corporations for its mainstreaming 
strategy. The qualitative nature of participants matters. Participation of NGOs, 
advocacy groups and activists will increase the legitimacy score of organizations. 
This is evaluated by examining the type of relationship advocacy groups may have 
with the organization.  For example, full membership represents the highest level of 
legitimacy. In the middle, there may be some degree of formal partnership between 
the organization and these legitimacy-promoting groups, or a declaration of verbal 
support without a formal partnership. Formal partnership receives fractional value 
assignment higher than verbal support, and no participa on receives no score. 
Wide Membership: 
Result Value 
Over 50 1 
30 to 49 0.75 
10 to 29 0.5 
3 to 9 0.25 
Under 3 0 










Formal Partnership .6 
Verbal Support .3 
None 0 
Participation of Advocacy Groups:  
Result Value 
Membership 1 
Formal Partnership .6 
Verbal Support .3 
None 0 
Participation of Activists:  
Result Value 
Membership 1 
Formal Partnership .6 




The standards themselves can be subject to institutional checks on power through the 
existence of a standard committee made up of stakeholders, or elected by 
stakeholders. A standard committee may have a variety of practices associated with 
its existence, but for the purposes of this research, the mere existence of one contrasts 
against its absence, where the former receives a 1 for legitimacy whereas the later 
receives no score. One particular procedural element for standards is whether the 
organization has formalized independent third party verification of its standards. 
While much has been written about this topic (Tanner 2000; Hatanaka, Bain and 
Busch 2005; Raynolds, Murray and Heller 2007), wherein certification is sub-




party (the buyer certifies the product), or an independent third-party. This particular 
aspect of an organizations process is arguably its most critical for ensuring 
accountability and transparency, and therefore I assign only a value for third-party 
certification. This is particularly relevant in the coffee industry where first and second 
party certifications do not exist. The “industry standard” is set at no lower than third-
party certification, and anything less is not considered a value of legitimacy.  









Results and Analysis 
The following table indicates, consistent with the overarching thesis on declining 
influence of procedural legitimacy, that standards organizations subsequent to FLO 
did not try to compete on procedural elements, nor did they engage in institutional 
isomorphism. This challenges the assumption made by the literature on Voluntary 
Clubs that outside the legitimacy provided by clubs, there is no market for the 
reputation.  Instead, after legitimacy for the standards market was created by early 
organizations, mainly the FLO, legitimacy was no longer a primary concern. 




established.  It required legitimacy to become the standard bearer, but once that is 
established, legitimacy is no longer a primary concer . Why did 4C decide to focus 
on procedural legitimacy?  
 
 
Table 5.1 Procedural Legitimacy Summary Table  
                  
Name of Organization FLO WFTO RA/SAN UTZ 4C CAFÉ Direct Trade  FT USA 
Year Certification Established 1997 1989 1997 2002 2004 2007 2006 2011 
Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit For Profit For Profit Non Profit 
Membership represented by 
stakeholders Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes No No Partial 
Multi-stakeholder participation Institutionalized Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Institutionalized None None Voluntary 
Stakeholders elect leadership Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 
Existence of General Assembly Yes No Yes No Yes No No No 
Existence of Standards 
Committee Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Existence of Board Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Board Elected by Stakeholders 
(properly defined) Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 
Institutionalized balance of 
participation  
Noted and 





Balanced Not Noted 
Noted and 
Balanced Not Noted 
Wide membership Over 50 Over 50 3 to 9 members Over 50 Over 50 Less than 3 Less than 3 Less than 3 
Inclusion in Umbrella 
Organization Membership None Membership Membership Membership None None None 




partnership None None 




partnership None None 
Participation of activists Formal partnership Membership Membership None None None None None 
Independent Third Party 
Verification Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Procedural Legitimacy Index 13.35 7.5 9.2 8.2 13 2.3 1.1 2.1 
 
 
4C as an organization with no previous legitimacy within civil society (as in 
RA), no strong business support (as in Starbucks), competing within the same 
mainstream market space as UTZ, and a strategy not to use branding, It had to 
develop its legitimacy to bolster its position.  Without the market levers available for 
latter stage standards organizations, 4C had to use legitimacy as a rite of passage into 
the social market and not be relegated to a bottom-of-the-barrel standard.  
FLO and the 4C both had similar battles.  The FLO, in the absence of any 
social market legitimacy, had to establish a baseline legitimacy for ethical production 
of coffee.  Once this was established, other niche players are able to enter the market 
and focus on developing their own unique brand, in other words, their own reputation 
inside the ethical coffee market (the brand within a brand). 4C did not attempt to do 
this. It is the only standard organization with no brand focus.  The others have eco-
labels, or in the case of Starbucks, rely on their own brand reputation, which incudes 
the power of its corporate social responsibility programs (including the sale of fair 
trade coffee) to bolster its reputation. 
Mainstream market standards copy procedural legitimacy.  The more a 
standard is backed by a strong market brand, or develops a new elite branding around 
it, the less it will rely on procedural legitimacy.   Legitimacy, thus, is seen as a proxy 
and prelude to reputation. But once a market for reputation is created within a social 
market, legitimacy is only required by organizations that lack any reputation 
whatsoever. This results in the paradox of branding, where an established and 
powerful firm can create their own voluntary standards without having to resort to the 
 
 
policies or procedures of early stage advocacy groups, yet still have credibility within 
a social market.  This shift from legitimacy does not mean that the standards for 
standards are decreasing, but rather than once a market for reputation is created, firms 
will benefit or lose based on their own reputation, without the need to join in alliance 
with a separate NGO-based governance organization.  
Market Integration 
The index seeks to measure the rate of integration with market dynamics, norms, 
principles, and people into the organization. This is an innovation in the perspective 
of voluntary standards based on the premise, fundamental to this study and this 
research program, is that the market itself is a valid political arena within which 
governance emerges, where political bargaining incurs, and where legitimacy is 
sought. It also continues to blur the lines of who t e appropriate political actors are 
for study.  In this case, while scholars have considered the emergence of standards as 
innovative forms of governance and therefore worthy of political analysis, I argue 
that even traditional market actors are worthy of analysis in the field of political 
science and international governance. The Market Integration variable considers 
several groups of variables examined below. 
A note on assigning values to variables: the data values are intended to 
provide an ordinal representation of cases expressing more, or less, market 
integration.  Each data point will be valued at 1 for the greatest representation of 
market integration, and 0 for the least.  Data points that are not binary, will be 
 
 
represented in fractional form consistent with the condition above, that the greatest 
representation of market integration will be valued at 1.  
1. Organizational Details 
An important key determinant of whether organizations are more or less market 
integrated is whether they are initiated by a business organization or NGO.  The 
lower the value, the less the organization will be under the influence of business. The 
greater the value, the more it will be driven by traditional economic interests. Possible 
results and corresponding values range from 0 to 1 in equal fractional increments, 
where State is 0, followed by UN Organization, Consortium without Business 
Participation, Advocacy Group, Consortium with Business, Business with NGO 
support, Industry Association, and finally Business alone which is assigned a score of 
1. 
 If the standard organization is a non-profit entity, it continues to align more 
with the original intent of social movements, but if it is a for-profit organization it 
would indicate greater integration with market norms and more aligned with 
traditional economic interests.  More broadly the fact that 18% of all standards that 
use ecolabels are for-profit would already indicate  significant adoption of social 
movement practices by traditional firms or the gradual adoption of social movement 








UN Organization .15 
Consortium w/o business .30 
Advocacy Group .45 
Consortium w/ business .60 
Business w/ NGO support .75 
Industry Association  .85 
Business Alone 1 
Profit or Non Profit: 
Result Value 
Non Profit 0 
For Profit 1 
  
 
2. Constituent Details 
Industry Associations are representatives of traditional businesses. Particip tion of 
industry associations in the organization of voluntary standards indicated greater 
market integration. The same applies for the participation of individual firms.  Both 
are evaluated for the degree of participation.  Full membership of firms indicates the 
most integration with the market, formal partnership  indicates slightly less 
integration, formally indicate verbal support indicates even less integration, whereas 
no firm membership would indicate no integration score for this variable.  I also 
perform a broad review of members to understand their make-up.  A wide network of 
ethically committed organizations and, because the social objective of ethical coffe is 
to empower small farmers and producers from less developed countries, I include   
developing country producers as indication that there is less integration with the
market.  On the other hand, a membership base consisting of a small network of firms 
 
 
would indicate greater integration with the market.  In between these two poles, there 
exist may a smaller network of advocacy organization and developing country 
producers, a wide and diversified, or a small and mixed, network of advocacy groups 
and business organizations, or a network consisting principally of firms with some 
advocacy support. Perhaps the most critical determinant of market integration as 
related to constituency is whether the organization itself was created through the 
initiative of one firm.  
Participation of Industry Associations: 
Result Value 
None 0 
Verbal Support .33 
Formal Partnership  .66 
Member 1 
Participation of Individual Firms: 
Result Value 
None 0 
Verbal Support .33 
Formal Partnership  .66 
Member 1 




Description of Members:  
Result Value 
Wide network of ethically committed organization and developing 
country producers 
0 
Smaller network of advocate organizations and developing country 
producers 
1 
Wide and diversified ranging from advocates to busine s 
organizations  
2 
Small network of mixed advocates and firms 3 
Principally firms with some NGO support 4 





Organizations that increasingly align with the market will seek leadership with 
experience in business rather than from advocacy groups, activism, or even 
government. Leadership Market Profile evaluates the professional profile of the 
executive leadership of the organization and categorizes the leaders as being 
primarily Business Leaders or NGO Leaders.  More business leaders in the executive 
leadership signals a desire to operate more effectively within the market, whereas 
greater NGO leadership signals a desire to push forward key causes and coordinate 
operations with other NGOs.  Business leaders will come primarily from traditional 
business organizations and for profit firms and will have degrees in business. NGO 
leaders will have experience working in and with oter NGOs. This variable is a ratio 
of business leaders as a percentage of total leadership team. A leadership team is the 
senior executive leadership including the Executive Director or CEO of the 
organization, and all their direct reports. They are normally easily identified as they 
are listed on the organization’s website as part of the senior leadership team.  
Leadership ends up defining the culture of the organization. A notoriously 
difficult thing to measure or determine, an organization’s culture was determined 
through a mix of interview and publicly available documentation, including annual 
report, website and vision and mission statements.  I  is necessarily a qualitative 
variable that is subject to my biases and individual re ding, and while it is included in 
this evaluation, does not weigh heavily on the final m rket integration score.  
 
 






Market  1 
 
4. Organization Strategy 
Organization strategy evaluates the degree to which an organization adopts market 
versus advocacy strategies (Taylor 2005). I assign a value of 1 if the organization was 
engaged in advocacy upon its foundation – if it is an original advocate. Advocacy is 
defined as engaging in public and private campaigns to further the normative cause of 
ethical production beyond the narrow market-based interest of its organization. Value 
is also assigned if the organization continues to engage in advocacy – if it is a current 
advocate.   
I base my evaluation an organization’s degree of focus on Market expansion, 
on interviews and answers to the question “how important is market expansion to 
your organization’s mission?” This is a sensitive question that lends itself to bias 
responses when the organization has a strong advocacy background and may be 
reluctant to admit to goals of market expansion.  Some teasing apart of the response is 
thus required. If a respondent provides a clear affi mation of their market expansion 
goals (as was the case with the 4C, the quantity of certified beans was paramount to 
 
 
their mission68), I score this variable as High. If they are explicit about the quality of 
standards and their adherents (as in the case of th WFTO) I score the variable as low, 
despite the fact that they would deem it a success if more traditional market actors 
would convert to their standards.  If the answer blends an emphasis on social or 
environmental change, but does so by making explicit attempts to cater to large 
traditional corporations, such as in the case of RA, I score this variable as Medium (a 
score of 0.5).  
Links Brand to Quality: By analysis of website documentation and brand 
marketing, I am able to evaluate the degree to which an organization associates its 
standard with product quality. More focus on quality of the product suggests a shift of 
focus from the ethical standards of the product, towards traditional market concerns: 
quality and value. Focus on quality normally sits in contrast to a focus on social and 
environmental good. One sign that the organization is positioning its certified product 
around quality is that it does little to promote its social and environmental benefits, 









Degree of focus on Market Expansion: 













Results and Analysis 
The following table shows how each subsequent organization within the ethical 
coffee social market gradually tended towards creating market integration, supporting 
a key argument of this study expressed in the logic f market integration. I show that 
there were three distinct phases of evolution towards market integration within the 
social market. The first, starting with the WFTO and i cluding FLO and RA, these 
three organizations are deeply entrenched in the advoc cy world, and while they have 
all taken steps towards greater market integration, hey remain far less market-based 
than other organizations in this social market.  If considered on its own, FT USA 
represents an exception to the steady increase of market integration through time. 
However, given it is a splinter group of the FLO, it is more revealing of the shift 
occurring within the FLO than that of the social market write large.  A political battle 
waged within the FLO where one group, those represent d in FT USA, had far greater 
market integration ambitions than the group as a whole.  No political bargain was 
possible inside the organization resulting in the split.   
The next group of two, UTZ and 4C, represent a significant leap from the 
market integration of the three historically advocacy-based groups (WFT, FLO and 
 
 
RA).  UTZ was initially created to take advantage of the opportunities that the FLO 
created within the market, specifically the oversupply of FLO compliant coffee – an 
explicitly market-based move that is reflected in its index score.  It does not advocate, 
is focused on market expansion, and has a high degree of firm members and 
stakeholders. The 4C also scores high due largely to its member composition of large 
multinational roasters, industry associations, trade s and retailers, and its lack of 
advocacy.  The next two organizations, DT and Starbucks represent another leap in 
the scoring, due mainly to the fact that they are for-profit, the composition of their 
leadership, and their high degree of focus on linking their standards to the quality of 
their beans.   
 
 
Table 5.2 Market Integration Summary Table  
                  
Name of Organization WFTO FLO RA/SAN UTZ 4C Direct Trade CAFÉ FT USA 
Year Certification Established 1989 1997 1997 2002 2004 2006 2007 2011 














Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit Non Profit For Profit For Profit Non Profit 
Participation of Industry 
Associations None None None None Formal partnership None None None 
Participation of individual firms Membership None None Membership Membership Membership Membership Verbal Support 



























Just FT USA and a 
board and advisory 
council that they 
select 
Leadership Market Profile 0% 16.67% 0% 25% 14% 100% 100% 85% 
Organization Culture Advocacy Advocacy Advocacy Mixed Mixed Market Market Mixed 
Originated engaging in advocacy Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
Currently Engages in Advocacy Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Degree of focus on market 
expansion Low Low Medium High High High High High 
Links Brand to Quality Low Low Low Low Some Focus Focus Some 
                  




Is increased market integration a bad thing?  We must keep in mind that as actors in 
the social market move towards the market, the market is also moving – with far 
greater force – towards the social market. More ethical coffee is being produced and 
sold, and more large multinationals are committing o sourcing all their coffee from 
sustainable sources.  A remarkable point is that the constitution of quality 
demonstrates an internalization of the norm of ethical production and social 
responsibility towards the farmer and the environment.  Quality is ethical production! 
This is a purely market-based strategy where the delivery of a quality ethical product 
is the only strategy.  
5.2 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates support for he overarching thesis of this 
study that evolving social markets will gradually eschew tenets of advocacy and 
activism, including most importantly the processes and procedures of legitimacy, in 
favor of greater integration with the market. This as been shown through a broad, 
and still qualitative, review of key variables pulled from the cases studied and 
discussed in previous chapters.  The variables in this chapter have been teased away 
from the qualitative review of cases and assigning ordinal values with the goal of 
identifying a pattern (increasing or decreasing) of legitimacy and market integration. 
These values are added up to give a descriptive indication of the ordinal value of 
reliance on legitimacy or integration with the marketplace for each standard 
organization being studied.  I refer to these as indexes – one for procedural 




they may be considered two sides of the same coin. That a reliance on legitimacy 
decreases along with an increased reliance on market dynamics makes sense and 
supports the overarching claim of this study: that social markets will tend away from 
the principles and practices of advocacy and activism, in favor of the market.   
If legitimacy defines the struggle and defines what organizations are striving 
for, then we would expect to see organizations align with certain organizational 
forms.  This is not what we observe. Instead, organizations decreasingly adopt what 
are considered ‘legitimate’ forms, and increasingly align with the forms, practices, 
and goals of market actors. The trend from advocacy towards market strategies is 
observed within organizations across the entire coffee sector.  The FLO 
mainstreaming strategy allowed it to dominate and alter the coffee market, and 
challenges to this strategy are narrowly observed. Only the WFTO takes an official 
stance against the move towards greater market peneration, yet its own strategy of a) 
adopting a separate eco-label to distinguish its members69, and of b) developing a 
closed market where members are encouraged to buy from each other70, provides 
evidence of their shift to play by market rules.  The WFTO adapted to the changing 
environment by creating the mechanisms it deemed necessary to encourage greater 
adoption of its standards.  
The Rainforest Alliance, in existence during the early days of the fair trade 
movement and originally advocacy-based, also adopte market strategies aimed at 
expansion.   It was a very early adopter of eco-labels and made the strategic decision 
                                                
69 Which it did in 2004, see ecolabelindex.com 




to switch its label from ECO-OK to the far more recognized Rainforest Alliance logo.  
This eco-label brand, along with its certification f large plantations, and financial 
support for producers, allowed them to secure a large enough supply of certified 
coffee to gain a major commitment from Kraft Foods buyers.  Kraft Foods is the 
largest buyer of Rainforest Alliance coffee and hascommitted to buying 100% of its 
coffee from sustainable sources by 2015.  
UTZ and the 4C both emerged with a similar goal to mainstream ethical 
coffee further than FLO can achieve in its ethical niche market.  UTZ Certified 
emerged in an environment where, as the economics of price equilibrium would 
predict, small producers around the world were rushed to certify their crops to take 
advantage of the minimum price model.  Yet the increased supply was not matched 
by consumer demand, which had been at that point limited to ethically-minded 
consumers of specialty coffee who were willing to absorb the increased cost of 
certified coffee. UTZ leadership, while motivated by the social cause to grow the 
ethical production of coffee, was also able to take dvantage of a shift in the industry 
created by the mismatch between supply and demand.  This is made evident by a 
strategy that did not include an eco-label, unique branding or price differential.  This 
strategy, based on market cues, was a sharp shift away from advocacy or pressure 
campaigns that target an increase in demand.  
Since first hitting the market in 2002, the market cues changed again.  The 
success of ethical coffee created a new consumer segment in the marketplace – a 




wide proliferation of the norm across the market and  mechanism of socialization, 
internalized the norm, but not enough to pay a premium for the product or to seek it 
out specifically.   In order to tap into this market segment UTZ would have to 
separate itself from the broader mainstream market targeted by the 4C, and brand its 
products as UTZ certified – a strategy it has already began to implement.   
Remaining solidly within the mainstream of coffee buyers is the 4C.  Setting 
aside the stringent standards of the early advocates while remaining true to the goal of 
greater sustainable practices around the globe, 4C’s strategy was to target the largest 
mainstream roasters and buyers who would be open to sourcing sustainable coffee for 
their own CSR objectives, but are unprepared to play within a new market segment or 
develop new branding or labeling related to their coffee.  Although Rainforest 
Alliance and UTZ were able to secure large traditional buyers of their coffee, they 
remained limited by both the supply of certified coffee and the demand of certified 
coffee among consumers. 4C bypassed this limitation by developing standards that 
would be easier to comply with and open to much larger producers and plantations.  
Working directly with these larger producers and buyers was, and remains, anathema 
to the individuals and organizations that maintain  culture of advocacy. Because of 
their limitations on certifying plantations and large producers, both the WFTO and 
the FLO maintain a distance and separation from the traditional supply chain.  The 
early advocates and norm entrepreneurs that are still represented in the FLO and 
WFTO were necessary in shifting norms within the marketplace. Yet, given the 




currently doing more to change the market towards greater sustainability than any 
other organization today. 4C does not certify individual beans that go into a product, 
allowing large organizations to gradually increase their sustainable purchases without 
impacting their brands or pricing. 
Another cause-oriented organization that has shifted strategies and adjusted 
policies geared towards greater market penetration is FT USA.  For analytical 
purposes FT USA can be observed as a splinter of FLO seeking greater liberty in 
adopting more responsive market strategies, or an entirely new organization wanting 
to play in the ethical market space (maintain branding and key principles related to 
minimum pricing), while loosening other principles related to plantation certification.  
Either categorization demonstrates a shift towards greater market strategies for 
growth and the inclusion of norm franchisees still hunned by FLO.  
FT USA representatives maintain a public stance that t eir split from FLO 
was based on the inconsistencies in FLO standards an  a desire to “do more good.”  
They seek to resolve what “many have called”71 a hypocrisy in their standards to 
support cooperatives, but not the workers of larger plantations – arguably the ones 
most in need of fair trade support and standards. Notable also from conversations is 
their strategy of optimizing for three circles: business, farmers (and their workers), 
and consumer.  This shift may be subtle, but in conflict with the FLOs original intent, 
to benefit small, impoverished producers (and makers or local crafts) by providing 
access to markets in the global North.   It is also notable for its emphasis on business 
                                                




benefits and a sharp contrast to a strategy of pressu  campaigns or boycotts; a 
strategy which has led to consistent support from the business community for the FT 
USA splinter, and criticism from fair trade advocates. Even Rainforest Alliance, 
which sits further along the “market integration” spectrum than WFTO or FLO, 
makes a point to publicly question FT USA’s certification of products from mixed 
sources.  Like any organization, FT USA is open andvulnerable to critique. But 
unlike organizations where issues are debated in the General Assembly, its 
governance is structured to allow it to ignore – ifit so chose – pressures from outside 
organization and focus on its own objectives, to cultivate “a more equitable global 
trade model that benefits farmers, workers, consumers, industry and the earth.”72  
FT USA’s institutional make up moves gradually away from the consensus 
based multi-stakeholder environment adopted by FLO.  Stepping even further away 
from this model is the Direct Trade initiative.  Direct Trade is not an organization but 
a social market strategy originated and adopted by for-profit roasters – a movement 
within a movement.  There is no third party verificat on or certification, only a stated 
buying strategy by roasters.  Although the model originated from dissatisfaction with 
the fair trade standards, roasters took their battle directly to the marketplace 
bypassing the political structures inherent in the many multistakeholder organizations 
in existence.  There are no established standards, policies, or alliance with civil 
society, advocacy, or pressure campaigns. A simple premise rules: work with 
suppliers to provide the best quality product, and reward them for it.  From the 
perspective of its adherents, DT offers a far higher standard of social and ethical 





production than any of the other standards, including FLOs fair trade.  The great 
paradox, is that this highest of the coffee standards, is also the least institutionalized 









6 MULTIPLICITY MATRIX 
A political system that has multiple centers of power at differing scales provides 
more opportunity for citizens and their officials to innovate and to intervene so 
as to correct maldistributions of authority and outc mes.  
E. Ostrom 1998 
 
 
The previous chapter provided evidence for the declin  of legitimacy as a key driver 
for the development of social markets. Instead, I show that standards organizations 
increasingly adopted the organizational forms, practices and goals of market actors.  
If campaigns for legitimacy do not define the character of later stage social markets, 
what does? How can we understand differences across these markets?  Since 
multiplicity is the norm in social markets,73 and this perceived “competition” within 
social markets raises concerns that private governance can replace public regulation 
with cohesive universal and effective policies, then understanding how and why 
multiplicity occurs is an important and necessary challenge to international relations 
scholars, and motivates the analysis in this chapter.  
In its simplest form, the logic of multiplicity states that standards 
entrepreneurs survey the environment within which they seek to emerge and choose 
the path towards the greatest benefit relative to costs. Costs and benefits are observed 
through two variables.  First, costs are evaluated through the political centralization of 
                                                




the social market, where greater centralization of p wer makes it harder for new 
entrants to offer alternate solutions, thereby increasing the costs of developing new 
standards. In highly centralized social markets, new entrants will be less inclined to 
bear the costs of competing against, and therefore more likely to join, established 
power centers. Power concentration within the social m rket is defined through a 
combination of traditional metrics of concentration such as, industry concentration, a 
metric commonly used by economists and management scholars; supply chain power 
adopted from the literature on Value Chain Analysis led by Gary Gereffi et. al (2005) 
which places industries on a scale where power is highly concentration (at the 
extreme within one individual firm) to not concentrated at all (as in transactions 
within an efficient market). Other indicators are the degree of concentration within 
industry associations (is there one industry associati n or many). Likewise, political 
centralization goes beyond economic concentration and evaluates the concentration of 
NGOs operating within that social market, as well as the degree of state involvement 
in the social market.  In the case of high centralization, multiplicity is less likely to 
occur. Second, benefits are based on the existence of a clear political and market 
constituency. If a potential new entrant can identify a unique group of people that 
they will serve, the potential benefits of greater than if all constituencies are currently 
being targeted and served by existing standards. Therefore, more opportunities for 
differentiation results in more potential benefits and increases the likelihood that 
multiplicity occurs. A summary matrix is shown below. 
Figure 6.1 Multiplicity Matrix  
 
 
6.1 Cases and Variables
6.1.1 Observations of Multiplicity
Principally, I am aiming to explore differences in multiplicity 
multiplicity. However, the degree of multiplicity is symptomatic of differences in 
conditions of the social market (independent variables elaborated on below) that lead 
to other realities as well. 
lowest multiplicity, but it also means that there is the highest likelihood that 
standards exist whatsoever. If a standard does emerg , 
will be because the dominant powers of the industry coordinated at the highest levels, 





– higher or lower 
 A situation of very high centralization of power leads to the 
as in the diamond industry, 








a dominant standard in this quadrant (II), display a high degree of procedural 
legitimacy.  Further, since one standard dominates, there is the lowest likelihood that 
market segmentation occurs, that is to say, that differing standards or labels will exist 
for different consumers.  
 In social markets with low opportunities for differentiation, but lower levels of 
centralization (Quadrant III) there exists a slightly higher likelihood that multiplicity 
occurs, but if it were to occur, it would not lead to many alternate standards.  In these 
social markets, since there are fewer market segments to explore, direct competition 
between standards is more likely.  This was observed in the forest industry where the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Sustainable Forest Initiative (SFI) fought 
against each other for dominance.  As part of this direct battle, standards 
organizations will continue to rely on legitimacy as  political tool, which may lead to 
ratcheting up of elements of procedural legitimacy.  
 In social markets with the lowest centralization and the greatest opportunities 
for differentiation (Quadrant IV), as in the coffee social market, there is the highest 
likelihood of multiplicity as well as highest number of alternate systems.  In these 
situations, new standards organizations will seek legitimacy directly through the 
market, will rely less on legitimacy, and cater to different market segments.  It will 
also lead to the most diverse and prolific social mrkets, where state involvement is 
least likely.  
 In social markets with high opportunities for differentiation, and relatively 




market, there is a moderate likelihood that multiplic ty occurs, although less than in 
markets where there is lower centralization. Legitimacy will trend down as additional 
alternate systems will go directly to their respective consumer segments for support 
and legitimacy. The likelihood of state involvement is lower but still more likely than 
in social markets with the lowest centralization.  
The social markets to be tested in this chapter were s lected to provide variance 
across quadrants with focus on degree of multiplicity.  These include the following 
social markets: Forest, Fisheries (wild, not farmer, fish), Tourism, National Brands 
(several products), Diamonds, Infant Food formula, Organic foods, Gold Mining, 
Banking and finance, Sugarcane, Tea, and Clothing (textiles). 
6.1.2 Understanding Factors Influencing Multiplicity 
To measure centralization of power, I explore five factors that have been provided in 
more detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. These include: industry concentration as 
measured by portion of industry revenue controlled by top firms; power asymmetries 
as measured by Gereffi’s model of governance power within markets (2005); state 
based concentration measured by whether or not the industry is connected within and 
segregated by state economies; industry associations centralization based on the 
presence of major international industry associations covering the majority of the 
industry, and major NGOs which evaluates the power and presence of one or a few 
major NGOs that would dominate the market.  
 
 
To measure opportunities for differentiation, I 
provided in greater detail in Chapter 2. These include
on the type of industry;
ecolabels or other means of communication; whether there is strong 
Recognition of certified product or service, and whether markets are segmented based 
on Consumer Psychographics
are derived by assigning a binary value 
political centralization and differentiation listed above. All variables are given equal 
weight.  The values for each variable are added up to get a composite value for 
Centralization and one for Differentiation.  Cases that sit above the half
(2.5 out of a possible value of 5 for centralization; 2 out f a possible value of 4 for 
differentiation) are categorized as High. Cases that sit below the half
categorized as low.  Observations of the various social markets are present d below. 
The matrix in Figure 6.2 shows a summary of observations





 whether or not Standards Target Consumers
. As in the previous chapter, results for the cases below 
– a 1 or 0 – to each of the variables for 
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6.2 Quadrant I: Higher Centralization and Higher Di fferentiation 
6.2.1 Centralization 
The organic and clothing and textile social markets have varying types of political 
centralization, but to similar degrees.  The organic movement, consistent with the 
early stages of all social markets, began as a moveent of farmers that eventually 
coalesced into formal organizations, culminating in the international umbrella 
organization for organic foods; with 780 affiliates around the world, the International 
Federation of Organic Agricultural Movement (IFOAM) is the dominant and central 
organization for organic standards across the globe. Yet, centralization of organic 
foods is increased due primarily to state involvement. The organics movement was 
early and inspired the participation of states, which generally play an active role in a 
country’s agricultural policies and standards.  There are over 100 countries in the 
world with regulations on organic agriculture and trade (Global Organic 2013). This 
state involvement as well as the prominence and power of IFOAM, increases the 
degree of centralization while the decentralized nature of the industry tempers it.  
Most organic farming occurs on small farms; in 2011, .8 million farmers in 162 
countries grew organically on more than 37 million hectares of agricultural land.74  
Only 2% of farmable and is dedicated to organic farming, although the large majority 
taking place in OECD countries (OECD 2013).   
The textiles social market is a market in transition, and this is reflected in the 
social market. With a history rooted in the Multifibre Arrangement, and then the 
                                                




WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, powerful lead firms, with comfortable 
access to the political machinations at the WTO, historically dominated the industry.  
These arrangements aligned with the interests of powerful firms and brands intent on 
trade liberalization, achieved in 2005 with the abolishment of the quotas from WTO 
agreements.  Centralized state authority was also at the source of the first major 
voluntary standard for textiles.  An initiative of the Clinton administration, the Fair 
Labor Association, formalized in 1999 through an agreement among the major 
multinational corporations in the apparel and footwear industries, is dedicated to 
protecting factory worker’s rights around the world.  The politically aligned origins of 
the standard go deeper as it based primarily on the in ernationally recognized and UN 
affiliated International Labor Organization standards.  
Yet, political centralization is not absolute in the clothing and textiles social 
market (WTO 2013). While there are significant disparities of power between 
suppliers and, brands and retailers, the producer base remains highly dispersed and 
decentralized across the developing world. Similar to the coffee social market, a 
decentralized producer base can lead to fragmentatio  of power and standards, a 
phenomenon that is beginning and will be observed as a dependent variable – the 






 Table 6.1 U.S. Organic Food vs. Total Food Sales (000s)75 
6.2.2 Differentiation 
Strong brands in the clothing industry and powerful etailers in the organic food 
industry create greater power disparities in these two social markets, yet they also 
lead to greater opportunities for differentiation. Both are buyer driven industries, 
although the buyer is not necessarily the consumer.  Both industries are dominated by 
large brands that act as lead firms in the supply chain, but each brand is also 
psychographically segmented providing different products for different buyer 
segments. This key differentiation opportunity, similar to the coffee market, results in 
the emergence of unique niche players, a hybrid of social and business entrepreneurs, 
to develop products and brands catering to different market segments. In the organics 
industry, it is driven by a unique characteristic of the agriculture supply chain where 
thousands of small producers can upgrade their position n the supply chain by 
offering products with varying ethical standards. In the clothing social market, new 
intermediary players that sit in between suppliers and end-consumers, have emerged 
to provide new standards that focus, not only on the quality of the product, but the 
quality of the social standards. The nature of the segmentation follows the nature of 
                                                
75 Source: Organic Trade Association’s 2011 Organic Idustry Survey conducted 12/22/2010 – 
3/7/2011 ($ Millions consumer sales) 
Category  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008  2009  2010  
Organic Food  12,002 14,223 17,221 20,410 23,607 24,803 26,708 
Growth  15.6% 18.5% 21.1% 18.5% 15.7% 5.1% 7.7% 
Total Food  544,141 566,791 598,136 628,219 659,012 669,556 673,324 
Growth  1.6% 4.2% 5.5% 5.0% 4.9% 1.6% 0.6% 
Organic as % 
Total 




the social market, where producers segment along organics standards, and clothing at 
the brand and retailer level.  
6.2.3 Outcome 
There are 780 different organics organizations aligned with IFOAM, many of them 
tied to state-based organics standards; an indelible nk to the centralization of 
agriculture at the state level. In the n=444 dataset of unique ecolabels, 100% of the 45 
organic food related labels are tied to geography. This social market resembles the 
forestry social market in its centralization – state based centers of power aligned with 
international umbrella organization (Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification, or PEFC in the case of forestry) – but is uniquely different in its ability 
to directly target the ethical consumer. As a result, several more-than-organic 
standards and labels emerge – a phenomenon that is yet to be observed in the forest 
social market – such as grass fed, and locally grown labels.  Under the titles of locally 
grown, grass fed (for meats), and “circle farming,” new food labels emerge that 
promote more-than-organic standards of production. While hard to measure, this 
standard of food, battling within the organics social market, is hyper-local and 
product based, and made possible because of the decentralization of agricultural 
farming and opportunities to sell directly to consumers.  Grievances of this more-
than-organic standard lacks a central governing body, umbrella organization, or state 
support – all the tenets of traditional political legitimacy – but finds a strong 
constituency in both high-end urban markets, as well as ocal rural areas. According 




eating seasonally, knowing your farmer, and using your domestic culinary arts to 
prepare, package, and preserve your own unprocessed foods is the ultimate secure 
way to verify your food” (Salatin 2012). Salatin’s perspective is that organic 
standards, and what can be legally defined as organic, re captured by powerful 
corporate interest having little to do with a naturl way of farming.  
 This new beyond-organics counter movement has beenref rred to as micro 
eco-farming (Adams 2004), which has united actors into reviving the organic 
movement’s initial ideals of sustainability, symbiotic agriculture and back-to-the-land 
ethos (Sikavica and Pozner 2013).  These new beyond-organic eco-farmers identify 
agribusiness as the problem to which their farming methods are a solution, effectively 
creating an oppositional discourse. “We don’t need agribusiness to save us from 
starvation. Food is our excuse to co-create with nature instead of being passive 
recipients; to reach across species; to mingle withother humans; and to listen to an 
earthly problem” (Adams, 2004, p. 18).  These eco-farmers are delivering products 
directly to their ethically minded consumers directly hrough such channels as 
farmers markets and CSAs – community supported agriculture. Though ecolabels 
remain elusive, they represent a new standard of ethical production that is highly 
decentralized and differentiated.   
The clothing social market displays evidence of centralization and 
differentiation, as well as the emergence of a movement to further advance the norms 
and principles first outlined by the central authorities embodied in the FLA and ILO.  




level, and the increasing vertical integration of textiles and clothing by major brands 
(Nordas 2004), the clothing and textiles social market coalesced around the 
emergence of a firm-based standard, the Sustainable Apparel Coalition.  This 
coalition of major brands leads to a highly centralized social market, which were it 
not for the ability of other opportunities for differentiation, may have resulted in a 
social market akin to the forest industry with two major camps, the FSC and PEFC, 
dominating.  Instead, borrowing from the segmentation of producers, as in the 
organics market, but with the high possibility for differentiation as in the coffee 
market, the clothing social market sees the emergence of social entrepreneurs that 
work to reduce the psychological space between the producers and the consumers.  In 
depth interviews with Thread International, provides a rich case study for this social 
market.  
Thread International is a for-profit organization that seeks to produce 
polyesters as raw material for clothing, sourced from recycled trash in less developed 
countries.  How are they considered a voluntary standards organization?  Much like 
certified coffee beans, clothing brands and retailers that use their ethical fabric will 
have the right to label their products with the “Fueled by Thread” ecolabel; a 
guarantee that the product sough to maximize for the following key objectives: 
Increase job creation in Haiti (both direct and indirect employment; Maximize 
support of Haitian businesses and entrepreneurs; Increase income opportunities in 
Haiti; Minimize work-place accidents; Maximize employee Health and Safety; 




emissions produced; Maximize pounds of recyclables removed from waste stream, 
streets and canals; Increase Revenue growth. 
A few notable observations from the Thread Internatio l case provide 
evidence supporting some hypotheses in this study, and lend support to the two key 
factors of change that guide the matrix in this chapter.  First, they charge a premium, 
and understand that their business model is based on branding. Second, they see no 
tension between their status as a non-profit and their social cause; instead, they 
believe that growing their business and profits is the best way to do the most social 
good. Third, legitimacy of their organization is not a concern. They have a not for-
profit arm, they are B certified, they do not work within a collaborative consensus-
seeking model, and are happy to do the certification themselves. Four, They 
appreciate that they are in a highly competitive market with similar organizations 
trying to do the same thing. Fifth, they appreciate th  role that the FLA, and 
sustainable apparel coalition has played in their dvelopment – by setting the stage 
for a market for groups like them to thrive, and provide even more good.  
6.3 Quadrant II: High Centralization and Lower Diff erentiation 
6.3.1 Centralization 
Banking, Diamonds, infant food formula, gold and sugarcane, all exist within highly 
politically centralized industries.  While sporadic regulations exist at the state level 
for the delivery of infant food formula, the only voluntary standard is developed and 




Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes. The standard itself has no power of 
enforcement, but can be ratified by individual governments at the state-level.  There 
are currently 65 countries that have adopted some or all the provisions of the WHO 
code. Given this limited adoption of the code, its more universal appeal is as a 
standard; the only standard in a highly concentrated industry. Below the WHO, sit a 
number of activist associations, and a number of pr-industry organizations. Yet, all 
centralize at the WHO.  The production, delivery and marketing of infant food 
formula is highly concentrated in the 7 major multina onal corporations that 
constitute the membership of the International Infant Food Manufacturers Association 
(IFM).  
The Diamond industry is heavily centralized politically, a function of the 
influence it can and has had on topics of human rights, war, and inter-state relations. 
Heavy involvement of the UN on matters of conflict diamonds, and the participation 
of states in the Kimberley Process – the only major international diamond standard in 
the world – exemplifies this centralization. It is also extremely centralized as an 
industry. Five producers – ALROSA, BHP Billiton, De Beers, Harry Winston 
Diamond and Rio Tinto – generate 78% of the production sector’s revenues (Bain 
2013). Also, in 2012 the top five became the top four when BHP Billiton sold its 
operations to Dominion. These four firms act as powerful lead firms dictating 
downstream terms of production, including cutting and exporting, and pricing.   
While cutting and polishing is performed by a slew of smaller actors, these larger 




engage in dealing typically sell 30–70% of their rough holdings to smaller cutters and 
polishers. Large companies that primarily engage in cutting and polishing might sell 
10–20% (Bain 2013: 37). “Trust and relationships play an important role in middle-
market sales process. Any newcomer wishing to buy ro gh or polished diamonds at 
wholesale prices needs references from existing players” (Bain 2013: 44). 
6.3.2 Differentiation 
The WHO standards on infant food formula specifically prohibit the targeting and 
marketing of infant foods to parents, thereby drastic lly reducing any opportunities 
for differentiation in that social market.  
Diamonds are a commodity, but unlike the coffee bean commodity, there is 
little psycho-graphic segmentation of diamonds, or segmentation, other than price, 
driven primarily by differences in the quality of the diamond and the cutting. While 
there is a large cutting industry in India, China and Africa, the greatest value-add for 
cutting is attributed to diamonds emerging from cutting firms in Belgium, Israel, 
Russia and the US. While not completely accurate, you generally get what you pay 
for with diamonds.  Premiums are based on a set of internationally recognized and 
widely understood criteria to determine quality.  Premiums are charged and 
segmented at the jewelry manufacturing level. Brand differentiation is very low for 
commodity trades. 
There is, however, some differentiation at the producer level. Artisanal, or 




affects the lives of another 80 to 100 million peopl .  This type of mining tends to sit 
out of sight of the organizations that would monitor and regulate mining, and 
represents an area of high risk for child labor, enviro mental degradation, 
prostitution, the spread of HIV/AIDS and conflict diamonds. It is also a distinct and 
separate segment of the producer market, before a large consolidation at the buyer, 
trader, and cutter level.  It is also where a separate organization – the Diamond 
Development Institute – seeking to increase transparency for the harvesting of 
diamonds has emerged, but still without any attempt at developing a new or separate 
standard.  
6.3.3 Outcome 
The IFM’s frustration with the lack of universal adoption of the WHO code for the 
marketing of infant food formulas, the member companies have discussed developing 
their own code, yet 3 years after this idea emerged, no standard exists. Instead, the 
highly centralized political landscape of infant food formula motivates the 
involvement of states, and the development of standards by state agencies. According 
to a tally provided by UNICEF (2011), 84 countries have enacted legislation 
implementing all or many of the provisions of the Code and subsequent relevant 
World Health Assembly resolutions, 27 have adopted some or few provisions and 
14 countries have draft laws awaiting adoption, and14 others are currently studying 
options to ratify.76   
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The passing of voluntary standards from NGO to state is most likely in this 
quadrant of the analysis, and evidenced also by the participation of states in the 
Kimberley Process for diamonds. Adopted by the UN through resolution, The 
Kimberley Process has 54 participants, representing 81 countries77, accounting for 
99.8% of the global production of rough diamonds.  The extremely consolidated 
nature of the diamonds industry makes the threat of new entrants nearly non-existent, 
and political centralization equally high.   
6.4 Quadrant III: Lower Centralization and Lower Di fferentiation 
6.4.1 Centralization 
Centralization of the forest and fisheries industrie  is similar in degree, but different 
in type. Forestry is a highly fragmented industry – the top four players control only 
6% of industry revenue – yet, because of the regular involvement of states, centralizes 
politically, most notably in the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) which brings together over 30 endorsed national certification 
systems. Fisheries are also a highly fragmented industry, with two broad 
categorizations: small and large producers. Large producers, led by Unilever, the 
major corporation that spearheaded the development of the Marine Stewardship 
Council, centralizes the certification of fisheries somewhat, but not completely.   
According to Constance and Bonanno (2000: 132) “Because of Unilever’s “quasi-
monopoly” of the fish industry, many small-scale commercial ventures that do not fit 
into the MSC certification process may be left out f the value-added eco-labeling 
                                                




program” creating this important split between large and small producers.  Moreover, 
most small producers are located in less developed countries where states act to 
protect the industry for political reasons.  
 The forestry industry is a complex web of private nd public landowners. 
With varying degrees of vertical integration of the supply chain, it constitutes an 
international industry where no core set of dominant players control. However, the 
common involvement of the state renders the industry even more complex. It is 
fragmented globally with regional instances of high concentration. In some cases, 
such as in the Canadian province of British Columbia, the state owns the largest share 
of forests, which classify it as a concentrated market (Stanbury and McLeod 1973: 
57).  In other cases, as in the United States, large industrial logging companies own a 
fair share of the market and have a high-degree of vertical integration, but they rely 
on thousands of non-industrial private forest owners for much of their wood and 
fibers.  In 1989 the 3 largest hardwood lumber producers accounted for only 4.1% of 
hardwood production in the United States (Timbertax 2013).  There is no indication 
that this number has changed dramatically since then.   
Even in regions of high concentration, as in BC, land ownership represents 
only a tiny fraction of international land ownership, where thousands of other 
landowners constitute the entire supplier base. This scenario plays out across the 
globe, with a diversity of landowners and industry supply chains unique to geography 
and state boundaries. While fragmented nationally and internationally, some 




major landowner. This will lead to internationally fragmentation with coordination 
and centralization within certain countries.  
The heavy state involvement within the forest industry is cemented in the UN 
international conference on the environment and development; the gathering that is 
credited with kicking off the non-market institutionalization of the FSC. It outlines 
the principle of state sovereignty provided below: 
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies and have the respon ibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
States have the sovereign and inalienable right to utilize, manage and develop their 
forests in accordance with their development needs and level of socio-economic 
development and on the basis of national policies consistent with sustainable 
development and legislation, including the conversion of such areas for other uses 
within the overall socio-economic development plan and based on rational land-use 
policies.”78 
  This emphasis on state sovereignty provides the early signal for how future 
institutionalization of forest standards organizations would emerge. That is, with an 
emphasis on private conversion of production practices rather than state regulation. It 
                                                





also provides an indication of the complex state of fragmentation of this industry.  In 
many cases, the state itself is the landowner and coordinator of the forestry industry. 
In these cases, the industry is actually a highly concentrated industry and, according 
to the thesis of this study, would display signs of low multiplicity at the state level.  
This can be confirmed in the cases where the state adh red to a set of standards that 
rolled into the PEFC and eschewed the alternative sandards of the FSC these cases 
the state-adopted standard is either the universal standard, or survives in an 
environment of low multiplicity.  
The fishing industry is equally fragmented with two exceptions that lead to 
some centralizing around 1) large buyers who work primarily with large commercial 
fisheries, led by Unilever, the primary force being the founding of the Marine 
Stewardship Council, the largest voluntary standard in the industry, and 2) the vast 
group of small-scale producers. Around 90 percent of the 38 million people recorded 
globally as fishers are classified as small-scale, and an additional 100+ million people 
are estimated to be involved in the small-scale post-harvest sector (Béné, Macfadyen 
and Allison 2007). A full half of fish trade is purchased from developing countries, 
yet there is no political organization at that level, nor is there any political 
organization at the small producer level (FAO 2008). Yet this intense fragmentation at 
the producer level narrows significantly at the purchaser level. Unilever controls 25% 
of frozen fish market in the US and Europe. This has given them unparalleled 
leverage in the market, which they have used to establi h the MSC.  In 2006, Walmart 




which has placed pressure on the MSC to certify large fisheries more quickly. 
According to the Walmart website, 73% of its seafood was certified as of January 
2011, including farmed fish certified by a different i stitution. Recently, US retailer 
Kroger, Ahold USA, and Australian retailer Woolworths made similar MSC- related 
pledges. Darden Restaurants Inc. (the largest casual dining restaurant company in the 
United States, and operator of well-known restaurants such as the Red Lobster brand) 
also includes sustainability issues in its seafood procurement policies (Bing 2007). 
McDonald’s has operated Sustainable Fisheries Guidelines since 2005, and says that 
in the past five years it has shifted more than 18,000 tons of fish away from 
unsustainable sources. It refers to the MSC in its corporate responsibility policies. 
Retailer commitments help illustrate where the power resides in this supply chain.  
Today, the MSC label is the most widely discussed fisheries certification, 
viewed by many as trustworthy: as of December 2012, a reported 183 marine 
fisheries were certified by the MSC, although only 141 had data available, accounting 
for just under 7 million tons of seafood per year. An additional 109 fisheries are going 
through the certification process, which, if successful could increase the total certified 
catch to almost 10 million tons, just over 10% of global reported catch. 
6.4.2 Differentiation 
A supplier driven commodity chain is characterized by capital and technology 
intensive industries dominated by large multinationals that control the supply chain 
through production. Barriers to entry into a producer-driven supply chain are high 




The forestry industry is dominated by the production side of the supply chain and 
heavily producer-driven; consider the investment required for machinery, mills, lands, 
or transportation systems required to enter the market. Further, in contrast to a buyer-
driven commodity chain, end-consumers rarely if ever drive production through its 
selective preference for one brand of wood versus another.  One brand of lumber is, 
for the most part, interchangeable with another brand of lumber.  In fact, the eco-
labels created for forestry standards are more recognizable to consumers than any 
other brand of lumber.  
Given the lack of product differentiation or brand recognition, FSC focused on 
who their actual buyer was – a key question in understanding political power in a 
social market; in this case, large national and international retailers of lumber. Their 
biggest win was the conversion of the Home Depot. This widely publicized event led 
to industry conformity at the large-retailer level (Lowes, Kaufman & Broad Homes 
Corporation, Centex Corporation, and Andersen Corporation). According to Cashore 
Auld and Newsom (2002: 242), in response to retailer conversion, the SFI took 
incredible measures to make its program acceptable o retailers.  Specifically, it added 
parameters to enable chain of custody verification and reporting, and changed policies 
to allow third party auditing, and the creation of an independent Sustainable Forestry 
Board to review standards, verification, and compliance.  So, it was the power gained 
through retailer conversion that forced the SFI to increase standards and create a 
varied and stakeholder diverse governance structure (including labor unions, 




gained praise from a variety of industry observes, including the WWF (ibid., p 245). 
With these changes and endorsements, they were able to successfully lobby pro-FSC 
retailers to reword their policies to be open to SFI. 
The most striking reality for certified forest products in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe is that buyer power is concentrat d with the largest retailers. In 
addition to the early adoption by UK giant, B&Q, the conversion of Home Depot to 
franchisee status gave FSC certified wood a significant boost in market penetration.  
As the FSC was making strides in Europe bringing important industry 
organizations into its fold, changes in the US were slow.  The lack of progress in the 
US, which can be attributed in part to an immature environment of collaboration 
between NGOs and MNCs, and in part to a lack of public awareness, was set to 
change as the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) took up the issue in 1992.  Using 
techniques attributed to the earliest stages of social market/norm development, RAN 
initiated an aggressive public relations campaign aainst Home Depot demanding it 
cease the sale of “old-growth tropical timber.”  The response from Home Depot was 
quick and directed: it would cease to sell products that can not be proven to be 
forested in a sustainable manner.  
The 1992 campaign, while successful, was also narrow. Home Depot’s 
purchasing practices were altered only in their commit ent to halt the sales of teak 
furniture, which sourced primarily from tropical forests.  So, in 1997 when RAN 
refocused its efforts against Home Depot, it brought with it a team of heavy-hitting 




home improvement chain in an attempt to cascade change in the retail world.   Using 
a variety of innovative pressure tactics, including the “kids campaign” where a five-
story banner was hung in front of Home Depot’s Atlanta headquarters in which 3,000 
children from across the US sent letters to Home Depot CEO asking for a Christmas 
gift of healthy forests.  The tactic was followed up with a New York Times ad 
headlined “Only a Kid Could Say ‘Save the Rainforests 3,000 Different Ways: Will 
Home Depot Listen to Just one?” (Conroy 2007, p 72) 
Campaigns culminated in 1999 when simultaneous demonstrations were held 
in 150 stores across the US. One story describes activists showing up at stores 
carrying clipboards and dressed in white lab coats wi h ‘Old Growth Inspectors’ 
written on the back.  They were able to obtain in-store intercom codes that they used 
to announce, “The wood in aisle 2D is ripped from the heart of the Amazon. Do be 
careful of any spilt blood on the floor as we do our bit to destroy the earth” (Graydon 
2006). After months of negotiations, on August 26, 1999, Home Depot announced it 
would end all purchases of wood products coming from old growth forests and to 
give preference in its purchases to products certified as arising from sustainable forest 
practices, such as under the standards of the Forest St wardship Council. Home 
Depot committed to buying only FSC certified wood (Conroy 2001). Within months, 
most of the leading home improvement retail chains in the US followed the Home 
Depot lead.  Michael Conroy notes, “as the implications of the Home Depot 
announcement rippled through the forest products industry, the Vancouver Sun 




British Columbia’s logging practices than 10 years of environmental wars and 
decades of government regulation’” (Conroy 2007, p 75). Notable is how activists 
targeted the retailers, and not the brands. 
One key limitation to the increased opportunity fordifferentiation is lack of 
elasticity of demand because of substitute products – which simply means that 
consumers are not willing to pay a premium for this product, even if it is for 
additional certification (Peck 2001, p 245).  However, other observers suggest that 
there is little evidence that significant effort was invested in promoting end-user 
consumer demand for certification (Bass Markopoulos and Grah 2001, p 64). This 
point expresses an emerging observation in this study, that voluntary standards and 
ecolabels, when leveraged appropriately, can increase the differentiation opportunities 
in a marketplace, thereby increasing the chances of increased multiplicity and 
segmentation.   
“While both are legally “voluntary”, meaning that they were not created by 
governments, in reality they have evolved into mandatory seals of approval in global 
markets. Large retailers, traders or processing companies now require their 
implementation” (Entine 2003). Noteworthy in this case is that power is concentrated 
at the retailer level, and not at the product level. The latter would require 
differentiation at the consumer level, which would encourage the formation of more 
multiplicity.  Instead, at the retailer level, stand rds simply compete against each 
other to win over large retailers and buyers.  This intense competition between 




This focus on the retailer is similar in the fisheries industry, where 
differentiation of fresh fish sold as produce does not exist at the product level. 
Packaged fish, where sales is largely dominated by the major multinational firms, 
including Unilever, is a middle-market product, to begin with, therefore 
differentiation is narrow.  These large corporations, sourcing from large commercial 
fisheries, have increased their commitment to purchasing MSC certified products, but 
the certification does not differentiate across product segments and is not necessarily 
intended to cater to the ethical consumer. Instead, it is a corporate-wide policy intent 
on boosting the firm’s overall reputation. Friend of the Sea (FOS) leverages the only 
major segmentation opportunity in the fisheries social market by focusing its 
certification on small-scale fisheries.  With standrds that adopt FAO guidelines, in 
contrast to MSC, and with a focus on small-scale fisheries, the FOS standard and set 
up products is arguably the more ethical more stringent standard.  
6.4.3 Outcome 
Most notable in this quadrant is that both social mrkets contain two major standards 
that do not collaborate.  There was, in both markets, low multiplicity, a trend of 
increasing legitimacy, and low differentiation. Segmentation within the social 
markets followed the political centralization of their industries.  Forest standards 
segmented based on state involvement, where industry standards competed with the 
only NGO and advocacy initiated system, whereas fisher es standards segmented 




The bifurcation of the fisheries industry is explained in this quote from Ponte 
(2012, p 312) “This has resulted in a peculiar configuration of the sustainable fish 
market. While it is not surprising that consumer markets for sustainable fish are still 
mainly located in the global North, a large majority of MSC-certified fish is captured 
in Northern fisheries, despite the fact that around half of total global exports of fish 
originate in the global South. This paper shows that while the market for fish in 
general has indeed become more global in the past three decades, and sustainability is 
indeed moving into the mainstream, the market for certified sustainable fish remains a 
Northern affair. By not being able to seriously address the issue of Southern 
exclusion, however, the MSC is limiting its long-term prospects of further expansion 
and is exposing itself to potential competition from ther initiatives in the market for 
sustainability standards, such as the FOS certification system.” 
The intense competition in the forestry social market existed from its earliest 
stages and resulted in some institutional stickiness, a  competition remained within 
the realm of legitimacy creation.   The rise of theSFI as a potential competitor to the 
FSC led it to focus efforts on developing legitimacy for its standards rather than focus 
on market segmentation or market access strategies (Ca hore Auld and Newsom 
2003). Likewise, the SFIs choice to continue to compete against FSC even while its 
standards gradually shifted towards those of the FSC.  
In their move to discredit FSC, it sought the alliance of professional foresters, 
loggers, 79,500 landowners, and non-professional private forest owners. But, in 




Environmental Protection Agency as a proxy for environmental advocacy groups 
(Ibid., p 240).  As the SFI argued that the FSC’s process was slow, inappropriate for 
industry, and the result of politics rather than true ecological differences across 
forests, it shifted its own organization towards the more political.  
Consistent with the three-stage social market development framework 
introduced in this study, the strategies and tactics used by the early environmental 
NGOs involved informational campaigns combined with pressure tactics, boycotts, 
and shaming.   Early donor-supported groups and activities applied project- and site-
level pressure often through outlandish schemes aimed at garnering negative media 
attention linked to the operating firm.  Eventually, as is common with early disparate 
social advocacy campaigns, the benefits of coordinatio  become evident and a more 
cohesive and organized campaign emerged with aims to gain political prominence 
and commitments from established INGOs such as the UN. The problem was 
widespread, transnational, and would need to be solved at the international level 
(Nussbaum and Simula 2005). 
In 1992, efforts culminated at the UN international conference on the 
environment and development (UNCED) in Brazil where three factors highlighting 
the imperative of international-level action were identified (Nussbaum and Simula 
2005, p 4): intolerable rates of deforestation and ssociated losses; threats to the lives 
of forest dwellers and indigenous people; meeting market demand for forest products. 
Subsequent meetings spearheaded by environmental groups led by the World Wildlife 




manner consistent with key environmental standards. The first of these meeting, held 
in Washington DC in spring of 1992. The FSC was formally established in 1994, but 
not without contention.  The well-documented battle b tween the FSC and the 
Sustainable Forest Initiative in the US has resulted in a bifurcated standards market 
with the FSC, supported by early advocacy groups and activists, and the PEFC acting 
as an umbrella organization to the many national and sub-national standards across 
the globe.  This social market is characterized by both a high degree of multiplicity 
because of the many unique regional standards, but also a low degree of multiplicity 
since within a given region there may be two choices – FSC or a standard aligned 
with the PEFC.  This aligns well with the fragmentation hypothesis since the forestry 
industry may be highly concentrated within certain regions, but very fragmented at 
the international level. Thus regionally, we observe low multiplicity, state 
involvement, and in some cases, a universal national standard. This aligns with the 
2x2 matric predicting an outcome for producer-drive industries with low 
fragmentation.  Yet at the international level, given the multitude of standards under 
the PEFC umbrella, we observe high multiplicity, direct competition between 
systems, a race-to-the top and intense competition for political legitimacy, and low 
segmentation.  
The famous direct political battle between the FSC and SFI (Cashore et al. 
2004) is a result of constraints in the marketplace, which led to sustained political 
battles.  The lack of segmentation opportunities within the forest industry meant that 




one for legitimacy, with standards vying to have large institutions of government and 
corporations – mainly producer groups – align with their standard.  Observations 
from the coffee industry demonstrate that the political battle was explained by market 
conditions, with the political battle observed as a dependent variable of these 
conditions. 
Institutional buyers converted to FSC products as away to reduce risk instead 
of a way to differentiate along brand-segmentation l nes. This does a great deal in 
increasing the demand for certified products, but does little to alter market structures 
for wood.  If this were variable, it would be an axis along the cost-vs-opportunity 
scale, where some strategies are merely costs or risk based: they increase costs or 
threaten to impose costs on delinquents. Whereas others are opportunity based: the 
opportunity to make money, develop new brands, etc. If it’s going to be the former, 
then adoption is based on traditional collaborative governance strategies. If it’s going 
to be the latter, then adoption is market-based.  
The most defining feature of FSC strategy was where within the supply-chain 
it chose to operate.  Rather than provide an opportunity for producers and 
intermediaries to brand their products according to certification and have buyers 
compete to provide this newly segmented product, it sought the commitment of major 
buyers, specifically major retailers and homebuilders. It targeted large institutional 
buyers, and as a result forced change down these vertical supply chains. This was 
exceptionally successful to achieve change in the rel vant supply chains, but also 




FSC targeted conversion along the same supply chain and did little to alter 
supply chain dynamics. It merely introduced a new cost rather than an opportunity for 
producers to join its ranks. The choice it presented to retailers and producers was: 
incur this cost, or risk not having business-as-usual.  Although the intention was to 
collaborate with industry groups, the scheme appeared more of a threat to industry 
groups rather than an opportunity for mutual gain.  It was therefore quite obvious that 
industry groups would collaborate on creating a system that worked better for them 
while still mitigating the risk that they viewed negatively in the eyes of consumers. 
Since wood markets were segmented very much along geo raphical lines, future 
standards competition reflected this reality.  Had new supply chain opportunities 
occurred through the development of new brand owners based on certification, a 
different response may have been expected. 
Another key limitation is the extent to which the forest certification standards 
systems were able to achieve their original goals to halt tropical deforestation 
(Counsell and Loraas 2002, p12). In reality, “most certified areas are found in 
government and industry-owned boreal and temperate forests of the North rather than 
the natural tropical forests of the global South.  Moreover, the communities which 
own or manage a rapidly growing share of Southern fo ests face significant barriers to 
accessing certification and its benefits” (Taylor 2005, p 433). Because of this 
important limitation to the supply of wood, one possibility extrapolated from the logic 




focusing on the production of forest products from the small landowners neglected by 
the FSC and members of the PEFC.  
This is now happening in the form of an official partnership between FSC and 
FLO to certify wood from smallholders and communities.79 This shift also represents 
a shift towards greater differentiation – decentralizing the industry by creating a 
separate consumer segment for smallholders versus large commercial landowners.  
6.5 Quadrant IV: Lower Centralization and Higher Di fferentiation 
6.5.1 Centralization 
Although there exists a UN code of ethics for the tourism industry, the social market 
does not centralize around any NGO or industry-specific organizations.  With 
consumers being the most significant market for international travel, the highly 
segmented, diverse, and even fickle end-consumer market shapes the differentiation 
opportunities within this social market. The level of concentration for the top four 
operators is about 9.3% of revenue, dominated by large irlines, tour operators and 
travel agencies. As the largest accommodation operators (Marriott, Accor and Hilton) 
derive their income mostly from domestic occupants, their market shares in the 
industry are all under 0.5%. Further analysis indicates that the majority of operators 
in the industry are subject to a low level of concentration, largely stemming from the 
large number of small business operators and, therefor , the fragmented nature of the 
industry.  
                                                




 As shown in chapter 3 of this study, the origins of the coffee social market 
were diverse and disparate.  Organizations as established and diverse as Oxfam, 
Church of the Brethren, the Mennonite Central Committee, International Federation 
of Alternative Trade, and the Fair Trade Federation (IFAT), European Fair Trade 
Association, Network of European World Shops, and Max Havelaar to name a few.  
The FLO emerged as an ambitious umbrella organization, trying the network 
together. But the unification of fair trade was never absolute. IFAT turned into the 
WFTO, and developed their own set of standards theybelieved were true to the 
original movement. Yet, even more significantly, was the decision from the 
Rainforest Alliance, a major force in environmental sustainability, created its own 
coffee certification label rather than join forces with the FLO.  
Coffee production consists of a diffuse, independent, a d, until the FLO came 
along, unorganized collection of 20-25 million farm workers. Estimates indicate that 
seventy-percent of the world’s coffee is produced on plantations smaller than 62 
acres, and approximately fifty-percent on family farms of less than 13 acres. FLO 
focused on these small farmers while ignoring the largest buyers and roasters. 
Further, since its policies required organization into cooperatives, it could not extend 
its reach to all 20-25 million farm workers. This left a huge segment of the producer 
population outside FLOs market.  
An important aspect of fragmentation is the power to impose power on others 
within an industry. Whereas the early coffee market would be considered a captive 




that. Now, smaller producers are not captive to large roasters or traders, or even to 
local coyotes, but can gain access to markets throug  certification.  The shift that 
FLO allowed was from a captive value chain, where suppliers are highly dependent 
on buyers, to a relational value chain, i teractions between buyers and sellers are 
complex with high asset specificity creating mutual dependence which may be 
managed through reputation, namely the reputation and cultural similarities created 
by the voluntary standard.  This shift represents a hift towards lesser power 
asymmetries and greater political decentralization.  Centralization in the coffee 
market is shifting from a highly centralized industry, to one that is more mixed. 
Although there is high concentration at the roaster level, with 5 major roasters 
controlling 50% of coffee imports, the introduction f the fair trade system enabled 
the promotion of coffee producers in the supply chain, thereby decentralizing coffee 
production and sales.  In the US alone, there are currently over 1,200 coffee roasters.  
Given the extremely high opportunities for differentiation discussed in the next 
section, coffee production and roasting is no longer subject to the power and control 
of a few lead firms. This parallels the state of centralization at the political level. The 
nature and character of the existing market for ethical coffee expanded in the wake of 
the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989 (World Bank 
1989).  Recall that providing a minimum price to small producers from poor coffee 
producing countries was the FLO’s raison d’être; a critical move to mitigate concerns 
around declining coffee prices in the wake of the fall of quotas.  The fall of the 
agreement also reduced the power of the central industry association for coffee 




coffee industry, enabled the growth and domination of the FLO, which led to the 
emergence of other systems to fill different market segments. 
The breaking down of the ICA, and the upgrading of producers – 25 million 
strong, representing 70% of the world’s coffee – decentralized the industry 
significantly. Yet, the power of the top 5 roasters remains strong. The 4C created an 
international baseline for coffee standards with strong support from these top roasters 
and put a stop to a massive proliferation of coffee standards. This, along with a 
formal adoption of an International Coffee Agreement by the 77 members of the 
International Coffee Council, which entered into force on February 2, 2011, has had a 
re-centralizing effect on the coffee market. Multiplicity as a function of industry and 
political centralization seems to have stabilized at the current stage. A more complete 
understanding of the nature multiplicity in the coffee sector is revealed through the 











Figure 6.3 Coffee Industry Structure  
 
 
National brands represent a unique form of social mrket because they 
encompass a variety of products and industries.  According to the data compiled 
retrieved from the ecolabel index, there are 62 ecolabels that cover a variety of 
products, 44 of these are country-specific (e.g., Eco-leaf Japan, Ecomark: India, 
Ekolabel: Indonesia, Environmental Choice New Zealand, or Green Label: Israel).  
Yet the diversity of these markets presents a problem for evaluating centralization. 
Are we to evaluate national brands as a social market, and consider other national 
brands as agents of multiplicity? Or, given the definition of a social market as the 
nexus of normset and industry, place each product that happens to be certified by a 
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industry?  Here, I argue that national brands belong in a social market with other 
national brands because the factors that will influence their emergence are 
international in nature and similar across states. The centralization of political power 
by state will dictate the nature of emergence for natio al brands – quite simply, that 
they will fragment according to state boundaries.  This is the primary centralizing 
force in the political economy of national brands social markets.   
Yet national brands encompass a variety of products and services, each with 
competitor standards that exist at the confluence of pr duct and normset. A paper 
towel product certified under the German Blue Label, for example, may also be 
certified under the Chlorine Free Products Association (CFPA)80, or Green-e 
certification81, or certified under the Forest Stewardship Council scheme.  While each 
of these certifications apply to the same product, their certification requirements are 
vastly different. The broad and diverse nature of natio al brands place them in a 
unique category of their own – other national brands.  Since the political economy of 
so many products across the globe is so different, the primary characteristic of 
centralization for national brands is national borders.  
6.5.2 Differentiation 
The $1.15 trillion USD tourism industry is as vast nd diverse as the 1.035 billion 
tourist arrivals globally each year (IBIS World 2012). Diversity and differentiation 
                                                
80 See http://www.chlorinefreeproducts.org/aboutus.html Last accessed March 2, 2014 
81 The organization verifies paper manufacturers' purchase of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) 
and certifies the RECs to ensure they meet strict environmental and consumer protection standards. - 
See more at: http://www.cleanlink.com/sm/article/Know-Your-Green-Paper-Certifications--




can hardly be greater than in the ethical tourism social market. Everything from 
airline carriers, to accommodations, food and beverag , retail goods, and prepaid 
tourism packages fall into this market. With very barriers to competition, a diversity 
of product-sets based not solely on geography, but on he diverse psychographic 
characteristics of tourists, and no dominant brand that spans state boundaries, 
differentiation for tourism is very high. “International tourism is one of the most 
highly competitive global industries, with a multitude of countries and major cities 
seeking their fair share of this activity and expenditure, to assist in generating national 
economic and employment growth.” (IBIS World 2012, p 18) “The level of product 
and service differentiation within this industry is increasing largely due to 
segmentation and fragmentation within domestic and international tourist markets. 
Standard demographic segmentation by product is no lo ger as relevant, as tourist 
needs/wants and desires tend to change depending on the purpose of their trip, the 
destination, who they are traveling with, etc. A person's product and service needs 
can also change between trips. The modern tourist is now searching for "quality of 
experiences" when traveling. This has led to signifcant opportunities for new entrants 
into most industry segments.” (IBIS World 2012, p 22)
Coffee is a consumer-facing product with a diverse set of brands and ranges of 
quality that target a variety of consumer groups. FLOs policy of setting minimum 
prices for certified beans meant that sellers passed this cost onto buyers. Sellers are 
able to do this because of the diverse consumer bas, some of which would be willing 




coffee and members of WFTO (Equal Exchange and CaféDirect), became dedicated 
franchisees, meaning they were fully committed to selling all of their products as 
certified free trade. Other sellers were able to gain the benefits of being considered 
“socially responsible” without altering their entire product. Since many coffee sellers 
offered a large variety of brands that varied along quality and price, they were able to 
convert only some of their products to fair trade. The diversity of products, brands 
and consumer segments meant companies could adopt fair trade selectively rather 
than commit fully, which made adoption less contentious.  
Differentiation of the coffee market stems in part from the role that fair trade 
played in the market, itself a consequence of the explosion of specialized coffee and 
shifting consumer preferences. By enabling the upgrading of producers from captured 
and powerless suppliers, to being unique to a brand  roaster, the fair trade 
movement enabled the increased segmentation and differentiation of the coffee 
market. Recall that that the introduction of fair trade shifted power dynamics in the 
coffee supply chain by 1) eliminating intermediaries known as coyotes that exerted 
power by imposing pricing and restrictions on producers; 2) providing higher 
minimum pricing and access to new markets to producers, and most importantly, 3) 
triggered the emergence of a new breed of intermediary and roaster offering ethically 
produced coffee to ethically-minded consumers.  This last shift has been critical in 
expanding the differentiation opportunities within the coffee social market. Now, any 
entrepreneur aligned with the social values of ethically sourced coffee can source, 





There are two ways to observe multiplicity in the coffee social market. On one hand, 
the early power and domination of the FLO, along with centralization of major 
roasters with the 4C, has led to a lower level of multiplicity.  On the other hand, given 
the completely decentralized nature of Direct Trade, any roaster and a number of 
products fit the bill.  What this has done, similar to the clothing industry, is have the 
market completely subsume the social market.  In other words, the opportunity for 
differentiation in the coffee market led to the wide proliferation of coffee social 
entrepreneurs, each able to develop their own unique product based on the new 
ethical sourcing of coffee. In this case, ethical production is no longer the purview of 
a set of NGOs or advocacy groups, but has integrated with the marketplace. 
Incentives and dynamics of newly emerging social entrepreneurs are within the 
marketplace, and coexist harmoniously with traditional actors, corporations, and 
NGOs. In this case, the norms have transformed the market, and the market has, in 
turn, transformed the politics of ethical coffee production. 
This is a key shift that occurred in the coffee market, and one that represents a 
far more general observation of this study: that voluntary standards can 
fundamentally alter the character of an industry by creating great opportunities for 
differentiation based on new standards. This is made possible by the precondition of 
legitimacy within a social market. Yet, this legitimacy has little or nothing to do with 
the legitimacy of one organization, but rather the legitimacy of the norm made 




legitimized, a social market can allow, depending on the structure of its political 
centralization and opportunities for differentiation, a multitude of voluntary standards 
operating within the market, and changing with the market.  
Given the highly decentralized political concentration of the tourism industry, 
combined with geography-based segmentation, as well as psychographic 
differentiation on consumers, it is expected, and also observed, to have a high degree 
of multiplicity. A recent study by the UN World Tourism Organization Network 
identified and reviewed 104 tourism-related ecolabels82, 59 of which are government 
lead, and a further 18 have some government involvement and support.83  They are as 
fragmented as the organics industry, without any centralization, and a greater degree 
of differentiation opportunities. 
Certification of national brands is dominated by the state-based nature of these 
schemes. Differentiation by product is variable, but it expressed outside the social 
market of national brands. National brands exist in multiplicity, but segment 
according to the boundaries of the nation state.   
6.6 Overall Analysis 
Knowing that there is a logic and pattern of multiplicity across industries is a valuable 
contribution to scholars of international governance as well as state regulators.  For 
regulators and policy makers, it provides a logic within which they can begin to 
                                                
82 see http://sdt.unwto.org/en/content/voluntary-initiatives-and-certification-systems-sustainable-
tourism last accessed September 13, 2013 
83 see http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/docpdf/certification-gov-recomm.pdf last 




understand what role, if any, they can play in promoting ethical production.  For 
example, since is more unlikely that standards willemerge in highly centralized 
industries, there is an opportunity for states to promote collaboration among key actor 
to develop standards. This is in opposition to highly decentralized industries, where 
we can expect voluntary standards to self-organize i  pursuit of key markets.  
For scholars, it perhaps raises more questions than i  answers, and provides a 
basis for future research that is explored further. H re I present some thoughts on how 
to build on this initial broad analysis with additional research.  First, a tally of all 
voluntary standards across the globe according to centralization and differentiation 
would allow us to see how many standards exist in each quadrant. This allows 
researchers to further assess if greater multiplicity occurs as expected: the greatest 
number of standards in quadrant IV, followed by quadrant I, then quadrant II, and the 
fewest standards organizations occupying quadrant II.   
 Another next step is to begin stripping away the factors that constitute the two 
key variables of centralization and differentiation t  see which factors most influence 
the outcomes observed.  Could it be that industry fragmentation is far less relevant 
than who the original political actors were in creating a standard?  Or is the opposite 
more accurate, that the political bargaining of original social advocates far less 
important in determining social market outcomes than the economic conditions of the 
market, specifically the fragmentation of that industry?  Or is industry fragmentation 
too closely related to the type of product being certifi d, in which case the relevant 




while politics and markets both play a role in social markets, does one influence 
eventual outcomes much more than another?  Is there an ‘economic realist’ 
perspective that suggests that it all comes down to profits, and the structure, norms, or 
strategies of social advocates merely noise that hardly influences the true power 
doctrines of markets – that big business wealth and dominance always wins? 
 Setting these questions aside for now, the following chapter returns to the 
coffee social market in order to ask another question: is there a pattern within the 
standards themselves?  There are higher standards and lower standards in any social 
market – that is to say, less or more stringent standards.  What explains how and 
when higher standards emerge versus lower standards, an  how do these relate, if at 





7 PATTERNS OF SEGMENTATION  
Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is 
dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions 
of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to 
coordinate the parts of his plan 
Hayek 1945, p526 
 
Is there a logic or pattern behind a standard organization’s quest for differentiation?  
Do standards interact and relate to market segments in a predictable pattern that helps 
explain if and when standards ratchet up or down?  To examine the way in which 
multiplicity segments within a social market in the coffee social market, I define the 
segments below and quickly demonstrate how the various standards were more likely 
to occupy different non-competing segments than to compete directly.   
7.1 Market Segments 
Recall that market segment refers to the sub-population targeted by the business and 
can be compared to a governing body’s constituency (Goldstein 2007).  This can be 
based on a group’s demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, income 
level, political leanings), geography, or behavioral characteristics. Business-to-
business market segments exist as well and can vary according to geography, 
customer type (industry, size of the organization, position in the value chain), or 
buyer behavior (relationship and loyalty to suppliers, usage patterns, and order size) 
(Smith 1956).  A system’s policies may be more relevant to one segment versus 




competing systems emerge.  Understanding the market segment that a system 
operates in is necessary to understand how competing systems emerge. Competing 
systems may choose to target a whole new segment of the marketplace with new 
standards rather than compete directly in the same segment.  Market segmentation 
will also inform us on who becomes a franchisee and why – actors outside the target 
segment may feel unthreatened by a standard system, whereas actors competing 
within the same segment will feel compelled to act.  
Market segments provide the governance boundaries for ystems. Trying to 
impose a system of standards on a group of actors in a separate market segment may 
be like trying to get another country to ratify a law passed in another country.  A 
coffee retailer that sells to working class buyers in less developed countries are likely 
to have no interest in becoming fair trade franchisees. Likewise, a food seller places 
little value on a product certified USDA organic unless they’re selling their products 
in the United States.  These market realities are key structural factors that may help 
explain latter stage development of voluntary standards, most specifically how and 
why competing standards emerge to compete.  In the cas of coffee, there are market 
segments on both the consumer and producer end of the supply chain. These are 
elaborated on below. 
7.1.1 Producer Segments  
Producer segments may be based on a variety of factrs, including size, specificity of 
production, production methods, or may be based on ge graphy if it relates to buying 




through its policies, producer segments are based on size. Individual Farmers: 
according to FLO, these are farms where “ farm work is mostly done by members and 
their families,” and “They do not hire workers all year round.”84  Plantations: these 
are large farms that hire workers year-round. Plantation owners are not likely to be 
doing any manual labor. 
7.1.2 Consumer Segments 
Consumer Segments are based on the behavior of buyers that can, as in the case of 
coffee, relate to a corresponding product offering.  In this case, coffee buyers are 
segmented by: Buyer Type, where preferences relating to ethical production, quality 
and price sensitivity; Channel, where they make purchases; Geographic Location, 
defined by locality, region, country or group of countries (Blois 2000). 
It is important to note that an individual consumer may exist in multiple 
segments. They may buy high-end premium coffee for consumption at home, and yet 
also a consumer of mainstream pre-ground filter coffee at work.  They consume gas-
station coffee, or whatever their church brews during events. Given this, it is crucial 
to understand who the institutional buyers are of cffee while defining market 
segments.  
Mass Market Not ethical: This mainstream coffee rarely if ever is identified 
by origin. They tend to be bought and sold on the basis of price, which for 
wholesalers is taken from the international commodities price for coffee beans 





(Lewin, Giovanucci, Varangis 2004). They are sold through mainstream channels 
such as supermarkets, or prepackaged coffee blends for institutional buyers such as 
offices, or gas stations. This segment caters primarily to institutional buyers that aim 
to source a large portion of their mainstream product line from ethical sources.  This 
is normally motivated by corporate-level Corporate Social Responsibility or 
Sustainability goals. Unless the consumer has done ind pendent research on the 
company’s buying practices, they would not know that e coffee they are purchasing 
is certified. There is generally no price premium associated with the ethical nature of 
this mainstream coffee. 
4C attested focus on the mainstream market results in a membership filled 
with mainstream coffee sellers and roasters such as: Aldi Supermarkets, Kraft Foods 
inc., Nestle, United Coffee, and many others.  The most prominent buyer brand of 4C 
coffee is Nescafe, a clanging signal to the segment 4C coffee operates in.  
Mass Market Ethical: This is mainstream coffee purchased from ethical 
sources and will be identified as ethical. This is done through public communications 
campaigns from the institutional buyer (along with CSR communications strategy), or 
through the addition of an ecolabel on the packaging. Ecolabels will generally not be 
a significant feature of the package, and there is generally no price premium. 
UTZ targets the mainstream market and has recently moved to brand their 
certified coffee with the UTZ Certified logo, and selling under brand names such as 
“Good Origin” from Sara Lee, an attempt to brand something as good without the eco 




Association and UTZ’s collaboration with them.  Adding the label moves UTZ into a 
slightly separate market segment.  RA has also entered the mainstream ethical coffee 
market through sales to mainstream sellers like British Airways, McDonald’s 
restaurants in the UK (through Kenco coffee sold through Kraft Foods inc) 
(Rainforest Alliance 2007), prepackaged beans or pods f r coffee makers (Kenco, 
Java One) or commercial buyers of coffee for office equipment (e.g., Boston Bean 
Company, Arco Coffee, Corporate Coffee Systems)85.  Through this channel, RA and 
UTZ target institutional buyers that want to increas  their sustainability and CSR 
profiles. In these cases, the consumers are not necessarily ethical consumers as 
defined below.  
Ethical Market: Buyers who seek out ethically produced products identified 
through their certification labels and are prepared to pay a premium for these 
products.  Mainly sold through organic or specialty markets (e.g., Whole Foods), on-
line, through specialty coffee shops (e.g., Starbucks).  This segment is occupied by 
the early advocacy-initiated standards, including FLO and RA and WFTO.  Unlike 
FLO, RA occupies a space that includes plantation farms. Since by definition WFTO 
members are those with a whole-company commitment to fair trade, many of their 
members sell FLO certified products.  
Specialty Coffee Non-Ethical Buyer: While much of the specialty coffee 
segment is occupied by ethical coffee, the two are not the same. Specialty coffee, as 
understood by the Specialty Coffee Association of America, is coffee originating 





from unique and diverse “geographic microclimates” that “produce beans with unique 
flavor profiles.” Beans are selected to be without defect, and production from picking 
through to brewing, focuses on the quality and for the expression of the coffee’s own 
unique flavors.  Terroir, a term that refers to the specific geographic, climactic, and 
geological composition of the soil from which wine grapes originate, can now refer to 
the same for coffee beans. Specialty coffee buyers look for quality and flavor first and 
pay special attention to the unique quality and flavor attributes of the bean. Starbucks 
is well known for capitalizing and mainstreaming the specialty coffee trend. This 
space is occupied primarily by Starbucks’ own CAFÉ standards. 
Specialty Coffee Ethical: Specialty coffee that promotes the ethical aspect of their 
trade, generally through Direct Trade branding. They occupy a segment referred to as 
coffee’s “third wave” which includes Direct Trade, single-origin beans, and lighter 
roasts. Third wave coffee makers view coffee as an artisanal product and promote 
“enjoying coffee for what it is” by not adulterating the flavor with milk or sugar. 
These products are sold through gourmet specialty coffee shops proliferating across 
the United States and the world. Even the same companies use varying standards to 
differentiate their products along quality lines. 
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Observation: Mass-market segments do not rely on branding or ec labels, but do 
rely on governance and procedural legitimacy. In contrast, higher end ethical 
segments rely far less on procedural legitimacy.  
FLOs origins and declared intent – to increase social justice to poor farmers – 
required that it cater to farmer interests. The small farmer as FLOs primary 
constituency was formalized into their governance structure. This cemented small 
farmer interests as FLOs principle supplier and precluded access to a large portion of 
green bean supply.  This also led to a unique set of buyers.  Instead of growing with 
large established brands, fair trade coffee expanded with niche social brands such as 
Café Direct and Equal Exchange, which worked within a specific consumer market 
segment of ethical consumers.  This allowed larger oasters to develop competing 
products without having to convert all brands to fair trade certified.  The result was 
that FLO occupied a specific producer and consumer niche in the coffee industry, 
leaving sufficient space for a multiplicity of standards to emerge without having to 
compete with FLOs political dominance and legitimacy.  
Given these industry realities, it is not surprising that other standards emerged. 
The opportunity to benefit from the expansion of the ethical coffee norm by serving 
market segments not covered by FLO is a far more powerful explanation than the 
battle for political legitimacy or a simple two-way contest between industry and 
NGOs. A combination of FLO political limitations, industry fragmentation, and 
branding provided an opportunity for NGOs to expand the cause by certifying where 




not covered by FLO.  Each new standard system occupied a space left open from the 
previous systems. With norm consolidation came a segmentation of standards and 
policy regimes.  
7.2 Relationship Between Segments and Standards 
Is there a rhyme or reason to the order of standards cross market segments?  Beyond 
the thesis that standards segment across market segments rather than competing 
directly, is there a relationship between the standard and the segment it occupies?  
Based on the categorization of segments above, and the evaluation of standards 
below, and the data on product pricing elaborated on below, I conclude that the 
quality of a standard is positively correlated with market segment. And more 
interestingly, pricing is negatively correlated with market externalities 
7.2.1 Evaluating the Standards 
The coffee social market started, and remains, a market built upon the norms of social 
advocacy first, and environmental advocacy secondarily.  While the FLO has also 
developed standards for various environmental requiments (e.g., soil preservation, 
the use of non-renewable energy in production), or labor requirements such as safety 
policies, gender equality, or religious tolerance, the original purpose of the program 
and that of the more recent programs is to provide economic development to 
producers of the world’s second most widely traded commodity through increased 
trade.   This is the original intent and it is also what distinguishes this standard from 




that it “is a trading partnership based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks 
greater equity in international trade,” (WFTO 2009) the notion of relationship trading 
is the central principle of the entire movement. The environmental requirements were 
added on as the organization formalized and gained power among producers.   
A major objective of implementing coffee standards is to improve the 
livelihoods of producers, although environmental impact remains an important 
element of all standards.  A recent study by The Sci ntific and Technical Advisory 
Panel (STAP, 2010) examined available literature on the subject of impact analysis. 
They found only six studies that evaluated the enviro mental and socioeconomic 
outcomes for certified producers. They concluded that there is not compelling 
evidence to draw conclusions on impact. Although, another study (Giovanucci et al 
2008) concludes that economic and social impacts are far more direct and measurable 
than environmental impacts. While this may also be du  to the lag time between 
implementation of environmental practices and impact, e onomic impacts assessed by 
net income increases and social impacts related to occupational health, employee 
relations and labor rights showed positive changes.  These studies strengthen the 
argument to focus on the social and economic aspect of coffee standards when 
measuring the quality of a standard based on reduction of negative externalities.   
7.2.1.1 Quality of Standards 
An order of standards based on their policies to achieve the core goals of ethical 
coffee is required in order to understand the relationship, if any, between quality of 




have ranked coffee standards, and incorporate my own data to account for the 
primacy of social standards and the value of relationship-based transactions, to come 
up with a ranking used in this research.  
The first ranking I examined was from ISEAL, the umbrella standards and 
certification organization that includes, among others, the SAN (the standards setting 
arm for Rainforest Alliance), the FLO, 4C and UTZ.  Based on a list of 166 criteria, 
where scoring was based on the degree to which a criteria was required in the 
standards, FLO scored highest with 219 points, followed by 4C and SAN tied with 
188 points (out of a possible total of 332), and UTZ at 157 points. When I tallied 
points for social criteria, the ranking was similar with FLO at 129 points, 4C with 
106, SAN at 96 and UTZ at 90.  Given the source, on would expect this ranking to 
be definitive and credible, yet it belies declarations from the standards organizations 
themselves.  4C maintains that it is the baseline standard, and that adherents should 
use them as a stepping-stone to other standards, includi g UTZ, RA and FLO, and are 
explicit in the technical steps required to move from 4C certification to RA 
certification (SalvaNatura 2011). The 4C as the baseline, or least stringent, standard is 
also consistent with the perspective of interviewees in the coffee business. This 
provides one data-point to support the hypothesis that the lower standards serve the 
mainstream market, but additional ranking of the other standards is required.  
All sustainability standard initiatives recognize that closer collaboration will 
help put a greater number of producers on the road t ward sustainability. 
Through its pre-competitive approach, the 4C Association seeks to foster 
cooperation between the standards and unite efforts in he coffee sector. It 




the 4C Code of Conduct as a tool for farmers to step up to more demanding 
certification schemes.86 
Another survey of standards performed by the Tropical Commodity Coalition 
in the Coffee Barometer study (2009) that included the 4C, Starbucks CAFÉ 
standards, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ as well as FLO, was based on a set of 9 
overarching criteria, and set the 4C standard as the least stringent, followed by a 
three-way tie between CAFÉ, UTZ and RA, with FLO leading the pack. Yet, this 
study was performed in 2009. If we are to incorporate some of the changes since then, 
we’ll find that CAFÉ standards, as they relate very specifically to their social impact 
on the farmer, which we’ve decided to set as the priority, sets itself apart from the RA 
and UTZ.  Specifically, this relates to Starbucks’ Farmer Loans program, a program 
that receives funding from Starbucks that has invested $18,102,000 in small coffee 
enterprises across 5 countries, affecting over 14,000 farmers and their families.  
These studies confirm the sentiment within the industry87, that there are three 
categories of standards, with clear rankings for the lowest standard, the highest as 
well as second highest. I review these rankings with a survey of standards below.   
Table 7.2 Standards and Segments Ranking  
                                                
86 http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/our-services/cooperation-with-other-standards.html#2 
87 Various interviews, 2011-2013 
Rank Program Score Market 
Segment  
1 4C 5 5 
2 UTZ 4 4/3 
3 RA 3 3 
4 CAFÉ 3 2 








As shown, the general pattern between the rigor of a standard, not for 
procedural legitimacy purposes, but for social impact, follows market segments where 
more rigorous standards occupy higher market segments, a d less rigorous standards 
occupy lower, more mainstream segments. The notable exc ption is that Starbucks’ 
CAFÉ standard occupies a higher market segment rank than FLO even while the FLO 
scores higher for standards intended to serve their producers.  Yet, I raise the 
possibility that the segments themselves should be flipped.  Is specialty coffee 
targeting non-ethical consumers targeting a higher market segment than FLOs ethical 
coffee? Given that most FLO certified coffee is very much considered specialty 
coffee, the distinctions between the segments are inexact.  I seek, therefore, a more 
measurable and quantitative proxy for market segments than the qualitative 
distinctions I defined above.  
An important indicator for the ranking of market segments is price.  Higher 
market segments are higher priced and lower market segments are lower priced.  
Based on a survey of over 200 price points across the United States over a 3-year 
period from 2010 to 2013, we observe that prices, which align with market segments, 




also have a positive relationship with the quality of stringency of a standard when 
evaluated on the principle of social criteria towards farmers.   






The criticism that standards are only for the rich liberal elite does not take into 
account the mainstreaming strategies of all standards.  As observed in this chapter, 
some standards are for the rich liberal elites, and others are for mainstream 
consumers.  What is clear is that the phenomenon of multiplicity – what some 
wrongly perceive as competition, and the result of deficiencies in legitimacy – is what 
enables the expansion of a social market into consumers segments not known to be 
politically active, ethical, or “conscious.”  I determine, furthermore, that there may be 
a pattern among standards that is certainly worth exploring further in future research; 
that premium products will adopt premium standards and mainstream products will 
adopt lower standards.  I am also able to provide some preliminary observation on the 
relationship between standards and procedural legitimacy – that higher standards, 
such as Direct Trade, are not related to increased levels of procedural legitimacy. 
Rank Program Score Average 
Price/lb in USD 
1 4C 5 6.67 
2 UTZ 4 9.23 
3 RA 3 12.10 
4 CAFÉ 3 12.75 
5 FLO 2 14.71 




Instead, Direct Trade is the more ambitious standard from the coffee social market 
and is associated with the least degree of procedural legitimacy as observed in chapter 
5.  The flip side may also be true – that later standards organizations that target the 
lower market segments aim to achieve higher levels of procedural legitimacy, as is 
observed in the 4C standard. This points to a potential hypothesis that these 







I urge that behavior is pervasively a function of norms; that human norms 
interact with human goods in surprising ways; that changes in norms might be 
the best way to improve social well-being 
         Sunstein 1995, p 6 
 
How can we understand the varied, expansive and seemingly tangled world of 
voluntary standards?  If these private forms of regulation have emerged to replace 
policy in the absence of international law in a globalized world of transnational 
production, what does competition among these standards tell us about international 
private policy making? This study has made …contribu ions to the theoretical and 
empirical scholarship surrounding these questions. Fir t, I have presented and tested a 
three-stage model for the mergence of voluntary standards, which has also shed light 
into the forms of institutions that emerge after the norm cascade of the established 
norms lifecycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Cortell and Davis 2000). Second, I 
have shown that there is a pattern and logic behind t e emergence of a multiplicity of 
organizations intent on promoting a new norm in the marketplace.  Third, I have 
tested and provided an alternate perspective on the role of legitimacy and the copying 
of legitimate forms in institutions of new governance.  
The unit of measure necessary to understand the behavior of voluntary 
standards used in this study is not the individual st ndards organization, but the 
collective of standards that emerge and compete within the same norm-market nexus. 




dependency of standards, as well as the political and economic context of the 
industries they operate in.   If there is a pattern in the emergence and competition of 
voluntary standards, and we observe differences across social markets, then by 
deduction, there must be explanatory power in the character and nature of the social 
markets themselves.  
8.1 The Logic of Multiplicity 
8.1.1 Political Centralization and Differentiation 
What factors within the social market help explain d fferences in the way voluntary 
standards emerge and compete?  This study highlights two: political centralization of 
the industry within which the social market operates, and the opportunities for 
differentiation through segmentation. Greater political and economic fragmentation 
(less centralization) leads to greater multiplicity because the costs of competing with 
the existing power structures are lowered, and a variety of options are more likely to 
exist for the creation of new alliances and new standards. For standards entrepreneurs 
unsatisfied with the status quo, the costs of changing a centralized power structure are 
likely higher than starting something new in a highly decentralized social market. 
This is true even when the status quo includes organizations that adopt the principles, 
norms and procedures of multilateralism – that is to say, open, consensus based, 
multi-stakeholder governance structures. As we observed in the FT USA split from 
FLO, changing the status quo within a multi-stakeholder context can be costly and 
prohibitive, leading one sect within the FLO to splinter off and create its own 




 In a more centralized social market, dominant standards are more likely to 
align with key international organizations – firms, NGOs, INGOs, and even states – 
that wield a tremendous amount of influence and power in the industry.  It is a 
strategy that is essential to their survival, and a natural consequence of centralization 
that key actors are attracted to the gravitational pull of the large powerful players.  In 
these highly centralized power structures, new entrants are faced with the daunting 
challenge of convincing potential constituents (firms, NGOs, INGOs, or states) to 
eschew the powers-that-be in favor of an upstart. Existing centralized actors yield 
governance power over their supply chain that is illustrated in Gereffi’s ‘Captive 
Market’ scenario, in sharp contrast to Gereffi’s ‘Markets’ scenario (Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005, p 87). In the latter scnario, power asymmetries are 
low, and new entrants can compete, whereas in the former scenario, power 
asymmetries are high, discouraging political competitors.  
Political centralization does not, however, tell the whole story. Instead, if new 
entrants can develop standards for different market segments, going straight to the 
public for legitimacy and acceptance, a much more div rse, varied, and rich social 
market emerges. Markets with greater opportunities for differentiation are more likely 
to develop a pattern of greater multiplicity. Notable is that with greater opportunities 
for differentiation we see more multiplicity but not more competition.  Competition 
ensues when standards organizations compete directly with one another for the same 
public.  This can occur in highly centralized social markets, but also in less 




Multiplicity, on the other hand, is a phenomena relat d to segmentation. Where more 
opportunities for differentiation occur, more multip icity will occur, usually across 
market segments.  
Multiplicity is at the center of the confusion around voluntary standards.  If 
these market-based forms of governance are to fill the regulatory gaps left open by 
international conventions embodied in the WTO and a absence of international law, 
how can they be effective when no one clear policy/regulation/standard is set?  
Confusion persists among consumers, analysts, firms, as well as scholars of new 
governance. The case of the coffee social market demonstrates that there is a pattern 
that emerges in social markets with high multiplicity.  That is, that higher more 
stringent standards are more likely to be serving higher-end, more upscale, market 
segments, whereas less stringent standards serve mainstre m markets, often not even 
targeting the ‘ethical consumer.’   
8.2 The Logic of Market Integration 
8.2.1 How Social Markets tend towards market dynamics 
Scholars have also described legitimacy as the primary source of value and 
differentiation for non-state market governance of v luntary clubs (prakash and 
potoski), where competition among standards as evidence of a battle for legitimacy 
(cashore et al); where non-universal legitimacy provides an opening where other 
standards can compete.  In this scenario, the eventual outcome of a successful 




organization. One key facet of legitimacy is examined in this study is procedural, 
where an organization abides by the principles, norms and procedures adopted by the 
international multilateral organizations. These organizations, aware and concerned of 
the absence of democratic levers at the internationl level, have created an 
organizational form of representative governance, where the states, NGOs, and other 
stakeholders act to represent their constituents within the INGO.  They do so through 
the open, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder environment of the INGO. Scholars 
have noted how other international organizations copy this form through a process of 
‘mimetic isomorphism’’ or ‘‘mimicking the most prominent or secure entities in the 
field’’ (Suchman 1995, p. 589).    
 This study has observed that there is very little evidence that these elements of 
procedural legitimacy are a) consistently copied, or b) explain the emergence of 
multiplicity or competition.  Instead, legitimacy is a key ingredient in two situations: 
First, at the genesis of the social market, emerging standards have to contend with the 
tensions that arise when the status quo is challenged, and rely on their internal 
legitimacy to demonstrate the power of their new norm-set.  Once the social market is 
created, through, among other things, the battles for legitimacy of the trailblazing 
norm entrepreneurs and the standards organizations that they work through or with, 
the entire norm-set benefits from a new more legitima e status.  Future standards 
organizations may, or may not, need to refight this battle.  This is most clearly 
exemplified in the case of Direct Trade coffee and Thread International, where these 




believing that their success in the marketplace will lead to greater social and 
environmental impact – an indicator of a true social business venture. Second, 
legitimacy is sought by standards organizations that do not seek legitimacy directly 
from the consumer through branding initiative, including ecolabeling.  This is 
observed in the example of the 4C coffee standard that mimicked principles and 
procedures of multilateralism, even after the coffee social market was well 
established and had legitimacy in the eyes of consumers, states, and NGOs.  
 This study has also shown that there are patterns of emergence within the 
social market across and within organizations. Namely, that social markets and the 
organizations within them will first emerge within the context of social advocacy and 
activism dominated by the world of NGOs and INGOs, but gradually transform and 
immerse themselves into the world of markets, market incentives, and market actors. 
This observation follows evidence that latter-stage voluntary standards tend towards 
greater adoption of market dynamics with less reliance on the procedures, processes 
and principles of multilateralism and political legitimacy.  This means that more of 
the leadership will be come from traditional busines backgrounds – with MBAs and 
experience in large corporations – rather than background in advocacy.  It will also 
mean that their strategies will be focused on market penetration, branding and product 
quality rather than on the development of standards, certification, or verification.  
While transparency remains a central element in the development of social markets, 
standards organizations believe they can achieve the necessary market penetration – a 




with Direct Trade in the coffee industry, and Thread International in the ethical 
clothing social market. Both these organizations sit on the high end of both standards 
and consumer segments, have and continue to be recognized by advocacy and activist 
groups, but have full eschewed traditional processes and procedures of governance 
and certification popularized by the early movement of standards organizations. 
The importance of non-market based advocacy groups and actors are critical 
in creating the normative and institutional foundations for future social market 
growth. Yet, as these markets increasingly adopt the norms and social goals of early 
entrepreneurs, conventional market rules and pressur  begin to overtake the social 
market. An increasingly market-based dynamic does not necessarily mean an end to 
social norms, nor does it necessarily result in the falt ring of social standards. Instead, 
latter stage development of social markets is expected to show a fragmentation of 
standards that are increasingly aligned with the original goals of advocacy groups.   
Powerful actors continue to leverage their supply chain dominance, while alternative 
governance systems will struggle to provide choices for increasingly segmented 
markets. 
These observations shed light on the growing movement around corporate 
social responsibility and place the critique of greenwashing or fairwashing within a 
larger context of social market growth.   The importance of this study can be 
summarized in these few lines: if positive social norms are to change market actors 
and their production methods, they will do so when the political and economic logic 




proper institutions that promote this alignment must exist, and the environment that 
foster emergence of these proper institutions must be promoted. Therein lies the role 
of successful social advocacy groups, states, NGO, and policy-makers alike. 
Notable also from the analysis is that despite the early stages of social market 
development that tends to be dominated by social advocates, NGOs, and activists, 
latter stages take on a decidedly market-based flavor. Competition ensues based on 
market realities, with political legitimacy taking a back-seat to standards competition 
once the desired level of legitimacy is achieved.  In other words, once standards pass 
a threshold of legitimacy, they can not be discredited based on this variable, instead 
competing systems emerge to link the level of standard and legitimacy to the 
appropriate market segment.  Just as any market offring is segmented based on the 
appropriate quality-price combination, so too will standards be segmented for the 
appropriate market segment, with quality of standards varying. The segmenting 
scenario, which is one observed in the coffee and wood markets, is that higher 
standards fetch price premiums when efforts are made to brand products beyond mere 
certification.  Lower standards will exist for larger market segments that may want to 
purchase ethically sourced products but are les willing to pay a premium for them.  
This segmentation is an important observation and a innovation is political 
preference matching: consumers can essentially select th ir desired level of ethical 
standard based on, among other things, pricing. This moves away from the need to 
achieve population wide consensus and allows the evolution of segmented policy 





The conclusions and observations of this study provide hints to a larger pattern within 
the disparate and confusing state of affairs of new governance mechanisms in the 
global political economy. These insights and implications are elaborated on below. 
1. The citizen-consumer is a powerful actor in global governance. 
The traditional and dichotomous relationship between state and market is not an 
appropriate rubric to understanding the governance of corporations’ means of 
production.  In the platonic version of markets, prefe ences are well ordered based on 
the transparent and readily available information on production methods and quality. 
Prices follow from these preferences and accurately ref ect a balance of supply and 
demand. In other words, the platonic version of markets necessarily includes social 
markets, or rather: all markets are social markets. Real markets are far from perfect 
markets, but in their capacity to increase incorporati n of social preferences, social 
markets nudge regular markets slowly towards greate efficiency.  In these newly 
influenced markets, the citizen-consumer plays a key role in tempering the tendencies 
of otherwise unhindered capitalism.   
 Broadening the lens somewhat, the citizen-consumer op n to the door to a 
hitherto faintly studied phenomenon of political consumerism. Voting with your 
money is an unrealized ideal without the proper organizational platforms that align 
intensive and extensive accountabilities, increase transparency, and ensure a 




imperfect and inchoate, provide an example of the typ  of institutions that can help 
bridge the divide between our political and economic selves.  
2. Private Regulation is not uniform or universal, but also not disorderly. 
Political scientists and advocates should not expect rivate governance to work like 
state policies. Standards systems need not have the ambition of altering the entire 
market, instead they must accept their role as one part of the complex institutional 
regime required for an eventual cascade of a norm, and conversion of an entire 
market. If there is to be a semblance of internatiol law by private regulation, it will 
exist as a mosaic of varying standards, rules, and regulations.  The result is a self-
organizing political system within and across social markets where international 
regulation – while helpful – is not necessary for the creation of a robust, tempered, 
repeatable, and somewhat predictable governance regime.  The gestalt perspective on 
the multitude of social markets constitutes a polycentric system, understood as a 
system “of many decision centers having limited andutonomous prerogatives and 
operating under an overarching set of rules.”(Aligica and Tarko 2012, p 237) The 
ability of standards entrepreneurs to create an appropriate set of standards for a 
segment of the population that is otherwise ignored, as evidenced in the segmenting 
of coffee standards, stands to be regarded as one of the unique self-correcting 
attributes of social markets.  Ostrom discusses the phenomenon of self-correction as a 
central feature of polycentricity (Aligica and Tarko 2012, p 246).  
While all institutions are subject to takeover by opp rtunistic individuals and to 
the potential for perverse dynamics, a political system that has multiple centers 
of power at differing scales provides more opportunity for citizens and their 




authority and outcomes. Thus, polycentric systems are more likely than 
monocentric systems to provide incentives leading to self-organized, self-
corrective institutional change. (E. Ostrom 1998) 
The citizens and innovators that intervene in order to correct these outcomes and 
maldistributions are, in the case of social markets, standards entrepreneurs discussed 
below.   
3. The standards entrepreneur is an important political actor. 
The entrepreneur is an agent of innovation who “incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within” (Schumpeter 1947, 31) – an important and necessary 
agent in capitalist societies. The standards entrepren ur is also an innovator and agent 
of change, but not merely in the way that Schumpeter described entrepreneurs.  They 
are not merely introducing new commodities, new processes of production, or new 
markets, but are presenting new policies, governance mechanisms, and regulations. 
They do so with two key goals in mind: to capitalize on market opportunities, and to 
expand the presence, power and availability of new norm-sets.  These joint 
motivations represent a new hybrid actor consistent with the hybrid nature and 
character of social markets and their principle organizations.  The end result is the 
proliferation of rules and regulations distinctly shaped according to the political and 
economic preferences of various constituencies (consumers).   
These standards entrepreneurs achieve outcomes that correct for the problem 
popularly stated surrounding ethical production: that these premium products and 
services cater to a small portion of the population, specifically liberal elite consumers 




market through the 4C is evidence that standards entrepreneurs can extend the reach 
of ethical production beyond the narrow population of premium-paying liberals to the 
wider population, whether these consumers know or care about environmental 
standards. 
4. States and Private standards can both reduce negative externalities, but they use 
opposing and inverse mechanisms to do so. 
Environmental and social costs of dispersed transnational production of certain goods 
are considered negative externalities: costs imposed by market transactions on 
unrelated third parties.  Because these costs are not incorporated into the price of the 
product, externalities are in contradiction to an effici nt market where prices 
accurately reflect all information about the product, and this information is 
transparently available to consumers and incorporated into their decision making. 
Since neither companies nor consumers pay for negativ  externalities, product pricing 
does not reflect the actual cost of production. Themarginal benefit of producing and 
selling the product is higher than the marginal cost of producing the product, resulting 
in an oversupply of products that cause negative ext rnalities, and an oversupply of 
negative externalities.   
Given the inaccurate appropriation of costs towards product pricing, and the 
lack of transparency surrounding these costs, externalities create disequilibrium in the 
market place, and are considered, even by the staunchest of free-market advocates, a 
failure of efficient markets and an opportunity forgovernment intervention through 
regulation.  How does government regulation solve th  problem of market 




Specifically, government regulation may choose from the following four policy 
options. First, assign property rights. This would give property owners the right to 
seek retribution from culprit firms. For example, if a company is polluting a river, the 
government can assign property rights to local townspeople who would suffer from 
the pollution. This would allow the townspeople to sue the company for polluting 
their property.  Second, calculate and impose limits on the amount of negative 
externalities a company is allowed to impose.  Third, tax the production of related 
products. Finally, sell permits allowing firms to impose negative externalities.   
All of these methods have one thing in common: they increase the cost of 
producing a product that imposes negative social or environmental costs; costs that 
will undeniably be passed on to the consumer. The net affect: consumers pay more 
for products that impose higher negative externalities.   
Standards act in the opposite way.  Instead of increasing pricing on products 
with the highest negative externalities, they increase the price on products with the 
lowest negative externalities. By mobilizing appropriate brand strategies, and tapping 
into higher end ethical consumers, firms can extract higher profits from these higher 
priced ethical products, motivating firms to reallocate resources towards producing 
more of these products.  
This observation lies at the very heart of market-based governance, and 
provides an incredibly interesting foil to public policy and state-based initiatives.  
How can this dynamic be interpreted within the context of public policy and tax 




themselves to a certain policy.  And, since there are multiple standards to choose 
from, they can choose to support one policy (standard) versus another.  Second, this 
‘tax’ is a progressive tax where the wealthiest consumers may choose to pay the most 
for the ‘best’ policy, and lower income consumers may choose a less stringent 
standard. 
5. Voluntary standards decentralize markets. 
Standards motivate the increased decentralization of power within a marketplace. 
When power is concentrated in the hands of a few firms, consumers have fewer 
choice and state policies can be captured by the power and influence of dominant 
firms.  Voluntary standards encourage the segmentatio  of markets by going directly 
to the consumer for power and influence.  The case of the coffee social market 
provides evidence for how the power of the once-dominant 5 largest roasters can be 
challenged by the introduction of new market segments for ethical coffee.  When new 
ethical market segments are created, smaller firms can gain advantage over dominant 
firms by specializing in the production and supply of ethical products.  In the coffee 
market this is exemplified by the growth and expansio  of intermediary roasters, and 
new coffee brands focused on the provision of fairly traded coffee. An entire industry 
of specialized coffee outside the dominant Starbucks was able to establish itself by 
sourcing beans from these alternative intermediary suppliers, roasters, and brands.  
While not every social market develops like the coffee market, there is place 
for this increased segmentation and decentralization in other markets as well. Thread 




fabric for clothing companies, has emerged within a political space dominated by the 
Sustainable Apparel Coalition, the Fair Labor Association and large clothing brands, 
by developing a brand uniquely focused on sustainable sourcing.  The same can be 
accomplished even in the most concentrated industries by connecting new products 
with artisanal producers.  Even the diamond industry can be decentralized if a seller 
of diamonds chose to collaborate directly with artisanal diamond miners.  
8.4 Limitations and Recommendations 
This study has contributed to scholarly understanding of market-based governance 
mechanisms in two important ways: First, to construct and verify a framework that 
explains the emergence of non-state institutions that emerge in response to new 
normative demands in the global public sphere. Second, by uncovering the logic 
behind these non-state forms of governance, develop a model by which we can 
understand patterns of multiplicity within social markets. While it has contributed to 
our understanding, the study is limited by a number of factors that future research can 
help remedy.  
Social Markets are not static.  They are constantly changing.  Even the factors that 
help explain the patterns of change within a social m rket can change over time. This 
is observed in the case of the coffee and clothing social market where a once-highly 
centralized social market was fragmented because of that industry’s response to new 
voluntary standards.  It was the success of fair trde, along with the rise of the 
specialty coffee industry popularized by Starbucks that allowed for other standards to 




coffee social market, that industry was highly centralized, with 5 dominant roasters 
owning most brands and imposing their power on a captive supply chain. Local 
coyotes purchased beans from poor farmers with little insight into actual market 
conditions maintained the status quo of power centralization to the advantage of 
established market actors. This, along with the highly centralized International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA), which collapsed in 1989, reflected a highly centralized industry.  
The state of the social market changed, which means the factors that help predict the 
patterns of emergence also changed.   
Deeper case-based analysis for more social markets will help isolate factors that 
influence change across social markets. A tremendous amount of insight was gained 
from having gone deep into the coffee social market.  Observations about the 
motivations of existing voluntary standards, the decision-making processes of 
potential adherents, and the mindset of the social entrepreneur as they evaluate 
whether or not to ally with an existing standard, or start their own, are highly 
informative in developing a model for social market development. This study has 
aimed to validate the initial three-stage model using the coffee market, then develop a 
model to uncover and predict the patterns of multiplicity across social markets.  This 
model can be refined and further understood by going deep into other social market 
cases as well.    
Create a dataset of over 400 voluntary standards with details surrounding key 
variables to further test hypotheses from this study. The case of the coffee social 




market integration, b) eschew principles of legitimacy and advocacy, except in the 
case where no branding opportunities exist, and c) that standards segment according 
to market segment, where the higher more stringent standards cater to higher-end 
consumers, and lower less stringent baseline standards c ter to mainstream markets. 
These hypotheses form the core argument to the first primary thesis of this study, that 
social markets evolve from advocacy and activist based organizations, to hybrid 
actors subsumed by market dynamics. A large-n statistical analysis of these claims 
would be helpful for further testing, and would also enable the isolation of key factors 
of change – those variables that are most influential w thin a statistical model of 
behavior.  
As previously discussed, another avenue for a global an lysis of all social 
market behaviors, researchers can tally of all voluntary standards across the globe 
according to centralization and differentiation would allow us to see how many 
standards exist in each quadrant. This allows reseach rs to further assess if greater 
multiplicity occurs as expected: the greatest number of standards in quadrant IV, 
followed by quadrant I, then quadrant II, and the fewest standards organizations 
occupying quadrant II.   
 Another next step is to begin stripping away the factors that constitute the two 
key variables of centralization and differentiation t  see which factors most influence 
the outcomes observed.  Could it be that industry fragmentation is far less relevant 
than who the original political actors were in creating a standard?  Or is the opposite 




important in determining social market outcomes than the economic conditions of the 
market, specifically the fragmentation of that industry?  Or is industry fragmentation 
too closely related to the type of product being certifi d, in which case the relevant 
factor is not the industry as a whole, but the product being produced?  In the end, 
while politics and markets both play a role in social markets, does one influence 
eventual outcomes much more than another?  Is there an ‘economic realist’ 
perspective that suggests that it all comes down to profits, and the structure, norms, or 
strategies of social advocates merely noise that hardly influences the true power 
doctrines of markets – that big business wealth and dominance always wins? 
Well-ordered social markets enhance individual liberty and freedom by 
allowing consumers and investors to advance their social values in the marketplace.  
“From a different perspective, often thought to be in tension with the first, well-
ordered social markets also extend the reach of democracy and popular sovereignty.  
They constitute new, potentially quite powerful, mechanisms for expressing and 
aggregating civic, social, and political preferences. Well-ordered social markets 
supplement conventional channels of political expression and popular control by 
creating distinctive arenas of governance in which citizens participate directly, 
through their market choices, in influencing the behavior of powerful economic 
entities often resistant to other forms of social control.” (Fung 2002, 150) 
This is one perspective that can be derived from this study. The other, less 
optimistic, was expressed by Robert O’Brien (2000) that “while social movements 




dominated by the extensive formal and informal contacts of transnational business 
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